This case has been cited 11 times or more.
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2006-12-06 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| Respecting the sufficiency of evidence of force or intimidation as an element of rape, this Court takes note that appellant, as the common-law spouse of the private complainant's mother, exercised moral ascendancy over her which made his threats to her all the more real and effective, particularly since she and her younger siblings were left in his custody. Thus, People v. Manggasin[30] teaches:. . . Accused-appellant contends that, on both occasions when she was raped, complainant did not show a determined resistance. The sexual molestations of complainant started when she was just twelve (12) years of age and lasted until she was seventeen (17). Accused-appellant is the common-law spouse of complainant's mother and the family breadwinner. As already stated, accused-appellant exercised a moral ascendancy over complainant which made the threats he made to her effective. Physical resistance need not be established in rape when intimidation is exercised upon the victim and the latter submits herself, against her will, to the rapist's embrace because of fear for life and personal safety. Complainant's complete obedience to accused-appellant's command, her lack of struggle against him, and her silence despite her sufferings were all caused by her fear of accused-appellant. In complainant's mind, she was convinced of the danger to her and her family. As has been aptly said, accused-appellant's moral ascendancy over the victim takes the place of violence and intimidation. (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted) | |||||
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2006-02-13 |
PER CURIAM |
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| We have consistently held that the concurrence of the minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender is a special qualifying circumstance which increases the penalty, and must be properly alleged in the information because of the accused's right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.[31] Juvilie's minority and her relationship with Gregorio having been duly established by evidence, the death penalty was correctly imposed upon the appellant. | |||||
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2004-02-05 |
PANGANIBAN, J. |
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| "The Court has scrupulously examined the testimony of the complainant Carla Espayos; it is convinced that the same, even standing alone, passes the test of credibility and may be made the basis of conviction. She was candid and truthful in her narrations, and the Court could not detect any tinge of insincerity in her testimony. There is no doubt that she is telling the truth."[18] There is no reason for us to doubt the assessment by the trial court of the testimony of the victim. In general, the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are not disturbed by appellate courts and are treated with much weight and great respect, since it had the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of those on the stand and was then in a position to discern whether they were telling the truth.[19] Needless to say, its evaluation of their testimony and credibility is binding upon appellate courts, in the absence of a clear showing that it reached such evaluation arbitrarily; or plainly overlooked certain facts of substance or value that, if considered, might affect the result of the case. [20] | |||||
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2003-12-11 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| Q: And where did you proceed after that? A: We went fishing, sir.[7] It is improbable that Elma Luna, then only a 9-year old child and not exposed to the ways of the world, would impute a crime as serious as rape to any man if what she claims is not true. It becomes even more improbable if the man she accuses of rape is the common law husband of her mother, unless the man indeed raped her.[8] Appellant claims that an argument he had with Elma Luna's mother prompted the latter to file the rape case against him. It is highly unlikely that a mother would expose her own daughter to the embarrassment and humiliation as well as to the trouble, ridicule and scandal arising from a public trial involving rape if such was not the truth.[9] | |||||
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2003-06-26 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| The relationship between a stepfather and a stepdaughter assumes the existence of a legitimate relationship, that is, the stepfather should be legally married to the stepdaughter's mother.[37] In contrast, a common-law husband is not legally married to his common-law wife. If such common-law wife has a daughter by another man, the daughter is not a stepdaughter of the common-law husband.[38] A common-law husband is subject to punishment by death if he commits rape[39] against his common-law wife's daughter by another man. However, the death penalty cannot be imposed on the common-law husband if the relationship alleged in the information is that of a stepfather and stepdaughter, and what is proven is the relationship between a common-law husband and the daughter of his common-law wife by another man.[40] | |||||
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2003-03-26 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| It is true that we adhere to the time honored-doctrine that the trial court's assessment of credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is accorded great weight and may even be deemed conclusive and binding on the appellate court.[22] In innumerable instances, however, we interfered with the judgment of the trial court when there appeared facts or circumstances of weight and influence which the trial court may have overlooked and, if taken into consideration, could have a significant effect on the outcome of the case.[23] | |||||
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2002-01-31 |
PARDO, J. |
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| "The crying of the victim during her testimony is evidence of the credibility of the rape charge."[24] Time and again we have ruled that factual findings of the trial court are generally not disturbed on appeal unless substantial facts have been overlooked which, if considered, would materially affect the result of the case.[25] We find no reason to depart from this rule. The victim's deportment during the trial, taken together with all the evidence on record, merits the badge of credibility. "It is improbable for a child of tender years and one not exposed to the ways of the world to impute a crime so serious as rape to any man, let alone her stepfather, if what she claimed was not true."[26] | |||||
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2000-09-28 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| The facts as found by the trial court show a clear-cut case of robbery and robbery with homicide. Great respect is accorded the factual conclusions of the trial court. The trial judge had the best opportunity to observe the behavior and demeanor of the witnesses. It formed first hand judgment as to whether particular witnesses were telling the truth or not.[27] Thus, absent misapprehension or misinterpretation of facts of weight and substance,[28] and absent any arbitrariness or irregularity,[29] the Court will not overturn its findings. | |||||
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2000-02-03 |
PER CURIAM |
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| In this case, Bermalyne's testimony is corroborated by medical findings of hymenal lacerations. Nor may the absence of physical injuries on Bermalyne preclude rape. In cases of incestuous rape, accused-appellant's moral ascendancy over the victim takes the place of violence and intimidation.[24] Moreover, for rape to exist, it is not necessary that the force or intimidation employed be so great or of such character as could not be resisted. It is enough that the intimidation produces such fear in the victim that if she does not yield to the demands of the accused, something grave would happen to her. Intimidation would also explain why there are no traces of struggle which would indicate that the victim fought off her attacker.[25] In fact, the law does not even impose a burden of proving resistance on the part of the rape victim.[26] | |||||