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CEFERINO PADUA v. SANTIAGO RANADA

This case has been cited 7 times or more.

	GR No. 174788 2013-04-11	SPECIAL AUDIT TEAM v. CA SERENO, C.J.
True enough, questions of fact require evidentiary processes, the "calibration of the evidence, the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and the relevance of surrounding circumstances, and the probability of specific situations,"[54] especially "[i]f the query requires x x x the existence or relevance of surrounding circumstances and their relation to each other, the issue in that query is factual."[55] Generally, these questions of fact cannot be decided by a petition for prohibition under Rule 65,[56] because the rule applies to jurisdictional flaws brought about by lack, excess, or grave abuse of discretion.[57]
	GR No. 169704 2010-11-17	ALBERT TENG v. ALFREDO S. PAHAGAC BRION, J.
By disallowing reconsideration of the VA's decision, Section 7, Rule XIX of DO 40-03 and Section 7 of the 2005 Procedural Guidelines went directly against the legislative intent behind Article 262-A of the Labor Code. These rules deny the VA the chance to correct himself[40] and compel the courts of justice to prematurely intervene with the action of an administrative agency entrusted with the adjudication of controversies coming under its special knowledge, training and specific field of expertise. In this era of clogged court dockets, the need for specialized administrative agencies with the special knowledge, experience and capability to hear and determine promptly disputes on technical matters or intricate questions of facts, subject to judicial review, is indispensable.[41] In Industrial Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[42] we ruled that relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court.[43]
	GR No. 166910 2010-10-19	ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO v. TOLL REGULATORY BOARD VELASCO JR., J.
The fact that P.D. 1112 partakes of a martial law issuance does not per se provide an objectionable feature to the decree, albeit it may be argued with some plausibility that then President Marcos intended to have the final say as to who shall act as the toll operators of the Luzon expressways. Be that as it may, "all proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, and acts promulgated, issued, or done by the former President (Ferdinand E. Marcos) are part of the law of the land, and shall remain valid, legal, binding, and effective, unless modified, revoked or superseded by subsequent proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, or other acts of the President."[83] To emphasize, Padua v. Ranada cited Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, quoting that: The Court wryly observes that during the past dictatorship, every presidential issuance, by whatever name it was called, had the force and effect of law because it came from President Marcos. Such are the ways of despots. Hence, it is futile to argue ... that LOI 474 could not have repealed P.D. No. 27 because the former was only a letter of instruction. The important thing is that it was issued by President Marcos, whose word was law during that time.[84]
	GR No. 166910 2010-10-19	ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO v. TOLL REGULATORY BOARD VELASCO JR., J.
Similarly in Padua v. Ranada, the fixing of provisional toll rates by the TRB without a public hearing was held to be valid, such procedure being expressly provided by law.[113] To be very clear, it is only the fixing of the initial and the provisional toll rates where a public hearing is not a vitiating requirement. Accordingly, subsequent toll rate adjustments are mandated by law to undergo both the requirements of public hearing and publication.
	GR No. 149548 2009-12-04	ROXAS v. DAMBA-NFSW CARPIO MORALES, J.
There is no dispute that Presidential Proclamation No. 1520 has the force and effect of law, since "all proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, and acts promulgated, issued, or done by the former President (Ferdinand E. Marcos) are part of the law of the land, and shall remain valid, legal, binding, and effective, unless modified, revoked or superseded by subsequent proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, or other acts of the President."[65]
	GR NO. 160703 2005-09-23	GMA NETWORK v. ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Consequently, while it is true that the regular courts are possessed of general jurisdiction over actions for damages, it would nonetheless be proper for the courts to yield its jurisdiction in favor of an administrative body when the determination of underlying factual issues requires the special competence or knowledge of the latter. In this era of clogged court dockets, administrative boards or commissions with special knowledge, experience and capability to promptly hear and determine disputes on technical matters or intricate questions of facts, subject to judicial review in case of grave abuse of discretion, are well nigh indispensable. Between the power lodged in an administrative body and a court, therefore, the unmistakable trend is to refer it to the former.[21]
	GR No. 161113 2004-06-15	FREEDOM FROM DEBT COALITION v. ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION TINGA, J.
In its Comment, the ERC concurred with the arguments of the OSG and insists that it is authorized to issue provisional orders under the law. ERC argues that it must not have been the intention of Congress to expand the functions of the ERC, as the successor of the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB), and clip its powers at the same time.[15]