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PEOPLE v. ANTHONY APOSTOL

This case has been cited 10 times or more.

2011-03-09
PEREZ, J.
On 4 March 1997, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a Resolution ordering the consolidation of Civil Case No. SP-4064 (94)[23] with Criminal Case No. 23267 pending before the Third Division pursuant to Section 4, Presidential Decree No. 1606, which  pertinently reads: Any provision of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall at all times be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in the same proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the filing of the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing of such civil action separately  from the criminal action shall be recognized; Provided, however, that where the civil action had heretofore been filed separately but judgment therein has not yet been rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, said civil action shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court as the case may be, for consolidation and joint determination with the criminal action, otherwise the separate civil action shall be deemed abandoned.[24]
2011-03-09
PEREZ, J.
Spouses Bombasi, thereafter, filed a criminal complaint[21] against Mayor Comendador, Asilo and Angeles for violation of Sec. 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 otherwise known as the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act" before the Office of the Ombudsman. On 22 February 1996, an Information[22] against Mayor Comendador, Asilo and Angeles was filed, which reads: That on or about October 15, 1993, at Nagcarlan, Laguna, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, all public officers, accused Demetrio T. Comendador, being then the Municipal Mayor, accused Paulino S. Asilo, Jr. being then the Municipal Administrator and accused Alberto S. Angeles being then the Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator, all of the Municipality of Nagcarlan, Laguna, committing the crime herein charged in relation to, while in the performance and taking advantage of their official functions, conspiring and confederating with each other, and with evident bad faith, manifest partiality or through gross inexcusable negligence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, criminally cause the demolition of a public market stall leased by the municipal government in favor of one Visitacion Coronado-Bombasi without legal or justifiable ground therefor, thus, causing undue injury to the latter in the amount of PESOS: FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY SEVEN THOUSAND AND NINE HUNDRED ONLY (P437,900.00).
2009-07-07
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Under the law and prevailing jurisprudence, the "gravamen of the offense of statutory rape as provided under Article 335, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code is the carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve years old."[17] "The only elements of statutory rape are: (1) that the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) that such woman is under 12 years of age. It is not necessary to prove that the victim was intimidated or that force was used against her because in statutory rape the law presumes that the victim, on account of her tender age, does not and cannot have a will of her own."[18] Although the prosecution inadvertently proposed during the pre-trial conference the admission of the age of the victim as being 12 years old, the pre-trial order was silent on whether the defense concurred in such proposal. Such being the case, there was no categorical admission as to the age of the victim. During trial, the prosecution insisted on its stance that the victim was only 11 years old at the time of the commission of the crime. Without the objection of the defense, the prosecution presented the oral testimony of the victim and her birth certificate tending to prove her age. Since the prosecution alleged in the information and successfully proved during trial that the victim was below 12 years old, the alleged crime can be categorized as statutory rape. Having established the age of the victim, the only remaining question is whether Benjie had carnal knowledge of her.
2008-10-08
BRION, J.
We fully support these findings. As we emphasized in People v. Apostol,[35] the "sweetheart" defense is a much-abused defense. As an affirmative defense, the allegation of a love affair must be supported by convincing proof other than the self-serving assertions of the accused.[36] It cannot be given credence in the absence of evidence, such as notes, gifts, pictures, mementos or other tokens independently proving its existence; nor can it be given weight where no other witness was presented to testify that the accused and the complainant were indeed sweethearts.[37] The sweetheart defense is considered an uncommonly weak defense because its presence does not automatically negate the commission of rape. The gravamen of the crime of rape is sexual congress of a man with a woman without her consent. Hence, notwithstanding the existence of a romantic relationship, a woman cannot be forced to engage in sexual intercourse against her will.
2006-02-13
TINGA, J.
All three (3) documents mentioned above, namely Orfila's birth certificate, her marriage contract, and William Orfila's birth certificate, are official records that are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.[63]  While it has been held that a birth certificate is the best evidence of a person's date of birth and that late registration by the mother of her child's birth does not affect its evidentiary value,[64] we cannot say the same for Orfila's birth certificate in the face of contradictory evidence.
2003-08-15
PANGANIBAN, J.
Baroy's Birth Certificate -- the authenticity of which was confirmed by the NSO -- outweighs the other evidence submitted to prove his date of birth. "A birth certificate is the best evidence of a person's date of birth."[5]
2001-10-12
PUNO, J.
With Editha's positive identification of the accused as the author of the dastardly acts committed upon her, the acccused's defense of denial and alibi must fall.  It is well-settled in jurisprudence that alibi is the weakest defense not only because of its inherent weakness and unreliability, but also because it is easy to fabricate.  To uphold this defense, it does not suffice to prove that the accused was at another place when the crime was committed, but it must also be shown that there was physical impossibility for the accused to have been at the scene of the crime.[41] As a general rule, this defense does not prosper especially when the complaining witness positively established the identity of the accused.[42] In the instant case, the accused himself testified that the distance between Mauswagon where the rapes were committed, and Kayok where he claims to have been at the time of the rapes, is about 26 kilometers; the distance can be negotiated in 30 minutes to one hour.[43] It was thus not physically impossible for the accused to have been in Kayok for the death anniversary of his father on the dates of the rape incidents and in the scene of the crimes in Mauswagon at the precise time the rapes were committed.
2000-03-31
PARDO, J.
Likewise, we affirm the award of moral damages in the amount of fifty thousand (P50,000.00) pesos for each count of rape, or a total of two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00). Consistent with present case law which treats the imposition of civil indemnity as mandatory upon the finding of rape,[52] accused is ordered to pay the amount of fifty thousand (P50,000.00) pesos civil indemnity ex delicto for each count of rape, or a total of two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00).
2000-03-27
PUNO, J.
We give short shrift to appellant's defense of alibi. He claims that he could not have committed the odious act narrated by Marites because at the time of the rape incident, he was in his house which was then being constructed. The defense relied upon by the appellant simply cannot stand in the face of the positive identification made by Marites. Time and again, the Court has held that alibi is the weakest defense not only because of its inherent weakness and unreliability, but also because it is easy to fabricate. For it to prosper, it does not suffice to prove that the accused was at another place when the crime was committed, but it must also be shown that there was physical impossibility for the accused to have been at the scene of the crime.[80] In general, this defense is rejected especially when the complaining witness positively established the identity of the accused.[81]