This case has been cited 11 times or more.
|
2013-01-09 |
ABAD, J. |
||||
| The evidence on record clearly established that appellant Chua was in possession of the plastic bags containing prohibited drugs without the requisite authority. Applying Section 3(j), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court,[11] a disputable presumption arises that she is the owner of the bag and its contents. It may be rebutted by contrary proof that the accused did not in fact exercise power and control over the thing in question, and did not intend to do so. The burden of evidence is thus shifted to the possessor to explain absence of animus possidendi.[12] Here, Chua failed to present evidence to rebut the presumption. She claims that she was a victim of frame-up and extortion by the narcotics agents of the NBI. This defense is viewed with disfavor for it can be easily concocted.[13] The defense of frame- up, often imputed to police officers, requires strong proof when offered as a defense, because of the presumption that public officers acted in the regular performance of their official duties.[14] | |||||
|
2011-11-23 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
||||
| Furthermore, when Legaspi testified in court, her defense was one of denial and not instigation. While instigation is a positive defense, it partakes of the nature of a confession and avoidance.[33] In instigation, the crime is actually performed by the accused, except that the intent originates from the mind of the inducer.[34] Thus, it is incompatible with the defense of denial, where the theory is that the accused did not commit the offense at all. Instigation and denial, therefore, cannot be present concurrently. Besides, this Court has consistently held that: [B]are denials are weak forms of defenses, especially in this case where the accused-appellant's testimony was not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. The uncorroborated denial by the accused-appellant cannot prevail over the testimonies of the arresting officer and the poseur-buyer, who both testified on affirmative matters. | |||||
|
2009-10-16 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
||||
| As to the claim of instigation, where the police or its agent lures the accused into committing the offense in order to prosecute him and which is deemed contrary to public policy and considered an absolutory cause,[45] there is nothing in the records which clearly and convincingly shows that appellant was instigated by the informant to sell shabu to SPO1 Indunan. What is apparent therein is that the informant merely introduced SPO1 Indunan to appellant as a user and buyer of shabu and that the informant did not in any way allure or persuade appellant to sell shabu to SPO1 Indunan.[46] Also, after such introduction, it was appellant who hastily asked SPO1 Indunan how much worth of shabu the latter would want to buy.[47] This obviously manifests that the idea to sell shabu originated from appellant without any instigation from SPO1 Indunan or the informant. Indeed, what have transpired in the instant case was a legitimate buy-bust operation and not instigation. A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment which in recent years has been accepted as a valid means of arresting violators of the Dangerous Drugs Law. It is commonly employed by police officers as an effective way of apprehending law offenders in the act of committing a crime. In a buy-bust operation, the idea to commit a crime originates from the offender, without anybody inducing or prodding him to commit the offense. | |||||
|
2009-09-04 |
BRION, J. |
||||
| The settled rule is that the presentation of an informant in an illegal drugs case is not essential for conviction nor is it indispensable for a successful prosecution because his testimony would be merely corroborative and cumulative.[62] Moreover, informants are usually not presented in court because of the need to hide their identities and preserve their invaluable service to the police.[63] Thus, we held in People v. Boco:[64] | |||||
|
2008-07-09 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
||||
| Again we cannot agree with the appellant. Important in a prosecution for the illegal sale of prohibited drugs is proof that the transaction or sale actually took place and the presentation in court of the corpus delicti,[23] which has two elements: (1) proof of the occurrence of a certain event and (2) a person's criminal responsibility for the act.[24] Here, the prosecution has adequately shown that an illegal sale of drugs took place between the police and the appellant in a valid entrapment scheme. The prosecution actually presented during the trial of the case, the illegal substance and the payment seized from the appellant's possession. | |||||
|
2004-02-16 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
||||
| Appellant's shift in the theory of his defense from alibi and outright denial to instigation or inducement does not aid his cause. This theory of instigation or inducement deserves scant consideration. Instigation or inducement is committed when law enforcers lure an accused into committing the offense in order to prosecute him.[41] It is contrary to public policy and considered an absolutory cause.[42] To substantiate such defense, however, the evidence must be clear and convincing. No such proof, however, was presented by the defense. | |||||
|
2003-08-05 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
||||
| In the prosecution for the sale of regulated drugs, like shabu, what is material is the proof that the transaction or sale transpired, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti.[17] Corpus delicti is the body or substance of the crime, and establishes the fact that a crime has been actually committed.[18] It has two elements, namely: (1) proof of the occurrence of a certain event; and (2) some person's criminal responsibility for the act.[19] | |||||
|
2002-12-17 |
PANGANIBAN, J. |
||||
| certain event and (2) a person's criminal responsibility for the act.[17] Further, in a prosecution for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Law, a case becomes a contest of credibility of witnesses and their testimonies. In such a situation, this Court generally relies upon the assessment by the trial court, which had the distinct advantage of | |||||
|
2000-07-24 |
DAVIDE JR., C.J. |
||||
| officer has been accepted by the seller.[10] It has been consistently ruled that the absence of marked money does not create a hiatus in the evidence for the prosecution as long as the sale of the dangerous drugs is adequately proven and the drug subject of the transaction is presented before the court. In every prosecution for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, what is material and indispensable is the submission of proof that the sale of illicit drug took place between the seller and the poseur-buyer.[11] Thus, contrary to the theory of CAPARAS, proof of actual payment of money is not an indispensable requisite to support a conviction for sale of prohibited drug. What is material in the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence.[12] In the case at bar, the prosecution was able to prove the fact of sale. The poseur-buyer Jamisolamin declared that on 19 April 1997 CAPARAS agreed to sell and deliver bricks of marijuana at P1,000 per kilo. On 29 April 1997, CAPARAS, pursuant to said agreement, transported | |||||
|
2000-02-17 |
PANGANIBAN, J. |
||||
| In every prosecution, the guilt of the accused has to be established invariably by proof beyond reasonable doubt.[22] The elements of the crime must be shown to exist and be adequately proven. As we stated in People v. Boco,[23] what is "material to a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence." | |||||
|
2000-02-17 |
PANGANIBAN, J. |
||||
| Appellants' behavior during the entrapment showed that there was conspiracy between them and a third person who got away with the buy-bust money. It is an established rule that direct proof is not essential to establish conspiracy, as it may be inferred from the acts of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, all of which indubitably point to or indicate a joint purpose, a concert of action and a community of interest.[30] | |||||