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PEOPLE v. ALBERTO S. ANTONIO

This case has been cited 10 times or more.

2011-06-15
VELASCO JR., J.
In People v. Antonio, [28] this Court consistently emphasized that the findings of the trial court, in the absence of any glaring error, gross misapprehension, arbitrary and unsupported conclusion of facts, are given great weight, because it is in a better position to observe the deportment and manner of witnesses during trial. We shall also observe this ruling here.
2010-12-14
ABAD, J.
The Revised Penal Code in Article 19 defines an accessory as one who has knowledge of the commission of the crime, yet did not take part in its commission as principal or accomplice, but took part in it subsequent to its commission by any of three modes: (1) profiting himself or assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the crime; (2) concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects or instruments thereof in order to prevent its discovery; and (3) harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principals of the crime, provided the accessory acts with abuse of his public functions or when the offender is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime.[168]
2008-11-03
BRION, J.
In People v. Antonio,[41] we held that it is not only the sudden attack that qualifies a killing into murder. There must be a conscious and deliberate adoption of the mode of attack for a specific purpose.
2003-05-29
PUNO, J.
The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be appreciated in favor of the appellant. First, he had not been actually arrested at the time he surrendered; second, he surrendered to a person in authority; and third, his surrender was voluntary.[25] Although he did not surrender to the policemen on the same night that the incident occurred, he did surrender himself to the barangay captain early the next day. Besides, when the policemen came that night, they were not looking for a specific person but were merely inquiring about the incident that happened in front of the house of appellant. There is no dispute that early the very next day, appellant surrendered himself to a person in authority and admitted the killing, before a warrant for his arrest was issued. In People v. Bautista,[26] we considered as a mitigating circumstance the voluntary surrender of the accused to a police authority four (4) days after the commission of the crime.
2003-05-08
QUISUMBING, J.
The credibility of prosecution witness Artemio Tallong is not in any way lessened, much less impaired, by the motives imputed to them by appellant.  Appellant claims that Tallong was a defector who fled the scene with him immediately after the incident, and surfaced with appellant only two days after the shooting. Appellant's contention is nothing more than a desperate attempt to discredit said witness. Different people react differently to a given type of situation and there is no standard form of behavioral response when one is confronted with a startling, strange or frightful experience. Considering that appellant himself admitted that Tallong had no participation in the murder, the fact that he fled the scene with appellant should not by itself be taken against him.  This Court recognizes that the initial reticence of witnesses to volunteer information about a criminal case and their aversion to be involved in criminal investigations due to fear of reprisal is not uncommon.[23]
2003-05-08
QUISUMBING, J.
Appellant's surrender to police authorities after the shooting should be credited in his favor as a mitigating circumstance, pursuant to Article 13 (7) of the Revised Penal Code.[30] There is voluntary surrender if three conditions are satisfied:  (1) the offender has not been arrested; (2) he surrendered himself to a person in authority or to an agent of a person in authority; and (3) his surrender was voluntary. There is no dispute that appellant voluntarily surrendered to the governor[31] a person in authority, then to the police, before he was arrested. In People v. Antonio,[32] the accused's surrender to the mayor was considered as a mitigating circumstance.  In the same way, appellant's voluntary surrender to the governor should be considered in his favor. It is immaterial that appellant did not immediately surrender to the authorities, but did so only after the lapse of two days.  In People v. Bautista,[33] the voluntary surrender of the accused to a police authority four (4) days after the commission of the crime was considered attenuating.  Finally, even if not raised on appeal, since an appeal opens the whole case for review, we could take into account this mitigating circumstance favorable to appellant.
2001-07-19
PARDO, J.
It must be observed that the issue raised by accused-appellant involves the credibility of witness, which is best addressed by the trial court, it being in a better position to decide such question, having heard the witness and observed his demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grueling examination. These are the most significant factors in evaluating the sincerity of witnesses and in unearthing the truth, especially in the face of conflicting testimonies. Through its observations during the entire proceedings, the trial court can be expected to determine, with reasonable discretion, whose testimony to accept and which witness to believe. Verily, findings of the trial court on such matters will not be disturbed on appeal unless some facts or circumstances of weight have been overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted so as to materially affect the disposition of the case.[17] Accused-appellant relied heavily on denial to prove his innocence. Denial like alibi is a weak defense, and must be rejected when the identity of the accused is sufficiently and positively established by eyewitnesses to the offense.[18] Faced with the positive identification of accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the crime, his denial or alibi cannot prevail.
2001-07-06
MENDOZA, J.
Accordingly, the penalty to be imposed should be reduced to reclusion temporal as provided by Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code. Considering the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender appreciated in favor of accused-appellant, the penalty to be imposed shall be in its minimum period in accordance with Art. 64(2) of the Revised Penal Code, or in the case of reclusion temporal, from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the penalty to be imposed shall be the penalty next lower in degree, or prision mayor in any of its periods.[49]
2001-03-30
BELLOSILLO, J.
Q: That is why he was not able to insert it into your vagina because it was soft? A: Yes, ma,am.[14] There is no question that private complainant's court testimony contradicts what she previously stated in her affidavit. But, it is a matter of judicial experience that affidavits, being ex parte, are generally inferior to the testimony given in open court.[15] Unlike testimony given in judicial proceedings where a party litigant is afforded the opportunity to probe the truthfulness of the statements by the other party and the judicious and imposing presence of the magistrate checks any attempt at introduction of statements contrived to dissemble and mislead, affidavits are executed under circumstances not in any way conducive to accuracy. Besides, when confronted with her first inaccurate statement, Lina Casupang satisfactorily explained why she gave a false statement. She said: "x x x because when my statement was taken, I was so afraid so I lied, but now I am no longer afraid."[16] Thus it was proper for the trial court to give more probative weight to private complainant's court testimony. We do not intend to rule otherwise.
2000-10-10
PUNO, J.
Appellants are, however, liable to pay for the loss earning capacity of the deceased.[43] It was established that the victim used to earn P400.00 per week by weaving mats for other people. Santos also testified that she was 54 years old at the time of her death. Applying the formula for loss of earning capacity, to wit: Net earning capacity (x) =       life expectancy x gross annual income -       living expenses (50% of gross annual income) appellants should be held liable to pay as follows: