Lawyerly

GR No. 193237

2012-10-09

CARPIO, J.

Cardino filed a Manifestation on 17 March 2011 praying that this Court take judicial notice of its resolution in G.R. No. 193237. Jalosjos filed a Motion for Reconsideration[10] on 22 March 2011. On 29 March 2011, this Court resolved[11] to consolidate G.R. No. 193536 with G.R. No. 193237.

GR No. 193237

2012-10-09

DOMINADOR G. JALOSJOS v. COMELEC

CARPIO, J.

Cardino filed a Manifestation on 17 March 2011 praying that this Court take judicial notice of its resolution in G.R. No. 193237. Jalosjos filed a Motion for Reconsideration[10] on 22 March 2011. On 29 March 2011, this Court resolved[11] to consolidate G.R. No. 193536 with G.R. No. 193237.

GR No. 196804

2012-10-09

MAYOR BARBARA RUBY C. TALAGA v. COMELEC

BERSAMIN, J.

Castillo's petition contained essential allegations pertaining to a Section 78 petition, namely: (a) Ramon made a false representation in his CoC; (b) the false representation referred to a material matter that would affect the substantive right of Ramon as candidate (that is, the right to run for the election for which he filed his certificate); and (c) Ramon made the false representation with the intention to deceive the electorate as to his qualification for public office or deliberately attempted to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render him ineligible.[37] The petition expressly challenged Ramon's eligibility for public office based on the prohibition stated in the Constitution and the Local Government Code against any person serving three consecutive terms, and specifically prayed that "the Certificate of Candidacy filed by the respondent [Ramon] be denied due course to or cancel the same and that he be declared as a disqualified candidate."[38]

GR No. 192856

2011-03-08

FERNANDO V. GONZALEZ v. COMELEC

VILLARAMA, JR., J.

As to the ground of false representation in the COC under Section 78, we held in Salcedo II v. Commission on Elections[25] that in order to justify the cancellation of COC, it is essential that the false representation mentioned therein pertain to a material matter for the sanction imposed by this provision would affect the substantive rights of a candidate - the right to run for the elective post for which he filed the certificate of candidacy. Although the law does not specify what would be considered as a "material representation", the Court concluded that this refers to qualifications for elective office. Citing previous cases in which the Court interpreted this phrase, we held that Section 78 contemplates statements regarding age,[26] residence[27] and citizenship or non-possession of natural-born Filipino status.[28] Furthermore, aside from the requirement of materiality, the false representation must consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. In other words, it must be made with an intention to deceive the electorate as to one's qualification for public office.[29]

GR Nos. 178831-32

2009-04-01

JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG v. COMELEC

PERALTA, J.

In her separate Answers[7] to the petitions, Limkaichong claimed that she is a natural-born Filipino since she was born to a naturalized Filipino father and a natural-born Filipino mother, who had reacquired her status as such due to her husband's naturalization. Thus, at the time of her birth on November 9, 1959, nineteen (19) days had already passed after her father took his Oath of Allegiance on October 21, 1959 and after he was issued a Certificate of Naturalization on the same day. She contended that the COMELEC should dismiss the petitions outright for lack of cause of action. Citing Salcedo II v. Commission on Elections,[8] she averred that a petition filed before an election, questioning the qualification of a candidate, should be based on Section 78,[9] in relation to Section 74[10] of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC),[11] and not under Sections 68[12] and 74 thereof in relation to Section 1,[13] Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure[14] and Section 5,[15] paragraph C (3.a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 7800.[16] She also contended that the petitions were dismissible on the ground that they were in the nature of a collateral attack on her and her father's citizenships, in contravention of the well-established rule that attack on one's citizenship may only be made through a direct action for its nullity.

GR No. 179695

2008-12-18

MIKE A. FERMIN v. COMELEC

NACHURA, J.

After studying the said petition in detail, the Court finds that the same is in the nature of a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC under Section 78[33] of the OEC. The petition contains the essential allegations of a "Section 78" petition, namely: (1) the candidate made a representation in his certificate; (2) the representation pertains to a material matter which would affect the substantive rights of the candidate (the right to run for the election for which he filed his certificate); and (3) the candidate made the false representation with the intention to deceive the electorate as to his qualification for public office or deliberately attempted to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render him ineligible.[34] It likewise appropriately raises a question on a candidate's eligibility for public office, in this case, hi possession of the one-year residency requirement under the law.

GR No. 177927

2008-02-15

FLORANTE S. QUIZON v. COMELEC and ROBERTO VILLANUEVA PUNO

YNARES-SATIAGO, J.

Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code[11] provides that petitions to deny due course or cancel a certificate of candidacy should be resolved, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. In construing this provision together with Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 or The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987,[12] this Court declared in Salcedo II v. COMELEC[13] that the fifteen-day period in Section 78 is merely directory. Thus:If the petition is filed within the statutory period and the candidate is subsequently declared by final judgment to be disqualified before the election, he shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or the Comelec shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. The fifteen-day period in section 78 for deciding the petition is merely directory.[14] (Emphasis supplied)

GR NO. 154798

2005-10-20

CRYSTAL SHIPPING v. DEO P. NATIVIDAD

QUISUMBING, J.

The reason for requiring a motion for reconsideration is to make sure that administrative remedies have been exhausted before a case is appealed to a higher court. It allows the adjudicator a second opportunity to review the case, to grapple with the issues therein, and to decide anew a question previously raised.[18] It is presumed that an administrative agency, if afforded an opportunity to pass upon a matter, will decide the same correctly, or correct any previous error committed in its forum.[19]

GR No. 161434

2004-03-03

MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON v. COMELEC

VITUG, J.

"Rule 14. Election Protest. - Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice-President of the Philippines who received the second or third highest number of votes may contest the election of the President or the Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing a verified petition with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the proclamation of the winner." The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines, and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-President. A quo warranto proceeding is generally defined as being an action against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office.[5] In such context, the election contest can only contemplate a post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered candidate who would have received either the second or third highest number of votes could file an election protest. This rule again presupposes a post-election scenario.

GR No. 161434

2004-03-03

MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON v. COMELEC

VITUG, J.

The concept of citizenship had undergone changes over the centuries. In the 18th century, the concept was limited, by and large, to civil citizenship, which established the rights necessary for individual freedom, such as rights to property, personal liberty and justice.[9] Its meaning expanded during the 19th century to include political citizenship, which encompassed the right to participate in the exercise of political power.[10] The 20th century saw the next stage of the development of social citizenship, which laid emphasis on the right of the citizen to economic well-being and social security.[11] The idea of citizenship has gained expression in the modern welfare state as it so developed in Western Europe. An ongoing and final stage of development, in keeping with the rapidly shrinking global village, might well be the internationalization of citizenship.[12]

	GR No. 193237 2012-10-09	DOMINADOR G. JALOSJOS v. COMELEC CARPIO, J.
Cardino filed a Manifestation on 17 March 2011 praying that this Court take judicial notice of its resolution in G.R. No. 193237. Jalosjos filed a Motion for Reconsideration[10] on 22 March 2011. On 29 March 2011, this Court resolved[11] to consolidate G.R. No. 193536 with G.R. No. 193237.
	GR No. 193237 2012-10-09	DOMINADOR G. JALOSJOS v. COMELEC CARPIO, J.
Cardino filed a Manifestation on 17 March 2011 praying that this Court take judicial notice of its resolution in G.R. No. 193237. Jalosjos filed a Motion for Reconsideration[10] on 22 March 2011. On 29 March 2011, this Court resolved[11] to consolidate G.R. No. 193536 with G.R. No. 193237.
	GR No. 196804 2012-10-09	MAYOR BARBARA RUBY C. TALAGA v. COMELEC BERSAMIN, J.
Castillo's petition contained essential allegations pertaining to a Section 78 petition, namely: (a) Ramon made a false representation in his CoC; (b) the false representation referred to a material matter that would affect the substantive right of Ramon as candidate (that is, the right to run for the election for which he filed his certificate); and (c) Ramon made the false representation with the intention to deceive the electorate as to his qualification for public office or deliberately attempted to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render him ineligible.[37] The petition expressly challenged Ramon's eligibility for public office based on the prohibition stated in the Constitution and the Local Government Code against any person serving three consecutive terms, and specifically prayed that "the Certificate of Candidacy filed by the respondent [Ramon] be denied due course to or cancel the same and that he be declared as a disqualified candidate."[38]
	GR No. 192856 2011-03-08	FERNANDO V. GONZALEZ v. COMELEC VILLARAMA, JR., J.
As to the ground of false representation in the COC under Section 78, we held in Salcedo II v. Commission on Elections[25] that in order to justify the cancellation of COC, it is essential that the false representation mentioned therein pertain to a material matter for the sanction imposed by this provision would affect the substantive rights of a candidate - the right to run for the elective post for which he filed the certificate of candidacy. Although the law does not specify what would be considered as a "material representation", the Court concluded that this refers to qualifications for elective office. Citing previous cases in which the Court interpreted this phrase, we held that Section 78 contemplates statements regarding age,[26] residence[27] and citizenship or non-possession of natural-born Filipino status.[28] Furthermore, aside from the requirement of materiality, the false representation must consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. In other words, it must be made with an intention to deceive the electorate as to one's qualification for public office.[29]
	GR Nos. 178831-32 2009-04-01	JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG v. COMELEC PERALTA, J.
In her separate Answers[7] to the petitions, Limkaichong claimed that she is a natural-born Filipino since she was born to a naturalized Filipino father and a natural-born Filipino mother, who had reacquired her status as such due to her husband's naturalization. Thus, at the time of her birth on November 9, 1959, nineteen (19) days had already passed after her father took his Oath of Allegiance on October 21, 1959 and after he was issued a Certificate of Naturalization on the same day. She contended that the COMELEC should dismiss the petitions outright for lack of cause of action. Citing Salcedo II v. Commission on Elections,[8] she averred that a petition filed before an election, questioning the qualification of a candidate, should be based on Section 78,[9] in relation to Section 74[10] of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC),[11] and not under Sections 68[12] and 74 thereof in relation to Section 1,[13] Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure[14] and Section 5,[15] paragraph C (3.a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 7800.[16] She also contended that the petitions were dismissible on the ground that they were in the nature of a collateral attack on her and her father's citizenships, in contravention of the well-established rule that attack on one's citizenship may only be made through a direct action for its nullity.
	GR No. 179695 2008-12-18	MIKE A. FERMIN v. COMELEC NACHURA, J.
After studying the said petition in detail, the Court finds that the same is in the nature of a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC under Section 78[33] of the OEC. The petition contains the essential allegations of a "Section 78" petition, namely: (1) the candidate made a representation in his certificate; (2) the representation pertains to a material matter which would affect the substantive rights of the candidate (the right to run for the election for which he filed his certificate); and (3) the candidate made the false representation with the intention to deceive the electorate as to his qualification for public office or deliberately attempted to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render him ineligible.[34] It likewise appropriately raises a question on a candidate's eligibility for public office, in this case, hi possession of the one-year residency requirement under the law.
	GR No. 177927 2008-02-15	FLORANTE S. QUIZON v. COMELEC and ROBERTO VILLANUEVA PUNO YNARES-SATIAGO, J.
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code[11] provides that petitions to deny due course or cancel a certificate of candidacy should be resolved, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. In construing this provision together with Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 or The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987,[12] this Court declared in Salcedo II v. COMELEC[13] that the fifteen-day period in Section 78 is merely directory. Thus:If the petition is filed within the statutory period and the candidate is subsequently declared by final judgment to be disqualified before the election, he shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or the Comelec shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. The fifteen-day period in section 78 for deciding the petition is merely directory.[14] (Emphasis supplied)
	GR NO. 154798 2005-10-20	CRYSTAL SHIPPING v. DEO P. NATIVIDAD QUISUMBING, J.
The reason for requiring a motion for reconsideration is to make sure that administrative remedies have been exhausted before a case is appealed to a higher court. It allows the adjudicator a second opportunity to review the case, to grapple with the issues therein, and to decide anew a question previously raised.[18] It is presumed that an administrative agency, if afforded an opportunity to pass upon a matter, will decide the same correctly, or correct any previous error committed in its forum.[19]
	GR No. 161434 2004-03-03	MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON v. COMELEC VITUG, J.
"Rule 14. Election Protest. - Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice-President of the Philippines who received the second or third highest number of votes may contest the election of the President or the Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing a verified petition with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the proclamation of the winner." The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines, and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-President. A quo warranto proceeding is generally defined as being an action against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office.[5] In such context, the election contest can only contemplate a post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered candidate who would have received either the second or third highest number of votes could file an election protest. This rule again presupposes a post-election scenario.
	GR No. 161434 2004-03-03	MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON v. COMELEC VITUG, J.
The concept of citizenship had undergone changes over the centuries. In the 18th century, the concept was limited, by and large, to civil citizenship, which established the rights necessary for individual freedom, such as rights to property, personal liberty and justice.[9] Its meaning expanded during the 19th century to include political citizenship, which encompassed the right to participate in the exercise of political power.[10] The 20th century saw the next stage of the development of social citizenship, which laid emphasis on the right of the citizen to economic well-being and social security.[11] The idea of citizenship has gained expression in the modern welfare state as it so developed in Western Europe. An ongoing and final stage of development, in keeping with the rapidly shrinking global village, might well be the internationalization of citizenship.[12]

VICTORINO SALCEDO II v. COMELEC