This case has been cited 8 times or more.
|
2015-06-22 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
||||
| There are two ways which could indicate, in fine, the presence of novation and thereby produce the effect of extinguishing an obligation by another which substitutes the same. The first is when novation has been explicitly stated and declared in unequivocal terms. The second is when the old and the new obligations are incompatible on every point. The test of incompatibility is whether or not the two obligations can stand together, each one having its independent existence. If they cannot, they are incompatible and the latter obligation novates the first. Corollarily, changes that breed incompatibility must be essential in nature and not merely accidental. The incompatibility must take place in any of the essential elements of the obligation, such as its object, cause or principal conditions thereof; otherwise, the change would be merely modificatory in nature and insufficient to extinguish the original obligation.[38] (Citations omitted.) | |||||
|
2015-06-17 |
PEREZ, J. |
||||
| It is true that the accused may be convicted of the felony under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code if the prosecution proves misappropriation or conversion by the accused of the money or property subject of the Information. In a prosecution for estafa, demand is not necessary where there is evidence of misappropriation or conversion.[14] The phrase, “to misappropriate to one’s own use” has been said to include “not only conversion to one’s personal advantage, but also every attempt to dispose of the property of another without right.”[15] In this case, the resolution of the issue of misappropriation by respondents depends upon the result of SEC Case No. 03-99-6259. If it is ruled in the SEC case that the present Anaped directors and officers were not validly elected, then respondent Victoria may have every right to refuse remittance of rental to Buban. Hence, the essential element of misappropriation in estafa may be absent in this case. | |||||
|
2014-04-29 |
PERALTA, J. |
||||
| Another procedural issue raised is, as claimed by petitioner, the formally defective Information filed against him. He contends that the Information does not contain the period when the pieces of jewelry were supposed to be returned and that the date when the crime occurred was different from the one testified to by private complainant. This argument is untenable. The CA did not err in finding that the Information was substantially complete and in reiterating that objections as to the matters of form and substance in the Information cannot be made for the first time on appeal. It is true that the gravamen of the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1, subparagraph (b) of the RPC is the appropriation or conversion of money or property received to the prejudice of the owner[6] and that the time of occurrence is not a material ingredient of the crime, hence, the exclusion of the period and the wrong date of the occurrence of the crime, as reflected in the Information, do not make the latter fatally defective. The CA ruled: x x x An information is legally viable as long as it distinctly states the statutory designation of the offense and the acts or omissions constitutive thereof. Then Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides that a complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed. In the case at bar, a reading of the subject Information shows compliance with the foregoing rule. That the time of the commission of the offense was stated as " on or about the fifth (5th) day of July, 1991" is not likewise fatal to the prosecution's cause considering that Section 11 of the same Rule requires a statement of the precise time only when the same is a material ingredient of the offense. The gravamen of the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) is the appropriation or conversion of money or property received to the prejudice of the offender. Thus, aside from the fact that the date of the commission thereof is not an essential element of the crime herein charged, the failure of the prosecution to specify the exact date does not render the Information ipso facto defective. Moreover, the said date is also near the due date within which accused-appellant should have delivered the proceeds or returned the said [pieces of jewelry] as testified upon by Tangkoy, hence, there was sufficient compliance with the rules. Accused-appellant, therefore, cannot now be allowed to claim that he was not properly apprised of the charges proferred against him.[7] | |||||
|
2013-10-14 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
||||
| The Court has further pointed out in Quinto v. People:[13] | |||||
|
2007-08-08 |
CARPIO, J. |
||||
| Novation, a civil law concept relating to the modification of obligations,[11] takes place when the parties to an existing contract execute a new contract which either changes the object or principal condition of the original contract, substitutes the person of the debtor, or subrogates a third person in the rights of the creditor.[12] The effect is either to modify or extinguish the original contract. In its extinctive form, the new obligation replaces the original, extinguishing the obligor's obligations under the old contract.[13] | |||||
|
2005-11-25 |
TINGA, J. |
||||
| Novation, in its broad concept, may either be extinctive or modificatory. It is extinctive when an old obligation is terminated by the creation of a new obligation that takes the place of the former; it is merely modificatory when the old obligation subsists to the extent it remains compatible with the amendatory agreement. An extinctive novation results either by changing the object or principal conditions (objective or real), or by substituting the person of the debtor or subrogating a third person in the rights of the creditor (subjective or personal). Under this mode, novation would have dual functions one to extinguish an existing obligation, the other to substitute a new one in its place requiring a conflux of four essential requisites: (1) a previous valid obligation; (2) an agreement of all parties concerned to a new contract; (3) the extinguishment of the old obligation; and (4) the birth of a valid new obligation.[21] | |||||
|
2003-12-11 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
||||
| Novation is never presumed,[46] and the animus novandi, whether totally or partially, must appear by express agreement of the parties, or by their acts that are too clear and unequivocal to be mistaken.[47] | |||||
|
2003-06-16 |
VITUG, J. |
||||
| An extinctive novation would thus have the twin effects of, first, extinguishing an existing obligation and, second, creating a new one in its stead. This kind of novation presupposes a confluence of four essential requisites: (1) a previous valid obligation, (2) an agreement of all parties concerned to a new contract, (3) the extinguishment of the old obligation, and (4) the birth of a valid new obligation.[6] Novation is merely modificatory where the change brought about by any subsequent agreement is merely incidental to the main obligation (e.g., a change in interest rates[7] or an extension of time to pay[8]); in this instance, the new agreement will not have the effect of extinguishing the first but would merely supplement it or supplant some but not all of its provisions. | |||||