This case has been cited 22 times or more.
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2014-11-24 |
LEONEN, J. |
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| This court has previously cited other privileged matters such as the following: "(a) editors may not be compelled to disclose the source of published news; (b) voters may not be compelled to disclose for whom they voted; (c) trade secrets; (d) information contained in tax census returns; . . . (d) bank deposits"[62] (pursuant to the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act); (e) national security matters and intelligence information;[63] and (f) criminal matters.[64] Nonetheless, the LSPA does not fall within any of these classes of information. Moreover, the privilege is not absolute, and the court may compel disclosure where it is indispensable for doing justice. | |||||
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2012-06-13 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| Jurisprudence[54] has provided the following limitations to that right: (1) national security matters and intelligence information; (2) trade secrets and banking transactions; (3) criminal matters; and (4) other confidential information such as confidential or classified information officially known to public officers and employees by reason of their office and not made available to the public as well as diplomatic correspondence, closed door Cabinet meetings and executive sessions of either house of Congress, and the internal deliberations of the Supreme Court. | |||||
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2012-06-13 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| Petitioners claim that the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in contracting for the purchase of AES goods and services from Smartmatic-TIM in spite of the below par performance of the latter's PCOS machines, CCS and other software and hardware in the May 2010 elections and non-compliance with the minimum functional capabilities required by law.[26] They echo the other petitioners' contention that the Comelec's decision to buy the CCS, PCOS machines, software and hardware of Smartmatic violates RA 9184's requirement of a prior competitive public bidding. Since the Comelec is bent on pursuing the purchase of the subject goods, which is an entirely new procurement, petitioners contend that there must be a public bidding. They argue that there is enough time to conduct public bidding for the 2013 elections, considering that for the May 2010 elections, the Comelec only had 10 months and they were able to conduct the public bidding. Petitioners are of the view that there is no more OTP to speak of, because the option period already lapsed and could not be revived by the unilateral act of one of the contracting parties.[27] | |||||
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2011-04-12 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| Incidentally, in its 1998 ruling in Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government,[92] the Court rendered an identical definition of ill-gotten wealth, viz: xxx. We may also add that `ill-gotten wealth', by its very nature, assumes a public character. Based on the aforementioned Executive Orders, `ill-gotten wealth' refers to assets and properties purportedly acquired, directly or indirectly, by former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives and close associates through or as a result of their improper or illegal use of government funds or properties; or their having taken undue advantage of their public office; or their use of powers, influence or relationships, "resulting in their unjust enrichment and causing grave damage and prejudice to the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines." Clearly, the assets and properties referred to supposedly originated from the government itself. To all intents and purposes, therefore, they belong to the people. As such, upon reconveyance they will be returned to the public treasury, subject only to the satisfaction of positive claims of certain persons as may be adjudged by competent courts. Another declared overriding consideration for the expeditious recovery of ill-gotten wealth is that it may be used for national economic recovery. | |||||
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2010-07-05 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| We have also recognized the need to preserve a measure of confidentiality on some matters, such as national security, trade secrets and banking transactions, criminal matters, and other confidential matters.[47] | |||||
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2009-02-24 |
PER CURIAM |
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| Ineluctably, any release of a copy to the public, or to the parties, of an unpromulgated ponencia infringes on the confidential internal deliberations of the Court. It is settled that the internal deliberations of the Court are confidential. [256] A frank exchange of exploratory ideas and assessments, free from the glare of publicity and pressure by interested parties, is essential to protect the independence of decision-making of those tasked to exercise judicial power. [257] | |||||
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2008-09-04 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| Respondent Committees argue as if this were the first time the presumption in favor of the presidential communications privilege is mentioned and adopted in our legal system. That is far from the truth. The Court, in the earlier case of Almonte v. Vasquez,[12] affirmed that the presidential communications privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution. Even Senate v. Ermita,[13] the case relied upon by respondent Committees, reiterated this concept. There, the Court enumerated the cases in which the claim of executive privilege was recognized, among them Almonte v. Chavez, Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG),[14] and Chavez v. PEA.[15] The Court articulated in these cases that "there are certain types of information which the government may withhold from the public,[16]" that there is a "governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other national security matters";[17] and that "the right to information does not extend to matters recognized as `privileged information' under the separation of powers, by which the Court meant Presidential conversations, correspondences, and discussions in closed-door Cabinet meetings."[18] | |||||
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2008-07-16 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| In Almonte v. Vasquez,[117] the Court recognized a common law governmental privilege against disclosure, with respect to state secrets bearing on diplomatic matters.[118] In Chavez v. PCGG,[119]the Court also recognizedtheconfidentialityof information on inter-government exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements subject to reasonable safeguards on the national interest.[120] It also reiterated the privilege against disclosure of state secrets bearing on diplomatic matters, as held in Almonte. Citing Chavez, Senate v. Ermita also acknowledged the states secrets privilege bearing on diplomatic matters. In PMPF v. Manglapus, the Court upheld the confidentiality of treaty negotiations. In that case, petitioners sought to compel the representatives of the President in the then ongoing negotiations of the RP-U.S. Military Bases Agreement to give them access to the negotiations, to treaty items already agreed upon, and to the R.P. and U.S. positions on items that were still being contested. | |||||
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2008-03-25 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| At this juncture, it must be stressed that the revocation of E.O. 464 does not in any way diminish our concept of executive privilege. This is because this concept has Constitutional underpinnings. Unlike the United States which has further accorded the concept with statutory status by enacting the Freedom of Information Act[23] and the Federal Advisory Committee Act,[24] the Philippines has retained its constitutional origination, occasionally interpreted only by this Court in various cases. The most recent of these is the case of Senate v. Ermita where this Court declared unconstitutional substantial portions of E.O. 464. In this regard, it is worthy to note that Executive Ermita's Letter dated November 15, 2007 limits its bases for the claim of executive privilege to Senate v. Ermita, Almonte v. Vasquez,[25] and Chavez v. PEA.[26] There was never a mention of E.O. 464. | |||||
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2008-03-25 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| The 1998 case Chavez v. PCGG[109] concerned a civil litigation. The question posed before the Court was whether the government, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), could be required to reveal the proposed terms of a compromise agreement with the Marcos heirs as regards their alleged ill-gotten wealth. The petitioner, a concerned citizen and taxpayer, sought to compel respondents to make public all negotiations and agreement, be they ongoing or perfected, and all documents related to the negotiations and agreement between the PCGG and the Marcos heirs. | |||||
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2008-03-25 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| As afore-discussed, this Court recognized in Almonte v. Vasquez[157] and Chavez v. PCGG[158] a governmental privilege against public disclosure of state secrets covering military, diplomatic and other national security matters. In U.S. v. Reynolds,[159] the U.S. Supreme Court laid down the procedure for invoking and assessing the validity of the invocation of the military secrets privilege, a privilege based on the nature and content of the information, which can be analogized to the diplomatic secrets privilege, also a content-based privilege. In Reynolds, it was held that there must be a formal claim of privilege lodged by the head of the department that has control over the matter after actual personal consideration by that officer. The court must thereafter determine whether the circumstances are appropriate for the claim of privilege, without forcing a disclosure of the very thing the privilege is designed to protect.[160] It was stressed that "(j)udicial control over the evidence in a case cannot be abdicated to the caprice of executive officers..."[161] It is possible for these officers "to satisfy the court, from all the circumstances of the case, that there is a reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters which, in the interest of national security, should not be divulged. When this is the case, the occasion for the privilege is appropriate, and the court should not jeopardize the security which the privilege is meant to protect by insisting upon an examination of the evidence, even by the judge alone, in chambers."[162] It was further held that "(i)n each case, the showing of necessity which is made will determine how far the court should probe in satisfying itself that the occasion for invoking the privilege is appropriate."[163] | |||||
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2007-08-15 |
VELASCO, JR., J. |
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| We explicated in Chavez v. PCGG[49] that in cases where issues of transcendental public importance are presented, there is no necessity to show that petitioner has experienced or is in actual danger of suffering direct and personal injury as the requisite injury is assumed. We find our ruling in Chavez v. PEA[50] as conclusive authority on locus standi in the case at bar since the issues raised in this petition are averred to be in breach of the fair diffusion of the country's natural resources and the constitutional right of a citizen to information which have been declared to be matters of transcendental public importance. Moreover, the pleadings especially those of respondents readily reveal that public funds have been indirectly utilized in the Project by means of Smokey Mountain Project Participation Certificates (SMPPCs) bought by some government agencies. | |||||
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2007-05-04 |
GARCIA, J. |
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| Like all constitutional guarantees, however, the right to information and its companion right of access to official records are not absolute. As articulated in Legaspi, supra, the people's right to know is limited to "matters of public concern" and is further subject to such limitation as may be provided by law. Similarly, the policy of full disclosure is confined to transactions involving "public interest" and is subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law. Too, there is also the need of preserving a measure of confidentiality on some matters, such as military, trade, banking and diplomatic secrets or those affecting national security.[19] | |||||
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2006-04-20 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| As Bayan Muna and Representatives Ocampo et al. have the standing to file their petitions, passing on the standing of their co-petitioners Courage and Codal is rendered unnecessary.[49] | |||||
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2006-04-20 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| In Chavez v. PCGG,[79] the Court held that this jurisdiction recognizes the common law holding that there is a "governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other national security matters."[80] The same case held that closed-door Cabinet meetings are also a recognized limitation on the right to information. | |||||
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2005-12-09 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| We hold otherwise. The power to tax and to grant tax exemptions is vested in the Congress and, to a certain extent, in the local legislative bodies.[18] Under Section 28(4), Article VI of the Constitution, no law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of all Members of Congress. Thus the exemption provided in the service contract cannot be given effect because the DOE, representing the government in the execution of the contract, has no authority to grant the same. | |||||
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2005-05-17 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| A compromise is a contract whereby parties, making reciprocal concerns, avoid litigation or put an end to one already commenced.[44] Like any other contract, it must comply with the requisite provisions in Article 1318 of the New Civil Code, to wit: (a) consent of the contracting parties; (b) object certain which is the subject matter of the contract; and (c) cause of the obligation which is established. Like any other contract, the terms and conditions of a compromise agreement must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy and public order.[45] Any compromise agreement which is contrary to law or public policy is null and void, and vests no rights and holds no obligation to any party. It produces no legal effect at all.[46] Considering all these, there can be no other conclusion than that the decision of the RTC on the basis of a compromise agreement where Benedick was recognized as the illegitimate child of Benito, Sr. is null and void. | |||||
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2004-01-13 |
PANGANIBAN, J. |
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| interest";[18] in other words, it is of "paramount public interest"[19] and "transcendental importance."[20] This fact alone would justify relaxing the rule on legal standing, following the liberal policy of this Court whenever a case involves "an issue of overarching significance to our society."[21] Petitioners' legal standing should therefore be recognized and upheld. Moreover, this Court has held that taxpayers are allowed to sue when there is a claim of "illegal disbursement of public funds,"[22] or if public money is being "deflected to any improper purpose";[23] or when petitioners seek to | |||||
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2003-11-10 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| The records show that Edmund Randolph of the State of Virginia presented to the Convention what came to be known as the Virginia Plan of structure of government. It was largely the handiwork of James Madison, Father of the American Constitution. It called for a strong national government composed of an executive, a bicameral legislature and a judiciary.[23] The Virginia Plan vested jurisdiction in the judiciary over impeachment of national officers.[24] Charles Pinkney of South Carolina offered a different plan. He lodged the power of impeachment in the lower house of the legislature but the right to try was given to the federal judiciary.[25] Much of the impeachment debates, however, centered on the accountability of the President and how he should be impeached. A Committee called Committee on Detail[26] recommended that the House of Representatives be given the sole power of impeachment. It also suggested that the Supreme Court should be granted original jurisdiction to try cases of impeachment. The matter was further referred to a Committee of Eleven chaired by David Brearley of New Hampshire.[27] It suggested that the Senate should have the power to try all impeachments, with a 2/3 vote to convict. The Vice President was to be ex-officio President of the Senate, except when the President was tried, in which event the Chief Justice was to preside.[28] Gouverneur Morris explained that "a conclusive reason for making the Senate instead of the Supreme Court the Judge of impeachments, was that the latter was to try the President after the trial of the impeachment."[29] James Madison insisted on the Supreme Court and not the Senate as the impeachment court for it would make the President "improperly dependent."[30] Madison's stand was decisively rejected.[31] The draft on the impeachment provisions was submitted to a Committee on Style which finalized them without effecting substantive changes.[32] | |||||
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2003-07-22 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| A compromise is binding and has the force of law between the parties, unless the consent of a party is vitiated - such as by mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influence - or when there is forgery, or if the terms of the settlement are so palpably unconscionable.[16] | |||||