This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2010-03-05 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| We close with the observation that what is involved here are not only errors of law, but also the errors of a litigant and his lawyer. As may have been noted, petitioner Tomawis' counsel veritably filed two (2) motions to dismiss, each predicated on the sole issue of jurisdiction. The first may have been understandable. But the second motion was something else, interposed as it was after the CA, by resolution, denied Tomawis' petition for certiorari for want of jurisdiction on the part of the appellate court to review judgments or orders of the SDC. The CA stated the observation, however, that Tomawis and his counsel may repair to this Court while the Shari'a Appellate Court has yet to be organized. Petitioner waited two years after the CA issued its denial before filing what virtually turned out to be his second motion to dismiss, coming finally to this Court after the same motion was denied. The Court must express disapproval of the cunning effort of Tomawis and his counsel to use procedural rules to the hilt to prolong the final disposition of this case. From Alonso v. Villamor,[42] almost a century-old decision, the Court has left no doubt that it frowns on such unsporting practice. The rule is settled that a question of jurisdiction, as here, may be raised at any time, even on appeal, provided its application does not result in a mockery of the basic tenets of fair play.[43] Petitioner's action at the later stages of the proceedings below, doubtless taken upon counsel's advice, is less than fair and constitutes censurable conduct. Lawyers and litigants must be brought to account for their improper conduct, which trenches on the efficient dispensation of justice. | |||||
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2005-07-29 |
TINGA, J. |
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| Anent the first assignment of error, there are divergent jurisprudential doctrines touching on this issue. On the one hand are the cases of Martinez v. Merced,[20] Marquez v. Secretary of Labor,[21] Ducat v. Court of Appeals,[22] Bayoca v. Nogales,[23] Jimenez v. Patricia,[24] Centeno v. Centeno,[25] and ABS-CBN Supervisors Employee Union Members v. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation,[26] all adhering to the doctrine that a party's active participation in the actual proceedings before a court without jurisdiction will estop him from assailing such lack of jurisdiction. Respondent heavily relies on this doctrinal jurisprudence. | |||||
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2005-05-06 |
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. |
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| Verily, petitioner's allegations in his complaint clearly make a case for an unlawful detainer. We find no error in the MTCC assuming jurisdiction over petitioner's complaint. A complaint for unlawful detainer is sufficient if it alleges that the withholding of the possession or the refusal to vacate is unlawful without necessarily employing the terminology of the law.[12] Here, there is an allegation in petitioner's complaint that respondents occupancy on the portion of his property is by virtue of his tolerance. Petitioner's cause of action for unlawful detainer springs from respondents' failure to vacate the questioned premises upon his demand sometime in 1996. Within one (1) year therefrom, or on November 6, 1996, petitioner filed the instant complaint. | |||||
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2001-07-20 |
KAPUNAN, J. |
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| The Court of Appeals did not commit any reversible error in the assailed decision. The Court agrees with the appellate court that petitioner is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the COSLAP since he participated actively in the proceedings before said body by filing an Answer, a Motion for Reconsideration of the COSLAP's decision and a Supplement to Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration. The Court also notes the appellate court's observation that petitioner began to question the jurisdiction of the COSLAP only when he realized that his period to appeal the COSLAP's decision had already lapsed.[10] It has been repeatedly held by this Court that the active participation of a respondent in the case pending against him before a court or a quasi-judicial body is tantamount to a recognition of that court's or body's recognition and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case and will bar said party from later on impugning the court's or body's jurisdiction.[11] | |||||