This case has been cited 7 times or more.
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2008-07-23 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| Grave abuse of discretion defies exact definition, but it generally refers to capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.[17] | |||||
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2007-06-08 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| Basic is the rule that the writ of prohibition is an extraordinary remedy to prevent the unlawful and oppressive exercise of legal authority and to provide for a fair and orderly administration of justice.[9] It is available only when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, and when the proceedings are done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. The petitioner must allege in his petition and establish facts to show that any other existing remedy is not speedy or adequate.[10] A remedy is plain, speedy and adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of that judgment and the acts of the tribunal or inferior court.[11] Further, the writ will not lie to correct errors of judgment but only errors of jurisdiction. As long as the tribunal acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its discretion will amount to nothing more than mere errors of judgment which are correctible by a timely appeal.[12] In determining whether a tribunal acted in grave abuse of discretion, mere abuse of discretion is not enough. There must be grave abuse of discretion as where the tribunal exercised its power in an arbitrary or despotic manner, by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent or gross as would amount to an evasion, or virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act in contemplation of law.[13] | |||||
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2007-02-21 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| Second, has there been a grave abuse of discretion by the Court of Appeals? Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in other words, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, and it must be so patent or gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law.[42] Certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion is an extraordinary remedy. Its use is confined to extraordinary cases wherein the action of the inferior court is wholly void.[43] Its aim is to keep the inferior court within the parameters of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[44] No grave abuse of discretion may be attributed to the court simply because of its alleged misappreciation of facts and evidence.[45] While certiorari may be used to correct an abusive acquittal, the petitioner in such extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the lower court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice.[46] | |||||
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2006-08-28 |
PUNO, J. |
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| In order that a judgment or order of acquittal may be successfully challenged in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, the petitioner must prove that the trial court, in acquitting the accused, committed not merely errors of judgment, but grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[67] No such grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to respondent Judge in dismissing the instant cases for the denial of private respondents' right to speedy trial. | |||||
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2004-02-24 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| In a long array of cases,[6] we dismissed similar petitions for erroneous application of the extraordinary writ of certiorari. Specifically in the case of People v. Maquiling,[7] we made the following observation:It is quite obvious from the foregoing allegations that petitioner imputed grave abuse of discretion to Respondent Court because of the latter's supposed misappreciation and wrongful assessment of factual evidence. However, as earlier stressed, the present recourse is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. It is a fundamental aphorism in law that a review of facts and evidence is not the province of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, which is extra ordinem beyond the ambit of appeal. Stated elsewise, factual matters cannot normally be inquired into by the Supreme Court in a certiorari proceeding. This Court cannot be tasked to go over the proofs presented by the parties and analyze, assess and weigh them again, in order to ascertain if the trial and the appellate courts were correct in according superior credit to this or that piece of evidence of one party or the other. The mere fact that a court erroneously decides a case does not necessarily deprived it of jurisdiction. Thus, assuming arguendo that a court commits a mistake in its judgment, the error does not vitiate the decision, considering that it has jurisdiction over the case. Although Maquiling does not foreclose availment of the remedy of certiorari to correct an erroneous acquittal, the petitioner must clearly demonstrate that the lower court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice. In the words of Maquiling: "if the petition, regardless of its nomenclature, merely calls for an ordinary review of the findings of the court a quo, the constitutional right against double jeopardy would be violated. Such recourse is tantamount to converting the petition for certiorari into an appeal, contrary to the express injunction of the Constitution, the Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence on double jeopardy." | |||||
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2004-01-15 |
PANGANIBAN, J. |
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| In any event, all is not lost for appellant. While she did not raise any other modifying circumstances that would alter her penalty, we deem it proper to evaluate and appreciate in her favor circumstances that mitigate her criminal liability. It is a hornbook doctrine that an appeal in a criminal case opens it wholly for review on any issue, including that which has not been raised by the parties.[69] | |||||
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2002-01-10 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| In a criminal case, an appeal throws the whole case wide open for review. Issues whether raised or not by the parties may be resolved by the appellate court.[16] However, considering the assigned errors, we find that the issues for resolution here pertain to (1) the assessment of credibility of the witnesses; (2) the presence of treachery as a qualifying circumstance, and of defense of relatives as a justifying circumstance; and (3) the propriety of conviction of the appellant for murder and for frustrated homicide, and of the corresponding sentences imposed. | |||||