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PEOPLE v. EDWIN DE VERA Y GARCIA

This case has been cited 11 times or more.

2004-05-20
PER CURIAM
Under Section 3, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, an extrajudicial confession made by an accused, shall not be sufficient ground for conviction, unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti. The Rule specifically requires that there should be some other evidence "tending to show the commission of the crime apart from the confession."[28] Appellant's confession is corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti, that is, the body of the crime and, in its primary sense, that a crime has actually been committed.[29]
2004-01-21
PER CURIAM
To hold a person liable as an accomplice, two elements must concur: (1) community of design, which means that the accomplice knows of, and concurs with, the criminal design of the principal by direct participation; and (2) the performance by the accomplice of previous or simultaneous acts that are not indispensable to the commission of the crime.[18] In the present case, neither element was proved. The mere presence of the six appellants in the company of appellants Cachola and Amay on board a jeep is not evidence of their knowledge of, or assent to, the criminal design to perpetuate the massacre.[19] That they were found to be with appellants Cachola and Amay almost two hours after the commission of the crime does not constitute previous or simultaneous act. Absent a link between the crime and their presence in the jeep two hours later, we cannot consider their participation even as accessories to the crime.
2000-10-13
QUISUMBING, J.
On record, appellant's participation in the commission of the crimes consisted of his presence at the locus criminis, and his shouting "Patayin, patayin iran amen!" (Kill them all!) during the later stage of the fatal incident. The prosecution witnesses did not see him bearing any weapon or using one to inflict any injury on the victims. He did not run away with the two other accused still at large. Thus, we are far from convinced that conspiracy existed between appellant and any of his sons. Conspiracy cannot be logically inferred from the overt acts of herein appellant. We have previously ruled that relationship or association alone is not a badge of conspiracy.[22] When there is doubt as to whether a guilty participant in the killing has committed the role of a principal or that of an accomplice, the court should favor the milder form of responsibility.[23]
2000-08-25
DE LEON, JR., J.
Itaas did not present any evidence in court to buttress his bare claim despite the fact that a doctor was summoned for his check up immediately upon his arrival in Manila after he was previously arrested in Davao City.[49] He did not complain to the administering officer about the threats and torture he allegedly suffered in the hands of the CIS agents. Neither did he file any criminal nor administrative complaint against said agents for maltreatment. The failure of the appellant to complain to the swearing officer or to file charges against the persons who allegedly maltreated him, although he had all the chances to do so, manifests voluntariness in the execution of his confessions.[50] To hold otherwise is to facilitate the retraction of his solemnly made statements at the mere allegation of torture, without any proof whatsoever.[51] The Court also notes that the respective written confessions of appellants are replete with details which could be supplied only by someone in the know so to speak.[52] They reflect spontaneity and coherence which psychologically cannot be associated
2000-08-25
DE LEON, JR., J.
requisites: (1) that two or more persons come to an agreement; (2) that the agreement concerned the commission of a crime; and (3) that the execution of the felony was decided upon.[67] While conspiracy must be proven just like any criminal accusation, that is, independently and beyond reasonable doubt,[68] the same need not be proved by direct evidence and may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime.[69] The case against appellant Donato Continente is primarily anchored on the written statement[70] that he gave during the investigation of these cases. The pertinent portions of his written statements are quoted hereunder, to wit: T: Ikaw ba'y naging full fledged member ng Partido?
2000-08-25
DE LEON, JR., J.
a clear showing, either directly or by circumstantial evidence, that he participated in the decision to commit the same;[71] in which case, his culpability will be judged based on the extent of his participation in the commission of the crime. In the case at bench, appellant Donato Continente is liable for the crimes charged in these criminal cases only as an accomplice under Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code. In order that a person may be considered an accomplice in the commission of a criminal offense, the
2000-07-24
PARDO, J.
all.[41] Aredidon is not a mere accomplice. He clearly concurred with the criminal design of Antonio and performed overt acts which led to the multiple rape committed. Consider that: (1) He fetched Adelina from her mother's house.
2000-06-22
GONZAGA-REYES, J.
In the instant case, the trial court erred in holding accused-appellant equally liable with his co-accused Isabelo Ragundiaz. Accused-appellant's conspiracy with the criminal design of Ragundiaz was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. Neither has it been shown that the acts committed by accused-appellant were indispensable to the commission of the crime. Thus, the lack of complete evidence of conspiracy, which creates the doubt whether he has acted as a principal or as an accomplice, impels this Court to resolve the question as to his liability in his favor by holding that he is guilty of the minor form of responsibility.[28] Accordingly, accused-appellant Rolando Flores should be convicted as an accomplice to the murder of Billy Cajuban.
2000-04-03
PANGANIBAN, J.
It is axiomatic that the prosecution must establish conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt.[26] Conspiracy is not a harmless innuendo to be taken lightly or accepted at every turn. It is a legal concept that imputes culpability under specific circumstances.[27] As such, it must be established as clearly as any element of the crime. The quantum of evidence to be satisfied is, we repeat, beyond reasonable doubt.[28]
2000-03-31
PANGANIBAN, J.
It is axiomatic that the prosecution must establish conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt.[26] Conspiracy is not a harmless innuendo to be taken lightly or accepted at every turn. It is a legal concept that imputes culpability under specific circumstances.[27] As such, it must be established as clearly as any element of the crime. The quantum of evidence to be satisfied is, we repeat, beyond reasonable doubt.[28]
2000-03-30
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
When, as in this case, "[a]n extrajudicial statement satisfies the requirements of the Constitution, it constitutes evidence of a high order because of the strong presumption that no person of normal mind would deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime unless prompted by truth and conscience.[64] The defense has the burden of proving that it was extracted by means of force, duress, promise or reward."[65] Unfortunately for accused-appellant, he failed to overcome the overwhelming prosecution evidence to the contrary.