This case has been cited 4 times or more.
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2006-06-30 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| The rule prevailing in this jurisdiction is that the discharge of an accused to be utilized as a state witness because he does not appear to be the most guilty, is highly factual in nature. The discretionary judgment of the trial court on this factual issue is seldom interfered with by the appellate courts except in case of grave abuse of discretion,[17] which we find not present in the case at bar. | |||||
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2001-10-26 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| Similarly, appellant's assertion, that the prosecution should have first presented the certificate of ownership of the stolen carabaos to warrant his conviction, is untenable. It is to be noted that the gravamen in the crime of cattle-rustling is the "taking" or "killing" of large cattle or "taking" its meat or hide without the consent of the owner. The "owner" includes the herdsman, caretaker, employee or tenant of any firm or entity engaged in the raising of large cattle or other persons in lawful possession of such large cattle. In this case Rosalina Plaza, the caretaker of the carabaos, did not consent to the taking away of the carabaos. She immediately informed Joel Barrieses, the owner, that the carabaos were stolen and reported the incident to the police. Note that the carabaos' ownership was never put in issue during the trial in the lower court and is now raised belatedly. It is settled that, generally, questions not raised in the trial court will not be considered on appeal.[18] | |||||
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2000-05-30 |
PARDO, J. |
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| In this case, the trial court found accused-appellant's threat to the victim as an overt act manifesting evident premeditation. However, Josephine Sevillana admitted in court that she was not able to confirm the threat made by accused-appellant as she did not hear any word uttered by him when she arrived at the Northmall and her sister did not tell her anything when she arrived at the gift shop. An expression of hatred does not necessarily imply a resolution to commit a crime; there must be a demonstration of outward acts of a criminal intent that is notorious and manifest.[34] Evident premeditation must be based on external acts which are evident, not merely suspected, and which indicate deliberate planning.[35] Thus, evident premeditation may not be appreciated against accused-appellant. | |||||
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2000-05-04 |
PARDO, J. |
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| We can not, however, agree with the trial court that evident premeditation attended the commission of the crime. For evident premeditation to be appreciated, the following elements must exist: (a) the time when the accused decided to commit the crime; (b) an overt act showing that the accused clung to his determination to commit the crime; and (c) the lapse of a sufficient period of time between the decision and the execution of the crime, to allow the accused to reflect upon the consequences of the act.[20] In this case, the record is bereft of sufficient evidence as to the time when accused-appellant decided to commit the crime. Eyewitness Rowena Dacut could not remember a prior incident which could incite accused-appellant to attack the victim. There was no proof when the intent to commit the crime was engendered in the mind of accused-appellant, or when he meditated and reflected on his intention to kill the victim. Evident premeditation must be based on external acts which are evident, not merely suspected, and which indicate deliberate planning.[21] There must be direct evidence showing a plan or preparation to kill, or proof that the accused meditated and reflected upon his decision to kill the victim.[22] When there is no showing as to how and when the plan to kill was decided or what time had elapsed before it was carried out, evident premeditation cannot be considered to exist.[23] | |||||