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PHILIPPINE AIRLINES v. NLRC

This case has been cited 1 times or more.

2006-06-26
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
The Court finds their respective definitions under Rule VUU of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. No. 292, Section 10 of the Rule clearly defines "reassignment" as the movement of an employee from one organizational unit to another in the same department or agency which does not involve a reduction in rank, status, or salary and does not require the issuance of an appointment while the succeeding Section 11 of the same Rule defined "demotion" as a movement from one position to another involving the issuance of an appointment with diminution in duties, responsibilities, status or rank which may or may not involve a reduction in salary. Further, note that Section 26(7), Book V, Title I, Subtitle A of the 1987 Revised Administrative Code recognizes reassignment as a management prerogative vested in any department or agency of government embraced in the civil service: (7) Reassignment.  An employee may be re-assigned from one organizational unit to another in the same agency; Provided, That such re-assignment shall not involve a reduction in rank, status and salary. As can be gleamed from the above, there was no demotion involved in the transfer of petitioners work station since what transpired was merely a reassignment brought about by the exigencies of the service.  The law is clear on this point  a demotion would entail the issuance of another appointment that would have given petitioner diminution in duties, responsibilities, status or rank yet no appointment to this effect was ever issued.  As aptly observed by the Solicitor General in his Comment,[18] there is no showing that petitioner, upon the effectivity of Hospital Order No. 184, was stripped of his plantilla position as hospital housekeeper which lends credence to the claim that Hospital Order No. 184 merely amounted to petitioner's reassignment rather than to his demotion.  Moreover, the rationale behind the Hospital Order was aptly explained by private respondent as follows: The justification for the transfer is very obvious.  The manpower needs of the Nursing Service alone is very great.  The transfer was instituted in the exigencies and necessities of the service.  The priority of the OR-DR Complex is higher since the area caters to 120 deliveries a day as against the hospital lobby, which is a non-patient area.[19] As correctly pointed out by the CA, an examination of petitioner's appointment as Hospital Housekeeper at Dr. Jose Fabella Memorial Hospital is without any specific station or unit assignment.  In fact, a closer look at said appointment disclosed that his work station is that of the entire hospital premises itself.  Thus, petitioner cannot claim a vested right in his previous station or work assignment.  As ruled by this Court in Fernandez v. Sto. Tomas:[20] The rule pursued by plaintiff only goes so far as the appointment indicates a specification.  Otherwise, the constitutionally ordained security of tenure cannot shield her.  In appointments of this nature, this Court has consistently rejected the officer's demand to remain even as public service dictates that a transfer be made in a particular station.  Judicial attitude toward transfers of this nature is expressed in the following statement in  Ibañez, et al. vs. Commission on Elections, et al. (G.R. No. L-26558, April 27, 1967; 19 SCRA 1002 [1967]);: That security of tenure is an essential and constitutionally guaranteed feature of our Civil Service System, is not open to debate.  The mantle of its protection extends not only against removals without cause but also against unconsented transfer which, as repeatedly enunciated, are tantamount to removals which are within the ambit of the fundamental guarantee.  However, the availability of that security of tenure necessarily depends, in the first instance, upon the nature of the appointment (Hojilla vs. Marino, 121 Phil. 280 [1965].)  Such that the rule which proscribes transfers without consent as anathema to the security of tenure is predicated upon the theory that the officer involved is appointed not merely assigned to a particular station (Miclat v. Ganaden, et al., 108 Phil. 439 [1960]; Jaro v. Hon. Valencia, et al., 118 Phil. 278 [1963]).  [Brillantes v. Guevarra, 27 sCRA 138 (1969)].[21] Adding a fatal blow to the petitioner's untenable position is the fact that he failed to overcome the presumption of regularity in the performance of private respondent's official duties when he issued the questioned Hospital Order.  Well entrenched in jurisprudence is the time honored principle that the law bestows upon a public official the presumption of regularity in the discharge of one's official duties and functions.  In the case of Fernando v. Sto. Tomas,[22] this Court categorically held that: ...public respondents have in their favor the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties which petitioners failed to rebut when they did not present evidence to prove partiality, malice and bad faith.  Bad faith can never be presumed; it must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.  No such evidence exists in the case at bar.[23] As to the claim for an award of moral and exemplary damages, the rule consistently held and frequently applied by this Court is that moral damages are recoverable only where the acts complained of are attended by bad faith or fraud, or constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.  This Court has consistently upheld the view that bad faith does not simply mean negligence or bad judgment.  In involves a state of mind dominated by ill-will or motive.  It implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity.  The person claiming moral damages must prove the existence of bad faith by clear and convincing evidence for the law always presumes good faith.[24]  As correctly observed by the Solicitor General in his Comment, petitioner failed to overcome the legal presumption of good faith.  Thus, no award for moral damages is forthcoming.