This case has been cited 16 times or more.
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2014-01-15 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| Allegations of forgery, like all other allegations, must be proved by clear, positive, and convincing evidence by the party alleging it.[44] It should not be presumed[45] but must be established by comparing the alleged forged signature with the genuine signatures.[46] Although handwriting experts are often offered as witnesses, they are not indispensable because judges must exercise independent judgment in determining the authenticity or genuineness of the signatures in question. [47] | |||||
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2013-11-20 |
BRION, J. |
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| Likewise notable is the settled rule that forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence. The burden of proof lies in the party alleging forgery.[15] | |||||
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2012-06-13 |
DEL CASTILLO, J. |
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| As we have often said, forgery is not presumed but must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence by the party alleging it.[53] It is established by comparing the alleged forged signature with the genuine signatures.[54] Considering the technical nature of the procedure in examining forged documents, handwriting experts are often offered as expert witnesses.[55] But although their testimonies are useful, resort to these experts is not mandatory or indispensable because a finding of forgery does not depend entirely on their testimonies.[56] Judges must also exercise independent judgment in determining the authenticity or genuineness of the signatures in question, and not rely merely on the testimonies of handwriting experts.[57] | |||||
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2011-06-06 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| It has long been ingrained in our jurisprudence that a void title may become the root of a valid title if the derivative title was obtained in good faith and for value. Following the principle of indefeasibility of a Torrens title, every person dealing with registered lands may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title of the vendor/transferor, and he is not required to go beyond the certificate and inquire into the circumstances culminating in the vendor's acquisition of the property. The rights of innocent third persons who relied on the correctness of the certificate of title and acquired rights over the property covered thereby cannot be disregarded and the courts cannot order the cancellation of such certificate for that would impair or erode public confidence in the Torrens system of land registration. [48] | |||||
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2011-02-01 |
PER CURIAM |
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| Also, in all the questioned cases pointed out by Dabu, including the cases of Enal and Vitug, Judge Kapunan failed to offer any evidence to support his defense that his signatures therein were forged. The rule is that he who disavows the authenticity of his signature on a public document bears the responsibility of presenting evidence to that effect.[8] Mere disclaimer is not sufficient. Under Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court,[9] the genuineness of handwriting may be proved in the following manner: [1] by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he has seen the person write; or he has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted on or been charged; [2] by a comparison, made by a witness or the court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge. At the very least, he should present corroborating witnesses to prove his assertion. At best, he should present an expert witness.[10] As a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence and the burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery.[11] This, unfortunately, Judge Kapunan failed to do. | |||||
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2011-01-31 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| In this case, the defense interposed by the accused Marquez was that his signatures in the disbursement vouchers, purchase requests and authorizations were forged. It is hornbook rule that as a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence[11] and the burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery.[12] | |||||
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2010-07-30 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
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| It was thus incumbent upon Adelaida to prove that Dycoco's signature is genuine. As stated earlier, a mere photocopy of the REM was presented. It is axiomatic that when the genuineness of signatures on a document is sought to be proved or disproved through comparison of standard signatures with the questioned signature, the original thereof must be presented.[6] Why respondents did not present the original, they did not explain. Why they did not present Adelaida, who must have been present at the execution of the REM as her purported signature appears thereon, or the notary public, or any of the witnesses, neither did they explain. Sec. 5 of Rule 130 which reads: SEC. 5. When original document is unavailable. -- When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of the unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated. | |||||
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2009-09-03 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Insofar as a person who fraudulently obtained a property is concerned, the registration of the property in said person's name would not be sufficient to vest in him or her the title to the property. A certificate of title merely confirms or records title already existing and vested. The indefeasibility of the Torrens title should not be used as a means to perpetrate fraud against the rightful owner of real property. Good faith must concur with registration because, otherwise, registration would be an exercise in futility.[33] A Torrens title does not furnish a shield for fraud, notwithstanding the long-standing rule that registration is a constructive notice of title binding upon the whole world. The legal principle is that if the registration of the land is fraudulent, the person in whose name the land is registered holds it as a mere trustee.[34] | |||||
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2008-08-26 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Insofar as a person who has fraudulently obtained property is concerned, the consequently fraudulent registration of the property in the name of such person would not be sufficient to vest in him or her title to the property. Certificates of title merely confirm or record title already existing and vested. The indefeasibility of the torrens title should not be used as a means to perpetrate fraud against the rightful owner of real property. Good faith must concur with registration because, otherwise, registration would be an exercise in futility.[33] However, where good faith is established, as in the case of an innocent purchaser for value, a forged document may become the root of a valid title.[34] | |||||
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2007-11-20 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| Finally, we need not tarry on the alleged issue on good faith. Good faith is always presumed, unless convincing evidence to the contrary is adduced.[25] Eliodoro failed to submit such contrary proof. Thus, the presumption of good faith in favor of the Villagracias stands. Whether there was good or bad faith on their part as buyers, in our view, is a non-issue, raised mainly by petitioner to beef up his scanty contention. | |||||
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2007-09-25 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| In their Memorandum,[34] petitioners Heirs of Go Kim Chuan reiterate the same issues raised in the Original Petition and the Amended Petition. They argue that Act 3344 only refers to transactions affecting lands or interests therein not previously registered under the Spanish Mortgage Law or under the Torrens system; that if AZNAR could not have registered the sale in 1964 under Act 496 because the title over the subject property was lost, AZNAR should have availed itself of the remedy of reconstitution; that registration under Act 3344 is without legal effect and could not operate as constructive notice to petitioners and third persons, hence, may not be used as basis for the application of Art. 1544 of the New Civil Code; that the Notice of Adverse Claim of AZNAR was annotated on TCT No. 20626 only on February 14, 1990 after the execution of the Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement with Absolute Sale in favor of Go Kim Chuan on February 18, 1989, hence, the CA erred when it held that Go Kim Chuan was not a buyer in good faith for supposedly having knowledge of such adverse claim; and that the doctrine laid down in Heirs of Severa Gregorio v. CA[35] is inapplicable since it referred to a case wherein the original copy of the document under review was not produced in evidence while in the instant case, the original copy of the Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale executed by the Amodias in favor of AZNAR was presented before the trial court judge. | |||||
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2007-01-22 |
GARCIA, J. |
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| x x x. Plaintiffs, despite the opportunity given them by this Court, failed to present a handwriting expert to determine whether there was indeed forgery in the execution of the subject Deed of Sale. In the absence of the testimony of the handwriting expert, the allegations of forgery by the plaintiffs is merely self-serving. Unfortunately, this Court is not in the position to assess or evaluate the differences and similarities in the questioned signatures, much less, categorically state whether or not forgery exists. Neither could this court rely on the observation of the plaintiffs as to the alleged "glaring differences and dissimilarities" of the questioned signatures. (Underscoring ours) Moreover, the technical procedure utilized by handwriting experts, while usually helpful in the examination of forged documents, is not mandatory or indispensable to the examination or comparison of handwritings.[16] | |||||
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2006-10-16 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| As a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence and the burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery. The best evidence of a forged signature in an instrument is the instrument itself reflecting the alleged forged signature. The fact of forgery can only be established by a comparison between the alleged forged signature and the authentic and genuine signature of the person whose signature is theorized upon to have been forged. Without the original document containing the alleged forged signature, one cannot make a definitive comparison which would establish forgery. A comparison based on a mere xerox copy or reproduction of the document under controversy cannot produce reliable results.[135] | |||||
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2004-08-11 |
YNARES-SATIAGO, J. |
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| As a general rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence. The burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery. In Heirs of Severa P. Gregorio v. Court of Appeals,[12] we held that due to the technicality of the procedure involved in the examination of the forged documents, the expertise of questioned document examiners is usually helpful; however, resort to questioned document examiners is not mandatory and while probably useful, they are not indispensable in examining or comparing handwriting. | |||||
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2003-09-18 |
AZCUNA, J. |
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| In view of the required length of possession, even if We hypothetically admit the truth of appellant's allegation in his complaint that he had been for more than thirty (30) years been in "open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession in concept of owner" of the subject land, still he cannot be deemed to have acquired a grant, or a right to a grant, by operation of law, considering his possession thereof did not commence "since June 12, 1945 or earlier" as required by Sec. 48 (b) and (c), as amended by P.D. No. 1073. Among the documentary evidence submitted by appellant during the hearing on the application for a writ of preliminary injunction are tax declarations in his name and that of his predecessor-in-interest Alipio Bacalso, the oldest being for the year 1962. Appellant, therefore, has not acquired ownership and title under the law, over the property subject of litigation, which remained part of the public domain, exclusively belonging to the State. The trial court thus did not err in ordering the dismissal of the complaint upon the ground of failure to state a cause of action.[38] Petitioner, therefore, clearly relies on Tax Declaration No. 117609[39] for the year 1962,[40] the earliest tax declaration presented during the hearing on the application for a writ of preliminary injunction, which appears to be the evidence mentioned in petitioner's Opposition[41] to respondents' motion to dismiss wherein petitioner brought to the attention of the trial court the fact that the subject property "is a portion of a parcel of land originally owned by Alipio O. Bacalso, whose possession of the same commenced way back in 1962, as evidenced by a tax declaration issued in his name" (emphasis supplied). | |||||
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2003-08-05 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| For a buyer to be deemed a purchaser in good faith, the ruling in Heirs of Severa P. Gregorio v. Court of Appeals[29] is instructive:A purchaser in good faith is one who buys the property of another without notice that some other person has a right to or interest in such property and pays a full and fair price at the time of purchase or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other person in the property. As good faith primarily refers to a state of mind and is always a question of intention, evidence as to conduct and outward acts are usually resorted to in order to arrive at a reasonable determination of the inward motive or intention. The records show that respondent Chua knew for a fact that prior to 1962 and prior to the sale, there were erected on the land in question an old wooden house and a semi-bungalow house which were occupied by the father of Amado Celestial, Erlindo Celestial and their other relatives.[30] Carmencita Paradena, a witness for the petitioners, admitted residing with Amado and Florencia as their tenant on the land in question since 1963. She also testified that the brothers and sisters of Amado resided with them in the old wooden house.[31] This contradicts what respondent Chua's claim that prior to the sale, only spouses Editha and Erlindo Celestial occupied the land in question and nobody else.[32] These facts alone should have put respondent Chua on guard that there were possible defects in the title of the vendor. As enumerated in Mathay v. Court of Appeals,[33] viz: | |||||