This case has been cited 12 times or more.
2016-01-20 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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Petitioner Diaz protested the outcome of this resolution by filing a special civil action for certiorari with this Court, on two occasions. When G.R. No. 88834 was dismissed for non-compliance with Circular No. 1-88,[35] petitioner Diaz re-filed her petition, raising exactly the same issues, and this was docketed as G.R. No. 89207.[36] | |||||
2016-01-20 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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On August 31, 1989, this Court issued a Resolution,[37] dismissing petitioner Diaz's petition in G.R. No. 89207. This Court noted the Ombudsman's findings and observations and found them to be supported by substantial evidence. | |||||
2015-11-10 |
PERLAS-BERNABE, J. |
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It is well-settled that an act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.[311] It has also been held that "grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower court or tribunal patently violates the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence."[312] | |||||
2014-08-06 |
PEREZ, J. |
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Our discussion on the meaning of grave abuse of discretion in Yu v. Judge Reyes-Carpio[12] citing Beluso v. Commission on Elections[13] and J.L. Bernardo Construction v. CA[14] is instructive: The term "grave abuse of discretion" has a specific meaning. An act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction." The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an "evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility." Furthermore, the use of a petition for certiorari is restricted only to "truly extraordinary cases wherein the act of the lower court or quasi-judicial body is wholly void." From the foregoing definition, it is clear that the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 can only strike an act down for having been done with grave abuse of discretion if the petitioner could manifestly show that such act was patent and gross. x x x. | |||||
2014-04-23 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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"Grave abuse of discretion" is well-defined and not an amorphous concept that may easily be manipulated to suit one's purpose.[45] The Court gave the following comprehensive definition of said term in Yu v. Reyes-Carpio[46]: The term "grave abuse of discretion" has a specific meaning. An act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction." The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an "evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility." Furthermore, the use of a petition for certiorari is restricted only to "truly extraordinary cases wherein the act of the lower court or quasi-judicial body is wholly void." From the foregoing definition, it is clear that the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 can only strike an act down for having been done with grave abuse of discretion if the petitioner could manifestly show that such act was patent and gross. x x x. (Citations omitted.) | |||||
2014-02-18 |
LEONEN, J. |
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The stay order and appointment of a rehabilitation receiver dated July 13, 2004 is an "extraordinary, preliminary, ex parte remed[y]."[59] The effectivity period of a stay order is only "from the date of its issuance until dismissal of the petition or termination of the rehabilitation proceedings."[60] It is not a final disposition of the case. It is an interlocutory order defined as one that "does not finally dispose of the case, and does not end the Court's task of adjudicating the parties' contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as regards each other, but obviously indicates that other things remain to be done by the Court."[61] | |||||
2013-09-24 |
PERLAS-BERNABE, J. |
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An act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.[28] It is wellsettled that the abuse of discretion to be qualified as "grave" must be so patent or gross as to constitute an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty or to act at all in contemplation of law.[29] In this relation, case law states that not every error in the proceedings, or every erroneous conclusion of law or fact, constitutes grave abuse of discretion.[30] The degree of gravity, as above-described, must be met. | |||||
2013-09-11 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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There are considerable differences between an ordinary appeal and a petition for certiorari which have been exhaustively discussed by this Court in countless cases. The remedy for errors of judgment, whether based on the law or the facts of the case or on the wisdom or legal soundness of a decision, is an ordinary appeal.[21] In contrast, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is an original action designed to correct errors of jurisdiction, defined to be those "in which the act complained of was issued by the court, officer, or quasi-judicial body without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack of in excess of jurisdiction."[22] A court or tribunal can only be considered to have acted with grave abuse of discretion if its exercise of judgment was so whimsical and capricious as to be equivalent to a lack of jurisdiction. The abuse must be extremely patent and gross that it would amount to an "evasion of a positive duty or to virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility."[23] | |||||
2013-08-28 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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Where a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court alleges grave abuse of discretion, the petitioner should establish that the respondent court or tribunal acted in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of its jurisdiction as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.[33] This is so because "grave abuse of discretion" is well-defined and not an amorphous concept that may easily be manipulated to suit one's purpose. In this connection, Yu v. Judge Reyes-Carpio[34] is instructive:The term "grave abuse of discretion" has a specific meaning. An act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction." The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an "evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility." Furthermore, the use of a petition for certiorari is restricted only to "truly extraordinary cases wherein the act of the lower court or quasi-judicial body is wholly void." From the foregoing definition, it is clear that the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 can only strike an act down for having been done with grave abuse of discretion if the petitioner could manifestly show that such act was patent and gross. x x x. (Citations omitted.) | |||||
2013-08-07 |
PERLAS-BERNABE, J. |
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It is a standing jurisprudential rule that not every error in the proceedings, or every erroneous conclusion of law or fact, constitutes grave abuse of discretion.[43] An act of a court or tribunal can only be considered to be tainted with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.[44] In order to be qualified as "grave," the abuse of discretion must be so patent or gross as to constitute an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty or to act at all in contemplation of law.[45] Finding that this characterization does not fit the CTA's exercise of discretion in this case, the Court holds that no grave abuse of discretion attended its grant of KCTMPC's motion to release. | |||||
2013-08-07 |
PERLAS-BERNABE, J. |
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In fine, based on the above-stated reasons, the Court holds that no grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the MTC as correctly found by the RTC. It is well-settled that an act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction." The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an "evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility."[35] Consequently, the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 46400 for lack of probable cause is hereby sustained. | |||||
2013-07-31 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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Where a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court alleges grave abuse of discretion, the petitioner should establish that the respondent court or tribunal acted in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of its jurisdiction as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.[31] This is so because "grave abuse of discretion" is well- defined and not an amorphous concept that may easily be manipulated to suit one's purpose. In this connection, Yu v. Judge Reyes-Carpio[32] is instructive:The term "grave abuse of discretion" has a specific meaning. An act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction." The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an "evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility." Furthermore, the use of a petition for certiorari is restricted only to "truly extraordinary cases wherein the act of the lower court or quasi-judicial body is wholly void." From the foregoing definition, it is clear that the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 can only strike an act down for having been done with grave abuse of discretion if the petitioner could manifestly show that such act was patent and gross. x x x. (Citations omitted.) |