This case has been cited 4 times or more.
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2000-12-04 |
PER CURIAM |
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| It is this Court's common observation drawn from judicial experience that in most rape cases the criminal responsibility of the offender almost always depends on the declaration of the complainant considering that the crime of rape is not usually committed in the presence of witnesses.[9] Like in many other rape cases, the guilt or innocence of the accused depends to a large extent on the truthfulness of the offended party's testimony. It is therefore axiomatic in rape cases that the testimony of the offended party be subjected to a careful scrutiny. This particular case is not an exception. In ascertaining whether to believe the version of the prosecution or that of the defense, this Court calls to mind the well-entrenched principle that the conclusion of the trial court as regards the assessment of the credibility of witnesses is generally viewed as correct and is accorded the highest respect considering that it is in a better position to discern and weigh the conflicting testimonies of the witnesses during trial. There are exceptions to this rule, such as when the evaluation was reached arbitrarily or when the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which if considered would affect the result of the case.[10] None of the exceptions is present in this case. | |||||
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2000-12-04 |
PER CURIAM |
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| At the core of FRANCISCO's first assigned error is the assessment of the credibility of GLENDA. When credibility is in issue, settled is the rule that this Court generally defers to the findings of the trial court considering that it is in a better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment during trial. There are exceptions to this rule, such as when the evaluation was reached arbitrarily or when the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which if considered would affect the result of the case.[20] Unfortunately for FRANCISCO, none of these exceptions appears on the records of these cases. On the contrary, its own careful assessment of the testimony of GLENDA convinces the Court with moral certainty that FRANCISCO raped GLENDA as charged. GLENDA's candid and straightforward testimony seals the truth because she has remained firm and enduring in every phase of the probing direct examination and very trying cross-examination. It is doctrinally settled that the testimony of a rape victim alone, if found credible, would be competent to convict the accused.[21] This Court has observed in many cases that when a victim says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has been committed.[22] | |||||
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2000-07-05 |
GONZAGA-REYES, J. |
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| The cited provision is one of the many provisions in the Rules of Court that serves to implement the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the charges against him. Relevant to this case is the phrase "a person of common understanding," which has its origin in this jurisdiction in the phrase "a person of ordinary intelligence".[44] | |||||