This case has been cited 17 times or more.
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2010-02-05 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| It is not the caption of the pleading but the allegations therein that are controlling.[14] The inclusion of the names of all the parties in the title of a complaint is a formal requirement under Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. However, the rules of pleadings require courts to pierce the form and go into the substance.[15] The non-inclusion of one or some of the names of all the complainants in the title of a complaint, is not fatal to the case, provided there is a statement in the body of the complaint indicating that such complainant/s was/were made party to such action. This is specially true before the HLURB where the proceedings are summary in nature without regard to legal technicalities obtaining in the courts of law[16] and where the pertinent concern is to promote public interest and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action, application or other proceedings.[17] | |||||
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2009-12-14 |
DE LEON, JR., J. |
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| A perusal of the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioners would show that the notice of hearing was addressed only to the Clerk of Court in violation of Section 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, which requires the notice of hearing to be addressed to all parties concerned. This defect, however, did not make the motion a mere scrap of paper. The rule is not a ritual to be followed blindly.[59] The purpose of a notice of hearing is simply to afford the adverse parties a chance to be heard before a motion is resolved by the court.[60] In this case, respondents were furnished copies of the motion, and consequently, notified of the scheduled hearing. Counsel for public respondents in fact moved for the postponement of the hearing, which the court granted.[61] Moreover, respondents were afforded procedural due process as they were given sufficient time to file their respective comments or oppositions to the motion. From the foregoing, it is clear that the rule requiring notice to all parties was substantially complied with.[62] In effect, the defect in the Motion for Reconsideration was cured. | |||||
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2009-07-07 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| Admittedly, even if an issue has not been raised in the complaint but evidence has been presented thereon, the trial court may grant relief on the basis of such evidence. A court may rule and render judgment on the basis of the evidence before it, even though the relevant pleading has not been previously amended, provided that no surprise or prejudice to the adverse party is thereby caused.[64] So long as the basic requirements of fair play have | |||||
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2009-01-20 |
PUNO, C.J. |
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| Petitioners' fourth argument, that private respondents' motion for reconsideration before the Shari'a District Court is defective for lack of a notice of hearing, must fail as the unique circumstances in the present case constitute an exception to this requirement. The Rules require every written motion to be set for hearing by the applicant and to address the notice of hearing to all parties concerned.[45] The Rules also provide that "no written motion set for hearing shall be acted upon by the court without proof of service thereof."[46] However, the Rules allow a liberal construction of its provisions "in order to promote [the] objective of securing a just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding."[47] Moreover, this Court has upheld a liberal construction specifically of the rules of notice of hearing in cases where "a rigid application will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice especially if a party successfully shows that the alleged defect in the questioned final and executory judgment is not apparent on its face or from the recitals contained therein."[48] In these exceptional cases, the Court considers that "no party can even claim a vested right in technicalities," and for this reason, cases should, as much as possible, be decided on the merits rather than on technicalities.[49] | |||||
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2007-12-27 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| Anent the second issue, we have consistently held that a motion which does not meet the requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15[14] of the Rules of Court is considered a worthless piece of paper, which the Clerk of Court has no right to receive and the trial court has no authority to act upon. [15] Service of a copy of a motion containing a notice of the time and the place of hearing of that motion is a mandatory requirement, and the failure of movants to comply with these requirements renders their motions fatally defective. However, there are exceptions to the strict application of this rule. These exceptions are: (1) where a rigid application will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice especially if a party successfully shows that the alleged defect in the questioned final and executory judgment is not apparent on its face or from the recitals contained therein; (2) where the interest of substantial justice will be served; (3) where the resolution of the motion is addressed solely to the sound and judicious discretion of the court; and (4) where the injustice to the adverse party is not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.[16] | |||||
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2007-10-10 |
TINGA, J, |
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| First, we resolve the procedural issues of the case. Rule 7, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states that the names of the parties shall be indicated in the title of the original complaint or petition. However, the rules itself endorses its liberal construction if it promotes the objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of the action or proceeding.[29] Pleadings shall be construed liberally so as to render substantial justice to the parties and to determine speedily and inexpensively the actual merits of the controversy with the least regard to technicalities.[30] | |||||
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2007-09-28 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| Sec. 13. Service upon private domestic corporation or partnership. If the defendant is a corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines or a partnership duly registered, service may be made on the president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent, or any of its directors.[21] In Villa Rey Transit, Inc. v. Far East Motor Corporation,[22] we characterized an agent in the contemplation of Rule 14 under the (1964) Rules of Court, as a representative so integrated with the corporation sued as to make it a priori supposable that he will realize his responsibilities and know what he should do with any legal papers served on him; one who performs vital functions in the corporation that it would be reasonable to presume that he would be able to discern the importance of papers delivered to him,[23] and be responsible enough to transmit the same to the corporation.[24] | |||||
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2007-04-03 |
CORONA, J. |
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| The belated filing of the motion for reconsideration rendered the decision of the Court of Appeals final and executory. A judgment becomes "final and executory" by operation of law. Finality becomes a fact when the reglementary period to appeal lapses and no appeal is perfected within such period.[6] As a consequence, no court (not even this Court) can exercise appellate jurisdiction to review a case or modify a decision that has became final.[7] | |||||
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2006-08-07 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Thus, even if the original complaint filed by petitioners before the RTC is denominated as "Annulment of Title and Damages," we find it practicable to rule on the division of the subject property based on the rules of succession as prayed for in the complaint, considering that the averments in the complaint, not the title are controlling.[12] | |||||
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2006-01-31 |
AZCUNA, J. |
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| First of all, the Court finds the decision of the RTC of Manila, in so far as it relates to the vessel M/V "Star Ace," to be void as jurisdiction was never acquired over the vessel.[10] In filing the case, Urbino had impleaded the vessel as a defendant to enforce his alleged maritime lien. This meant that he brought an action in rem under the Code of Commerce under which the vessel may be attached and sold.[11] However, the basic operative fact for the institution and perfection of proceedings in rem is the actual or constructive possession of the res by the tribunal empowered by law to conduct the proceedings.[12] This means that to acquire jurisdiction over the vessel, as a defendant, the trial court must have obtained either actual or constructive possession over it. Neither was accomplished by the RTC of Manila. | |||||
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2005-12-14 |
PANGANIBAN, J. |
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| The test is the presence of the opportunity to be heard, as well as to have time to study the motion and meaningfully oppose or controvert the grounds upon which it is based. Considering the circumstances of the present case, we believe that the requirements of procedural due process were substantially complied with, and that the compliance justified a departure from a literal application of the rule on notice of hearing.[17] | |||||
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2005-12-14 |
PANGANIBAN, J. |
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| Equally important is the fact that the trial court set the Motion for Reconsideration and the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration for hearing on December 7, 2001, during which petitioner's counsel appeared.[21] In other cases,[22] the Court has held that lack of notice is cured when, after learning that a motion has that defect, the trial court promptly resets a hearing with due notice to all the parties. Hence, we find no reversible error committed by the CA in ruling that the Motion for Reconsideration was not pro forma and in setting aside the subject Orders of the trial court. | |||||
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2005-04-12 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| Thus, while the docket fees were based only on the real property valuation, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the action, and judgment awards which were left for determination by the court or as may be proven during trial would still be subject to additional filing fees which shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It would then be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court of the trial court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fees.[51] | |||||
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2005-02-11 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| For failure of the respondents to abide by the judicial compromise, petitioners are vested with the absolute right under the law and the agreement to enforce it by asking for the issuance of the writ of execution. Doctrinally, a Compromise Agreement is immediately final and executory.[55] Petitioners' course of action, asking for the issuance of a writ of execution was in accordance with the very stipulation in the agreement that the lower court could not change. | |||||
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2000-06-16 |
DE LEON, JR., J. |
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| At the outset, let us state that this case should have been consolidated with the recently decided case of Vlason Enterprises Corporation v. Court of Appeals and Duraproof Services, represented by its General Manager, Cesar Urbino Sr.[6], for these two (2) cases involved the same material antecedents, though the main issue proffered in the present petition vary with the Vlason case. | |||||
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2000-06-16 |
DE LEON, JR., J. |
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| The material antecedents, as quoted from the Vlason[7] case, are:Poro Point Shipping Services, then acting as the local agent of Omega Sea Transport Company of Honduras & Panama, a Panamanian Company (hereafter referred to as Omega), requested permission for its vessel M/V Star Ace, which had engine trouble, to unload its cargo and to store it at the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) compound in San Fernando, La Union while awaiting transhipment to Hongkong. The request was approved by the Bureau of Customs.[8] Despite the approval, the customs personnel boarded the vessel when it docked on January 7, 1989, on suspicion that it was the hijacked M/V Silver Med owned by Med Line Philippines Co., and that its cargo would be smuggled into the country.[9] The district customs collector seized said vessel and its cargo pursuant to Section 2301, Tariff and Customs Code. A notice of hearing of SFLU Seizure Identification No. 3-89 was served on its consignee, Singkong Trading Co. of Hongkong, and its shipper, Dusit International Co., Ltd. of Thailand. | |||||
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2000-06-16 |
DE LEON, JR., J. |
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| Second. We settled the issue of finality of the trial court's decision dated February 18, 1991 in the Vlason case, wherein we stated that, considering the admiralty case involved multiple defendants, "each defendant had a different period within which to appeal, depending on the date of receipt of decision."[63] Only upon the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal, with no appeal perfected within such period, does the decision become final and executory.[64] | |||||