This case has been cited 7 times or more.
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2011-05-30 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| Incidentally, on April 2, 2007, after the parties have submitted their respective memoranda, DEL MONTE filed a Manifestation and Motion[73] before the Court, stating that similar settlement agreements were allegedly executed by the plaintiff claimants with DEL MONTE and CHIQUITA sometime in 1999. Purportedly included in the agreements were Civil Case Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96. Attached to the said manifestation were copies of the Compromise Settlement, Indemnity, and Hold Harmless Agreement between DEL MONTE and the settling plaintiffs, as well as the Release in Full executed by the latter.[74] DEL MONTE specified therein that there were "only four (4) plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 5617 who are claiming against the Del Monte parties"[75] and that the latter have executed amicable settlements which completely satisfied any claims against DEL MONTE. In accordance with the alleged compromise agreements with the four plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 5617, DEL MONTE sought the dismissal of the Amended Joint-Complaint in the said civil case. Furthermore, in view of the above settlement agreements with ABELLA, et al., in Civil Case No. 24,251-96, DEL MONTE stated that it no longer wished to pursue its petition in G.R. No. 127856 and accordingly prayed that it be allowed to withdraw the same. | |||||
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2009-12-04 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| Respecting the appellate court's ruling that it is POEA Memo Circular No. 55, series of 1996 which is applicable and not Memo Circular No. 9, series of 2000, apropos is the ruling in Seagull Maritime Corporation v. Dee[10] involving employment contract entered into in 1999, before the promulgation of POEA Memo Circular No. 9, series of 2000 or the use of the new POEA Standard Employment Contract, like that involved in the present case. In said case, the Court applied the 2000 Circular in holding that while it is the company-designated physician who must declare that the seaman suffered permanent disability during employment, it does not deprive the seafarer of his right to seek a second opinion which can then be used by the labor tribunals in awarding disability claims. | |||||
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2000-05-04 |
PARDO, J. |
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| It is basic that qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be proven with equal certainty as the commission of the act charged as criminal offense.[24] Since the commission of the crime is qualified by treachery, accused-appellant is liable for murder. | |||||
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2000-03-07 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| We find, however, that the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not sufficiently proven. Qualifying circumstances must be indubitably proven as the crime itself.[21] As a rule, a sudden attack by the assailant, whether frontally or from behind, is treachery if such mode of attack was deliberately adopted by him with the purpose of depriving the victim of a chance to either fight or retreat."[22] While the attack on the victim was sudden, it does not appear from the evidence that appellant consciously adopted the means, method or manner of attack on the victim. Hence, there being only one qualifying circumstance alleged in the information, and none being proven, appellant should be held guilty of the lesser crime of homicide. | |||||