This case has been cited 3 times or more.
|
2001-02-23 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
||||
| When the testimonies of witnesses in open court are conflicting in substantial points, the calibration of the records on appeal becomes difficult. It is the word of one party against the word of the other. The reviewing tribunal relies on the cold and mute pages of the records, unlike the trial court which had the unique opportunity of observing first-hand that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witness' deportment on the stand while testifying.[27] The trial court's assessments of the credibility of witnesses is accorded great weight and respect on appeal and is binding on this Court,[28] particularly when it has not been adequately demonstrated that significant facts and circumstances were shown to have been overlooked or disregarded by the court below which, if considered, might affect the outcome hereof.[29] The rationale for this has been adequately explained in that, | |||||
|
2000-06-08 |
DE LEON, JR., J. |
||||
| The trial court awarded Margie the amounts of P30,000.00 and P20,000.00 by way of civil indemnity and moral damages, respectively. As regards the civil indemnity, this Court has to date consistently ruled that if, in the crime of rape, the death penalty is not imposed, the indemnity ex delicto for the victim should be in the amount of P50,000.00.[45] Moral damages may also be awarded to the victim in such amount as the court deems just without the necessity for pleading or proof of the mental or physical suffering provided in Article 2217 of the Civil Code other than the fact of the commission of the offense. This is because it is recognized that the victim's injury is concomitant with and necessarily resulting from the odious crime of rape to warrant per se the award of moral damages.[46] In the light of the circumstances of the present case, we find the award of P50,000.00 by way of moral damages justified. | |||||
|
2000-03-31 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
||||
| Second, carnal knowledge took place by using force or intimidation. Appellant insists that "the complainant did not offer any tenacious resistance to the alleged sexual assault."[29] Nowhere is it required in our law or jurisprudence, however, that a woman must offer "tenacious" resistance to a sexual assault. The law does not impose upon the rape victim the burden of proving resistance.[30] We have held countless of times that "the force or violence required in rape cases is relative. When applied, it need not be overpowering or irresistible; it is enough that it has enabled the offender to consummate his purpose or to bring about the desired result."[31] For rape to exist, it is not necessary that the force or intimidation employed in accomplishing the crime be so great or of such character as could not be resisted. What is necessary is that the force or intimidation be sufficient to consummate the purpose which the accused had in mind.[32] In this case, the victim testified that appellant poked a knife at her neck,[33] threatened her not to shout or he would kill her.[34] The act of holding a knife by itself is strongly suggestive of force or at least intimidation, and threatening the victim with a knife is sufficient to bring her into submission.[35] Thus we have held that physical resistance need not be established in rape cases when intimidation is exercised upon her and she submits herself against her will to the rapist's lust because of fear for her life and personal safety.[36] The victim's failure to resist the accused's assault successfully and to escape when the opportunity presented itself should not be construed as a manifestation of consent.[37] | |||||