This case has been cited 4 times or more.
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2003-03-28 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| We agree with the Office of the Solicitor General that it was natural for Concepcion to fail to notice the body of Carlito when she was faced with the shocking scene of her husband being hacked and stabbed to death by appellant and his son. The Supreme Court has long recognized that different people react differently to a given type of situation, and there is no standard form of behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, startling or frightful experience.[13] In the present case, it is perfectly normal for Concepcion to be oblivious of the persons who were present at the crime scene at that time because of the frightening sight that confronted her. | |||||
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2001-10-25 |
PER CURIAM |
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| We agree with the position taken by the OSG. In our review of Wilma's entire testimony, we find her testimony consistent on the subject of the principal occurrence of the two rapes and the positive identification of her violator in both instances. Despite certain variances on details, we find that her testimony as a witness consistently refers to significant facts, which are crucial to the innocence or guilt of an accused.[19] A perfect description of the crime scene is not essential for it is not an element of the crime. The reference to the "other room" by complainant indeed meant the other half of the room divided by the katsa curtain. Her alleged contradictory statements pertain only to minutiae, not touching on the essentials of the crime. A minor inconsistency, if any existed, strengthens rather than diminishes the credibility of complainant as it erases suspicion of a contrived testimony.[20] The disputed point on whether her mother was home either in mid-October 1994 or on February 24, 1997, appears to us secondary. | |||||
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2000-10-05 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| The trial court imposed the death penalty on accused-appellant based on its finding that Divina Corsanis, the victim's mother, is the common-law spouse of accused-appellant. While the trial court correctly found accused-appellant to be the common law spouse of the victim's mother, the Information, however, did not allege accused-appellant as the common-law spouse of Divina, but that he was the step-father and guardian of the victim. Hence, the trial court cannot properly impose the death penalty considering that his being the common-law spouse of Divina Corsanis was not alleged in the Information. Unlike a generic aggravating circumstance which may be proved even if not alleged, a qualifying aggravating circumstance cannot be proved as such unless alleged in the information. It must be properly pleaded in order not to violate the constitutional right of the accused to be properly informed of the nature and cause of the accusations against him.[9] Specifically, in People v. Fraga,[10] this Court held that "(a)lthough the rape of a person under eighteen (18) years of age by the common-law spouse of the victim's mother is punishable by death, this penalty cannot be imposed on accused-appellant x x x because his relationship was not what was alleged in the informations. What was alleged was that he is the stepfather of the complainant." | |||||
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2000-08-31 |
DAVIDE JR., C.J. |
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| with a strange, startling or frightful experience. One person's spontaneous response may be aggression, while another's may be cold indifference.[33] Consequently, HELEN's inexplicable actuation only conformed to the natural reaction of a bewildered victim of a sexual assault. As for the delay in the reporting of the sexual assaults, jurisprudence has established that delay in revealing the commission of rape is not an indication of a fabricated charge. It must be remembered that HELEN was continuously threatened by CESAR. In People v. | |||||