Lawyerly

GR No. 181284

2015-10-20

PERALTA, J.

In Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,[34] former Associate Justice Jose C. Vitug opined[35] that customary laws should not apply to non-ICCs/IPs simply because Congress parroted the Constitution: The second paragraph of Section 5 of Article XII of the Constitution allows Congress to provide "for the applicability of customary laws governing property rights or relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domains." I do not see this statement as saying that Congress may enact a law that would simply express that "customary laws shall govern" and end it there. Had it been so, the Constitution could have itself easily provided without having to still commission Congress to do it. Mr. Chief Justice Davide has explained this authority of Congress, during the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Convention, thus: (emphasis supplied)

GR No. 179987

2013-09-03

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN v. REPUBLIC

BERSAMIN, J.

Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), a legal concept first introduced into the country from the West by Spain through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas,[14] all lands of the public domain belong to the State.[15] This means that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land, and is charged with the conservation of such patrimony.[16] All lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Also, public lands remain part of the inalienable land of the public domain unless the State is shown to have reclassified or alienated them to private persons.[17]

GR No. 176951

2008-11-18

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF PHILIPPINES v. COMELEC

CARPIO, J.

In any event, the Court in more than one instance has taken a liberal stance as far as standing is concerned. This is especially true when important constitutional issues are at stake. The cases of Philippine Constitution Association, Inc. v. Gimenez,[52] Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,[53] Guingona, Jr. v. Carague,[54] Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR),[55] Osmeña v. Commission on Elections,[56] Carpio v. Executive Secretary,[57] Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, Jr.,[58] Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,[59] and Agan v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc.,[60] bear witness to the liberal attitude of the Court on locus standi.

GR No. 166715

2008-08-14

ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST v. PURISIMA

CORONA, J.

An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial adjudication.[10] A closely related requirement is ripeness, that is, the question must be ripe for adjudication. And a constitutional question is ripe for adjudication when the governmental act being challenged has a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it.[11] Thus, to be ripe for judicial adjudication, the petitioner must show a personal stake in the outcome of the case or an injury to himself that can be redressed by a favorable decision of the Court.[12]

GR No. 161881

2008-07-31

NICASIO I. ALCANTARA v. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

Petitioner further calls for IPRA's application, since "the right to lands of the ancestral domain arose only in view of the IPRA Law and cultural minorities had priorly no right to recover their ancestral lands."[39] Petitioner is utterly mistaken or misinformed. Before IPRA, the right of ICCs/IPs to recover their ancestral land was governed by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 410,[40] which declared ancestral lands of national cultural communities as alienable and disposable, and E.O. No. 561,[41] which created the COSLAP. These laws were the bases of the Court's decision in G.R. No. 145838. That the rights of most ICCs/IPs went largely unrecognized despite these laws was not due to the laws' inadequacies, but due to government indifference and the political inertia in their implementation.[42]

GR No. 164763

2008-02-12

ZENON R. PEREZ v. PEOPLE and SANDIGANBAYAN

REYES, R.T., J.

It is established doctrine that a statute should be construed whenever possible in harmony with, rather than in violation of, the Constitution.[82] The presumption is that the legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible and just law and one which operates no further than may be necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the law.[83] It is presumed that the legislature has acted within its constitutional powers. So, it is the generally accepted rule that every statute, or regularly accepted act, is, or will be, or should be, presumed to be valid and constitutional.[84]

GR NO. 162243

2006-11-29

HEHERSON ALVAREZ SUBSTITUTED BY ELISEA G. GOZUN v. PICOP RESOURCES

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

The issuance of a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title is merely a formal recognition of the ICCs/IPs' rights of possession and ownership over their ancestral domain identified and delineated in accordance with the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act,[104] and therefore, cannot be considered a condition precedent for the need for an NCIP certification. In the first place, it is manifestly absurd to claim that the subject lands must first be proven to be part of ancestral domains before a certification that they are not part of ancestral domains can be required. In Cruz v. Secretary of DENR,[105] where no single member of the Court penned a majority opinion (since the petition to declare Republic Act No. 8371 unconstitutional was dismissed for the reason that the votes were equally divided), Mr. Justice Reynato Puno, who voted to dismiss the petition, wrote in his separate opinion:As its subtitle suggests, [Section 59 of R.A. No. 8371] requires as a precondition for the issuance of any concession, license or agreement over natural resources, that a certification be issued by the NCIP that the area subject of the agreement does not lie with any ancestral domain. The provision does not vest the NCIP with power over the other agencies of the State as to determine whether to grant or deny any concession or license or agreement. It merely gives the NCIP the authority to ensure that the ICCs/IPs have been informed of the agreement and that their consent thereto has been obtained. Note that the certification applies to agreements over natural resources that do not necessarily lie within the ancestral domains. For those that are found within the said domains, Sections 7(b) and 57 of the IPRA apply.

GR NO. 129546

2005-12-13

PROVINCE OF RIZAL v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

In Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,[41] we had occasion to observe that "(o)ne of the fixed and dominating objectives of the 1935 Constitutional Convention was the nationalization and conservation of the natural resources of the country. There was an overwhelming sentiment in the convention in favor of the principle of state ownership of natural resources and the adoption of the Regalian doctrine. State ownership of natural resources was seen as a necessary starting point to secure recognition of the state's power to control their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization."[42]

GR NO. 129546

2005-12-13

PROVINCE OF RIZAL v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

In Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,[41] we had occasion to observe that "(o)ne of the fixed and dominating objectives of the 1935 Constitutional Convention was the nationalization and conservation of the natural resources of the country. There was an overwhelming sentiment in the convention in favor of the principle of state ownership of natural resources and the adoption of the Regalian doctrine. State ownership of natural resources was seen as a necessary starting point to secure recognition of the state's power to control their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization."[42]

GR No. 158449

2004-10-22

LUNINGNING P. DEL ROSARIO-IGTIBEN v. REPUBLIC

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

The distinction between Sections 44 and 48(b) of the Public Land Act was recognized by Mr. Justice Puno, in his separate opinion in the case of Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,[19] in which he discussed the development of the Regalian doctrine in the Philippine legal system

GR No. 158449

2004-09-22

LUNINGNING P. DEL ROSARIO-IGTIBEN v. REPUBLIC

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

The distinction between Sections 44 and 48(b) of the Public Land Act was recognized by Mr. Justice Puno, in his separate opinion in the case of Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,[19] in which he discussed the development of the Regalian doctrine in the Philippine legal system

	GR No. 181284 2015-10-20	LOLOY UNDURAN v. RAMON ABERASTURI PERALTA, J.
In Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,[34] former Associate Justice Jose C. Vitug opined[35] that customary laws should not apply to non-ICCs/IPs simply because Congress parroted the Constitution: The second paragraph of Section 5 of Article XII of the Constitution allows Congress to provide "for the applicability of customary laws governing property rights or relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domains." I do not see this statement as saying that Congress may enact a law that would simply express that "customary laws shall govern" and end it there. Had it been so, the Constitution could have itself easily provided without having to still commission Congress to do it. Mr. Chief Justice Davide has explained this authority of Congress, during the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Convention, thus: (emphasis supplied)
	GR No. 179987 2013-09-03	HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN v. REPUBLIC BERSAMIN, J.
Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), a legal concept first introduced into the country from the West by Spain through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas,[14] all lands of the public domain belong to the State.[15] This means that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land, and is charged with the conservation of such patrimony.[16] All lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Also, public lands remain part of the inalienable land of the public domain unless the State is shown to have reclassified or alienated them to private persons.[17]
	GR No. 176951 2008-11-18	LEAGUE OF CITIES OF PHILIPPINES v. COMELEC CARPIO, J.
In any event, the Court in more than one instance has taken a liberal stance as far as standing is concerned. This is especially true when important constitutional issues are at stake. The cases of Philippine Constitution Association, Inc. v. Gimenez,[52] Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,[53] Guingona, Jr. v. Carague,[54] Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR),[55] Osmeña v. Commission on Elections,[56] Carpio v. Executive Secretary,[57] Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, Jr.,[58] Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,[59] and Agan v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc.,[60] bear witness to the liberal attitude of the Court on locus standi.
	GR No. 166715 2008-08-14	ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST v. PURISIMA CORONA, J.
An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial adjudication.[10] A closely related requirement is ripeness, that is, the question must be ripe for adjudication. And a constitutional question is ripe for adjudication when the governmental act being challenged has a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it.[11] Thus, to be ripe for judicial adjudication, the petitioner must show a personal stake in the outcome of the case or an injury to himself that can be redressed by a favorable decision of the Court.[12]
	GR No. 161881 2008-07-31	NICASIO I. ALCANTARA v. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
Petitioner further calls for IPRA's application, since "the right to lands of the ancestral domain arose only in view of the IPRA Law and cultural minorities had priorly no right to recover their ancestral lands."[39] Petitioner is utterly mistaken or misinformed. Before IPRA, the right of ICCs/IPs to recover their ancestral land was governed by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 410,[40] which declared ancestral lands of national cultural communities as alienable and disposable, and E.O. No. 561,[41] which created the COSLAP. These laws were the bases of the Court's decision in G.R. No. 145838. That the rights of most ICCs/IPs went largely unrecognized despite these laws was not due to the laws' inadequacies, but due to government indifference and the political inertia in their implementation.[42]
	GR No. 164763 2008-02-12	ZENON R. PEREZ v. PEOPLE and SANDIGANBAYAN REYES, R.T., J.
It is established doctrine that a statute should be construed whenever possible in harmony with, rather than in violation of, the Constitution.[82] The presumption is that the legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible and just law and one which operates no further than may be necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the law.[83] It is presumed that the legislature has acted within its constitutional powers. So, it is the generally accepted rule that every statute, or regularly accepted act, is, or will be, or should be, presumed to be valid and constitutional.[84]
	GR NO. 162243 2006-11-29	HEHERSON ALVAREZ SUBSTITUTED BY ELISEA G. GOZUN v. PICOP RESOURCES CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
The issuance of a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title is merely a formal recognition of the ICCs/IPs' rights of possession and ownership over their ancestral domain identified and delineated in accordance with the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act,[104] and therefore, cannot be considered a condition precedent for the need for an NCIP certification. In the first place, it is manifestly absurd to claim that the subject lands must first be proven to be part of ancestral domains before a certification that they are not part of ancestral domains can be required. In Cruz v. Secretary of DENR,[105] where no single member of the Court penned a majority opinion (since the petition to declare Republic Act No. 8371 unconstitutional was dismissed for the reason that the votes were equally divided), Mr. Justice Reynato Puno, who voted to dismiss the petition, wrote in his separate opinion:As its subtitle suggests, [Section 59 of R.A. No. 8371] requires as a precondition for the issuance of any concession, license or agreement over natural resources, that a certification be issued by the NCIP that the area subject of the agreement does not lie with any ancestral domain. The provision does not vest the NCIP with power over the other agencies of the State as to determine whether to grant or deny any concession or license or agreement. It merely gives the NCIP the authority to ensure that the ICCs/IPs have been informed of the agreement and that their consent thereto has been obtained. Note that the certification applies to agreements over natural resources that do not necessarily lie within the ancestral domains. For those that are found within the said domains, Sections 7(b) and 57 of the IPRA apply.
	GR NO. 129546 2005-12-13	PROVINCE OF RIZAL v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
In Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,[41] we had occasion to observe that "(o)ne of the fixed and dominating objectives of the 1935 Constitutional Convention was the nationalization and conservation of the natural resources of the country. There was an overwhelming sentiment in the convention in favor of the principle of state ownership of natural resources and the adoption of the Regalian doctrine. State ownership of natural resources was seen as a necessary starting point to secure recognition of the state's power to control their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization."[42]
	GR NO. 129546 2005-12-13	PROVINCE OF RIZAL v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
In Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,[41] we had occasion to observe that "(o)ne of the fixed and dominating objectives of the 1935 Constitutional Convention was the nationalization and conservation of the natural resources of the country. There was an overwhelming sentiment in the convention in favor of the principle of state ownership of natural resources and the adoption of the Regalian doctrine. State ownership of natural resources was seen as a necessary starting point to secure recognition of the state's power to control their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization."[42]
	GR No. 158449 2004-10-22	LUNINGNING P. DEL ROSARIO-IGTIBEN v. REPUBLIC CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
The distinction between Sections 44 and 48(b) of the Public Land Act was recognized by Mr. Justice Puno, in his separate opinion in the case of Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,[19] in which he discussed the development of the Regalian doctrine in the Philippine legal system
	GR No. 158449 2004-09-22	LUNINGNING P. DEL ROSARIO-IGTIBEN v. REPUBLIC CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
The distinction between Sections 44 and 48(b) of the Public Land Act was recognized by Mr. Justice Puno, in his separate opinion in the case of Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,[19] in which he discussed the development of the Regalian doctrine in the Philippine legal system

ISAGANI CRUZ v. SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT