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DEAN C. WORCESTER v. MARTIN OCAMPO

This case has been cited 6 times or more.

	GR No. 219603 2016-01-26	MARY ELIZABETH TY-DELGADO v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL CARPIO, J.
In Zari v. Flores,[12] we likewise listed libel as one of the crimes involving moral turpitude. The Revised Penal Code defines libel as a "public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead."[13] The law recognizes that the enjoyment of a private reputation is as much a constitutional right as the possession of life, liberty or property.[14]
	GR No. 203335 2014-04-22	JOSE JESUS M. DISINI v. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE ABAD, J.
As early as 1912, the Court held that libel is a form of expression not protected by the Constitution.[8] Libel, like obscenity, belongs to those forms of speeches that have never attained Constitutional protection and are considered outside the realm of protected freedom. As explained by the US Supreme Court in Champlinsky v. New Hampsire:[9]
	GR No. 203335 2014-02-18	JOSE JESUS M. DISINI v. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE ABAD, J.
Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper governmental purpose, constitutionally subject to state regulation, may not be achieved by means that unnecessarily sweep its subject broadly, thereby invading the area of protected freedoms.[7] But Section 4(a)(3) does not encroach on these freedoms at all. It simply punishes what essentially is a form of vandalism,[8] the act of willfully destroying without right the things that belong to others, in this case their computer data, electronic document, or electronic data message. Such act has no connection to guaranteed freedoms. There is no freedom to destroy other people's computer systems and private documents.
	GR NO. 160283 2005-10-14	JOHN KAM BIAK Y. CHAN v. IGLESIA NI CRISTO CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
As a general rule, joint tortfeasors are all the persons who command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who approve of it after it is done, if done for their benefit.[29]
	GR NO. 141994 2005-01-17	FILIPINAS BROADCASTING NETWORK v. AGO MEDICAL CARPIO, J.
The basis of the present action is a tort. Joint tort feasors are jointly and severally liable for the tort which they commit.[52] Joint tort feasors are all the persons who command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who approve of it after it is done, if done for their benefit.[53] Thus, AMEC correctly anchored its cause of action against FBNI on Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code.
	GR No. 160286 2004-07-30	SPS. FRANCISCO M. HERNANDEZ AND ANICETA ABEL-HERNANDEZ AND JUAN GONZALES v. SPS. LORENZO DOLOR AND MARGARITA DOLOR YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Moreover, Article 2180 should be read with Article 2194 of the same Code, which categorically states that the responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for quasi-delict is solidary. In other words, the liability of joint tortfeasors is solidary.[12] Verily, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, an employer may be held solidarily liable for the negligent act of his employee.[13]