Lawyerly

GR No. 196005

2014-10-01

CARPIO, ACTING C.J.

Under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, a person is exempt from criminal liability if he acts under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury.[49] For such defense to prosper the duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done.[50] A person invoking uncontrollable fear must show that the compulsion was such that it reduced him to a mere instrument acting not only without will but against his will as well.[51] It is necessary that the compulsion be of such a character as to leave no opportunity to escape or self-defense in equal combat.[52]

GR No. 177570

2011-01-19

PEOPLE v. NELIDA DEQUINA Y DIMAPANAN

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.

A person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, like one who acts under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury, is exempt from criminal liability because he does not act with freedom. Actus me invito factus non est meus actus. An act done by me against my will is not my act. The force contemplated must be so formidable as to reduce the actor to a mere instrument who acts not only without will but against his will. The duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and of such nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. A threat of future injury is not enough. The compulsion must be of such a character as to leave no opportunity for the accused for escape or self-defense in equal combat.[19] Here, Dequina's version of events that culminated with her and Jundoc and Jingabo's arrests on September 29, 1999 is implausible. Equally far-fetched is Jundoc and Jingabo's assertion of blind trust in Dequina and total ignorance of the transportation of marijuana. We agree with the Court of Appeals when it observed that: While [Dequina] wants us to believe that she acted under compulsion and that a certain Sally called all the shots, she nevertheless admitted that their accommodations when they reached Manila was with her aunt in Guadalupe. On cross examination, she said that it was she who told Sally that they were going to stay with her aunt. More importantly, the alleged threat on her daughter was unclear. At one point in her testimony, she claimed that her daughter was to be under the custody of Sally while she was away. However, during the trial her lawyer manifested that her daughter was in fact in Manila and in the court room attending the hearing. Moreover, accused-appellants themselves picture a very precise and elaborate scheme in the transport of the huge shipment of marijuana. With this, it is simply contrary to human experience that the people behind the shipment would entrust the same to an unknowing and uncertain person such as [Dequina] and her two stooges, unless they themselves were in on it. Furthermore, the scheme or transport of the marijuana shipment was so exact that [Jundoc] and [Jingabo] only had enough time to rest in the house of [Dequina's] aunt in Guadalupe - from the time they arrived in Manila in the morning to the time they had to go to provincial bus station in the afternoon, negating their purported desire to see Manila. Clearly, the defense' story is riddled with holes.[20]

GR No. 178062

2010-09-08

PEOPLE v. ABDUL AMINOLA Y OMAR

VELASCO JR., J.

The CA correctly ruled on the question of legality of the warrantless arrests of accused-appellants. A warrantless arrest is not a jurisdictional defect and any objection to it is waived when the person arrested submits to arraignment without any objection,[25] as in this case. Accused-appellants are questioning their arrest for the first time on appeal and are, therefore, deemed to have waived their right to the constitutional protection against illegal arrests and searches.[26]

GR No. 168446

2009-09-18

PEOPLE v. ERNESTO CRUZ

PERALTA, J.

Judge Learned Hand once called conspiracy "the darling of the modern prosecutor's nursery."[44] There is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it.[45] Conspiracy as a mode of incurring criminal liability must be proven separately from and with the same quantum of proof as the crime itself. Conspiracy need not be proven by direct evidence. After all, secrecy and concealment are essential features of a successful conspiracy. Conspiracies are clandestine in nature. It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, showing that they had acted with a common purpose and design.[46] Paraphrasing the decision of the English Court in Regina v. Murphy,[47] conspiracy may be implied if it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent of each other, were, in fact, connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment.[48] To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity.[49] There must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.[50]

GR No. 179943

2009-06-26

PEOPLE v. MARLON ALBERT DE LEON Y HOMO

PERALTA, J.

If it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment, a conspiracy may be inferred though no actual meeting among them to concert means is proved. That would be termed an implied conspiracy.[45] The prosecution was able to prove the presence of an implied conspiracy. The witnesses were able to narrate in a convincing manner, the circumstances surrounding the commission of the robbery and positively identified appellant as one of the robbers. Witness Eduardo Zulueta testified that appellant was one of the robbers who poked a gun at him, thus: Q. Were you able to identify those two armed male persons who poked their guns at you?

GR NO. 158754

2007-08-10

PEOPLE v. SANDIGANBAYAN

GARCIA, J.

Admittedly, direct proof is not essential to establish conspiracy. Since by its nature conspiracy is planned in utmost secrecy, it can rarely be proved by direct evidence. Consequently, the presence of the concurrence of minds which is involved in conspiracy may be inferred from proof of facts and circumstances which, taken together, apparently indicate that they are merely parts of some complete whole. If it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment, a conspiracy may be inferred though no actual meeting among them to concert is proved. That would be termed an implied conspiracy.[22]

GR No. 148518

2004-04-15

PEOPLE v. NARCISO SALDAÑA

PER CURIAM

As to herein appellants Morales and Malit, we find here a fit occasion to reiterate our ruling in the case of People v. Del Rosario.[100] Under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, [101] a person is exempt from criminal liability if he acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, or under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury, because such person does not act with freedom.[102] In Del Rosario,[103] however, we held that for such defense to prosper the duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and of such nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. A threat of future injury is not enough.[104]

GR Nos. 138874-75

2004-02-03

PEOPLE v. FRANCISCO JUAN LARRA×AGA

PER CURIAM

Clearly, the argument of Rowen, Ariel and Alberto that they were not part of the "conspiracy" as they were merely present during the perpetration of the crimes charged but not participants therein, is bereft of merit. To hold an accused guilty as co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity.[146] There must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.[147] Responsibility of a conspirator is not confined to the accomplishment of a particular purpose of conspiracy but extends to collateral acts and offenses incident to and growing out of the purpose intended.[148] As shown by the evidence for the prosecution, Rowen, Ariel and Alberto were not merely present at the scene of the crime.

GR No. 138937

2004-01-20

PEOPLE v. ANTONIO ABES Y YAMBOT

QUISUMBING, J.

There is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it.[73] Conspiracy as a mode of committing a crime must be proved separately from and with the same quantum of proof as the offense itself, but from its essential features of secrecy and concealment, it need not be proved by direct evidence. Instead, it is sufficient for conspiracy to be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during, and after the commission of the felony, showing they had acted with a common purpose and design.[74] Stated differently, the rule is that conviction is proper upon proof that the accused acted in concert, each of them doing his part to fulfill the common unlawful design, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent of each other, were, in fact, connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment.[75] In such a case, the act of one becomes the act of all and each of the accused will be deemed equally guilty of the crime committed.[76]

GR Nos. 139474-75

2003-12-11

PEOPLE v. EDUARDO PABILLARE Y VARONA

PER CURIAM

To hold an accused guilty as co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity.[20] There must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.[21] Responsibility of a conspirator is not confined to the accomplishment of a particular purpose of conspiracy but extends to collateral acts and offenses incident to and growing out of the purpose intended.[22] The following acts of appellants Cañada and Pabillare lead us to conclude that they conspired to commit the crime: (a) Cañada who was driving the car suddenly chased and overtook the motorcycle driven by the victim causing him to fall; (b) at such unsuspecting state, Pabillare and Johnny forcibly took and dragged him inside the car; (c) Pabillare and Johnny beat the victim and compelled him to produce money for his release; (d) Cañada never showed any opposition to such acts, instead he obeyed every instruction of Pabillare and Johnny; (e) while Johnny was negotiating for the ransom money, Cañada was left with the victim, closely guarding him; (f) Cañada brought the victim to the place where the pay-off would take place; and (g) Pabillare took the ransom money.

GR Nos. 111734-35

2000-06-16

PEOPLE v. FERNANDO A. MALAPAYON

PARDO, J.

Wilhelmina testified that when she was brought to the safe house, she saw three men, among them, accused-appellant Macario. Macario saw Wilhelmina, his employer, bound and blindfolded. She was clearly held against her will. Yet, he did not do anything to help her. The reasons which sufficed to convict Mercedita apply also to Macario. We note that Macario and Fernando Malapayon were together when they were both arrested at Saint Luke's Hospital on November 27, 1992.[48] Macario and Fernando Malapayon were together from the time of the abduction to the time of rescue. Verily, Macario cannot claim ignorance of the kidnapping. Here we find a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment towards a common unlawful purpose. This indicates participation in a conspiracy.[49]

GR Nos. 111734-35

2000-06-16

PEOPLE v. FERNANDO A. MALAPAYON

PARDO, J.

Unlike Macario, Rafael sufficiently explained his presence at the safe house. His justification was not rebutted by the prosecution. Failure of the prosecution to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence entitles the accused-appellant to an acquittal.[55] Conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by positive and conclusive evidence.[56] Mere companionship does not establish conspiracy.[57] When a circumstance is capable of two interpretations, one consistent with the accused's guilt, and one with his innocence, the latter must prevail.[58]

	GR No. 196005 2014-10-01	PEOPLE v. CHARLIE FIELDAD CARPIO, ACTING C.J.
Under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, a person is exempt from criminal liability if he acts under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury.[49] For such defense to prosper the duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done.[50] A person invoking uncontrollable fear must show that the compulsion was such that it reduced him to a mere instrument acting not only without will but against his will as well.[51] It is necessary that the compulsion be of such a character as to leave no opportunity to escape or self-defense in equal combat.[52]
	GR No. 177570 2011-01-19	PEOPLE v. NELIDA DEQUINA Y DIMAPANAN LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
A person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, like one who acts under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury, is exempt from criminal liability because he does not act with freedom. Actus me invito factus non est meus actus. An act done by me against my will is not my act. The force contemplated must be so formidable as to reduce the actor to a mere instrument who acts not only without will but against his will. The duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and of such nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. A threat of future injury is not enough. The compulsion must be of such a character as to leave no opportunity for the accused for escape or self-defense in equal combat.[19] Here, Dequina's version of events that culminated with her and Jundoc and Jingabo's arrests on September 29, 1999 is implausible. Equally far-fetched is Jundoc and Jingabo's assertion of blind trust in Dequina and total ignorance of the transportation of marijuana. We agree with the Court of Appeals when it observed that: While [Dequina] wants us to believe that she acted under compulsion and that a certain Sally called all the shots, she nevertheless admitted that their accommodations when they reached Manila was with her aunt in Guadalupe. On cross examination, she said that it was she who told Sally that they were going to stay with her aunt. More importantly, the alleged threat on her daughter was unclear. At one point in her testimony, she claimed that her daughter was to be under the custody of Sally while she was away. However, during the trial her lawyer manifested that her daughter was in fact in Manila and in the court room attending the hearing. Moreover, accused-appellants themselves picture a very precise and elaborate scheme in the transport of the huge shipment of marijuana. With this, it is simply contrary to human experience that the people behind the shipment would entrust the same to an unknowing and uncertain person such as [Dequina] and her two stooges, unless they themselves were in on it. Furthermore, the scheme or transport of the marijuana shipment was so exact that [Jundoc] and [Jingabo] only had enough time to rest in the house of [Dequina's] aunt in Guadalupe - from the time they arrived in Manila in the morning to the time they had to go to provincial bus station in the afternoon, negating their purported desire to see Manila. Clearly, the defense' story is riddled with holes.[20]
	GR No. 178062 2010-09-08	PEOPLE v. ABDUL AMINOLA Y OMAR VELASCO JR., J.
The CA correctly ruled on the question of legality of the warrantless arrests of accused-appellants. A warrantless arrest is not a jurisdictional defect and any objection to it is waived when the person arrested submits to arraignment without any objection,[25] as in this case. Accused-appellants are questioning their arrest for the first time on appeal and are, therefore, deemed to have waived their right to the constitutional protection against illegal arrests and searches.[26]
	GR No. 168446 2009-09-18	PEOPLE v. ERNESTO CRUZ PERALTA, J.
Judge Learned Hand once called conspiracy "the darling of the modern prosecutor's nursery."[44] There is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it.[45] Conspiracy as a mode of incurring criminal liability must be proven separately from and with the same quantum of proof as the crime itself. Conspiracy need not be proven by direct evidence. After all, secrecy and concealment are essential features of a successful conspiracy. Conspiracies are clandestine in nature. It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, showing that they had acted with a common purpose and design.[46] Paraphrasing the decision of the English Court in Regina v. Murphy,[47] conspiracy may be implied if it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent of each other, were, in fact, connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment.[48] To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity.[49] There must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.[50]
	GR No. 179943 2009-06-26	PEOPLE v. MARLON ALBERT DE LEON Y HOMO PERALTA, J.
If it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment, a conspiracy may be inferred though no actual meeting among them to concert means is proved. That would be termed an implied conspiracy.[45] The prosecution was able to prove the presence of an implied conspiracy. The witnesses were able to narrate in a convincing manner, the circumstances surrounding the commission of the robbery and positively identified appellant as one of the robbers. Witness Eduardo Zulueta testified that appellant was one of the robbers who poked a gun at him, thus: Q. Were you able to identify those two armed male persons who poked their guns at you?
	GR NO. 158754 2007-08-10	PEOPLE v. SANDIGANBAYAN GARCIA, J.
Admittedly, direct proof is not essential to establish conspiracy. Since by its nature conspiracy is planned in utmost secrecy, it can rarely be proved by direct evidence. Consequently, the presence of the concurrence of minds which is involved in conspiracy may be inferred from proof of facts and circumstances which, taken together, apparently indicate that they are merely parts of some complete whole. If it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment, a conspiracy may be inferred though no actual meeting among them to concert is proved. That would be termed an implied conspiracy.[22]
	GR No. 148518 2004-04-15	PEOPLE v. NARCISO SALDAÑA PER CURIAM
As to herein appellants Morales and Malit, we find here a fit occasion to reiterate our ruling in the case of People v. Del Rosario.[100] Under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, [101] a person is exempt from criminal liability if he acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, or under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury, because such person does not act with freedom.[102] In Del Rosario,[103] however, we held that for such defense to prosper the duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and of such nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. A threat of future injury is not enough.[104]
	GR Nos. 138874-75 2004-02-03	PEOPLE v. FRANCISCO JUAN LARRA×AGA PER CURIAM
Clearly, the argument of Rowen, Ariel and Alberto that they were not part of the "conspiracy" as they were merely present during the perpetration of the crimes charged but not participants therein, is bereft of merit. To hold an accused guilty as co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity.[146] There must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.[147] Responsibility of a conspirator is not confined to the accomplishment of a particular purpose of conspiracy but extends to collateral acts and offenses incident to and growing out of the purpose intended.[148] As shown by the evidence for the prosecution, Rowen, Ariel and Alberto were not merely present at the scene of the crime.
	GR No. 138937 2004-01-20	PEOPLE v. ANTONIO ABES Y YAMBOT QUISUMBING, J.
There is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it.[73] Conspiracy as a mode of committing a crime must be proved separately from and with the same quantum of proof as the offense itself, but from its essential features of secrecy and concealment, it need not be proved by direct evidence. Instead, it is sufficient for conspiracy to be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during, and after the commission of the felony, showing they had acted with a common purpose and design.[74] Stated differently, the rule is that conviction is proper upon proof that the accused acted in concert, each of them doing his part to fulfill the common unlawful design, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent of each other, were, in fact, connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment.[75] In such a case, the act of one becomes the act of all and each of the accused will be deemed equally guilty of the crime committed.[76]
	GR Nos. 139474-75 2003-12-11	PEOPLE v. EDUARDO PABILLARE Y VARONA PER CURIAM
To hold an accused guilty as co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity.[20] There must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.[21] Responsibility of a conspirator is not confined to the accomplishment of a particular purpose of conspiracy but extends to collateral acts and offenses incident to and growing out of the purpose intended.[22] The following acts of appellants Cañada and Pabillare lead us to conclude that they conspired to commit the crime: (a) Cañada who was driving the car suddenly chased and overtook the motorcycle driven by the victim causing him to fall; (b) at such unsuspecting state, Pabillare and Johnny forcibly took and dragged him inside the car; (c) Pabillare and Johnny beat the victim and compelled him to produce money for his release; (d) Cañada never showed any opposition to such acts, instead he obeyed every instruction of Pabillare and Johnny; (e) while Johnny was negotiating for the ransom money, Cañada was left with the victim, closely guarding him; (f) Cañada brought the victim to the place where the pay-off would take place; and (g) Pabillare took the ransom money.
	GR Nos. 111734-35 2000-06-16	PEOPLE v. FERNANDO A. MALAPAYON PARDO, J.
Wilhelmina testified that when she was brought to the safe house, she saw three men, among them, accused-appellant Macario. Macario saw Wilhelmina, his employer, bound and blindfolded. She was clearly held against her will. Yet, he did not do anything to help her. The reasons which sufficed to convict Mercedita apply also to Macario. We note that Macario and Fernando Malapayon were together when they were both arrested at Saint Luke's Hospital on November 27, 1992.[48] Macario and Fernando Malapayon were together from the time of the abduction to the time of rescue. Verily, Macario cannot claim ignorance of the kidnapping. Here we find a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment towards a common unlawful purpose. This indicates participation in a conspiracy.[49]
	GR Nos. 111734-35 2000-06-16	PEOPLE v. FERNANDO A. MALAPAYON PARDO, J.
Unlike Macario, Rafael sufficiently explained his presence at the safe house. His justification was not rebutted by the prosecution. Failure of the prosecution to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence entitles the accused-appellant to an acquittal.[55] Conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by positive and conclusive evidence.[56] Mere companionship does not establish conspiracy.[57] When a circumstance is capable of two interpretations, one consistent with the accused's guilt, and one with his innocence, the latter must prevail.[58]

PEOPLE v. JOSELITO DEL ROSARIO Y PASCUAL