This case has been cited 4 times or more.
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2014-04-29 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| x x x An information is legally viable as long as it distinctly states the statutory designation of the offense and the acts or omissions constitutive thereof. Then Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides that a complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed. In the case at bar, a reading of the subject Information shows compliance with the foregoing rule. That the time of the commission of the offense was stated as " on or about the fifth (5th) day of July, 1991" is not likewise fatal to the prosecution's cause considering that Section 11 of the same Rule requires a statement of the precise time only when the same is a material ingredient of the offense. The gravamen of the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) is the appropriation or conversion of money or property received to the prejudice of the offender. Thus, aside from the fact that the date of the commission thereof is not an essential element of the crime herein charged, the failure of the prosecution to specify the exact date does not render the Information ipso facto defective. Moreover, the said date is also near the due date within which accused-appellant should have delivered the proceeds or returned the said [pieces of jewelry] as testified upon by Tangkoy, hence, there was sufficient compliance with the rules. Accused-appellant, therefore, cannot now be allowed to claim that he was not properly apprised of the charges proferred against him.[7] | |||||
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2011-11-16 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| In the light of the failure of the prosecution evidence to pass the test of moral certainty, a reversal of Salcena's judgment of conviction becomes inevitable. Suffice it to say, a slightest doubt should be resolved in favor of the accused.[48] In dubio pro reo.[49] | |||||
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2010-03-19 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| Prevailing jurisprudence uniformly hold that the trial court's findings of fact, especially when affirmed by the CA, are, as a general rule, entitled to great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal.[62] However, this rule admits of exceptions and does not apply where facts of weight and substance with direct and material bearing on the final outcome of the case have been overlooked, misapprehended or misapplied.[63] After due consideration of the records of this case, evidence presented and relevant law and jurisprudence, we hold that this case falls under the exception. | |||||
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2008-02-06 |
TINGA, J, |
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| In the case at bar, the basis of acquittal is reasonable doubt, the evidence for the prosecution not being sufficient to sustain and prove the guilt of appellants with moral certainty. By reasonable doubt is not meant that which of possibility may arise but it is that doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an inability, after such an investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt. An acquittal based on reasonable doubt will prosper even though the appellants' innocence may be doubted, for a criminal conviction rests on the strength of the evidence of the prosecution and not on the weakness of the evidence of the defense.[57] Suffice it to say, a slightest doubt should be resolved in favor of the accused.[58] | |||||