This case has been cited 4 times or more.
|
2013-04-01 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
||||
| Affinity may also be defined as "the relation which one spouse because of marriage has to blood relatives of the other. The connection existing, in consequence of marriage between each of the married persons and the kindred of the other. The doctrine of affinity grows out of the canonical maxim that marriage makes husband and wife one. The husband has the same relation by affinity to his wife's blood relatives as she has by consanguinity and vice versa."[22] | |||||
|
2004-03-02 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
||||
| The information alleges that "herein complainant and offended party [is] the sister-in-law of the accused and therefore a relative by affinity within the third civil degree." Said circumstance presupposes the existence of a legitimate relationship,[43] such that the appellant should be shown as lawfully married to the private complainant's sister, Justina. As held in the case of People v. Berana,[44] to effectively prosecute for the crime of rape committed by a relative by affinity within the third civil degree, it must be established that (1) appellant is legally married to private complainant's sister, and (2) private complainant and appellant's wife are full or half blood siblings.[45] | |||||
|
2000-03-31 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
||||
| Second, carnal knowledge took place by using force or intimidation. Appellant insists that "the complainant did not offer any tenacious resistance to the alleged sexual assault."[29] Nowhere is it required in our law or jurisprudence, however, that a woman must offer "tenacious" resistance to a sexual assault. The law does not impose upon the rape victim the burden of proving resistance.[30] We have held countless of times that "the force or violence required in rape cases is relative. When applied, it need not be overpowering or irresistible; it is enough that it has enabled the offender to consummate his purpose or to bring about the desired result."[31] For rape to exist, it is not necessary that the force or intimidation employed in accomplishing the crime be so great or of such character as could not be resisted. What is necessary is that the force or intimidation be sufficient to consummate the purpose which the accused had in mind.[32] In this case, the victim testified that appellant poked a knife at her neck,[33] threatened her not to shout or he would kill her.[34] The act of holding a knife by itself is strongly suggestive of force or at least intimidation, and threatening the victim with a knife is sufficient to bring her into submission.[35] Thus we have held that physical resistance need not be established in rape cases when intimidation is exercised upon her and she submits herself against her will to the rapist's lust because of fear for her life and personal safety.[36] The victim's failure to resist the accused's assault successfully and to escape when the opportunity presented itself should not be construed as a manifestation of consent.[37] | |||||