This case has been cited 7 times or more.
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2006-05-03 |
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. |
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| The Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora[80] -- a recent case most pertinent to these cases at bar -- echoed a principle similar to Lansang. While the Court considered the President's "calling-out" power as a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed that "this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion." This ruling is mainly a result of the Court's reliance on Section 1, Article VIII of 1987 Constitution which fortifies the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political departments. Under the new definition of judicial power, the courts are authorized not only "to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable," but also "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government." The latter part of the authority represents a broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review what was before a forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of the government.[81] It speaks of judicial prerogative not only in terms of power but also of duty.[82] | |||||
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2004-11-25 |
TINGA, J, |
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| The 1987 Constitution is explicit in defining the scope of judicial power. It establishes the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of acts of the political departments. It speaks of judicial prerogative in terms of duty.[25] | |||||
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2004-05-28 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| While the doctrine admits of certain exceptions, i.e., special and important reasons or for exceptional and compelling circumstances,[19] the circumstances of this case do not permit the application of such exceptions. | |||||
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2004-03-23 |
TINGA, J. |
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| technical examination. Conversely, it found Dimaporo's motion unpersuasive and accordingly denied the same. In so doing, the HRET merely acted within the bounds of its Constitutionally-granted jurisdiction.[25] After all, the Constitution confers full authority on the electoral tribunals of the House of Representatives and the Senate as the sole judges of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective members. Such jurisdiction is original and exclusive.[26] Anent Dimaporo's contention that the assailed Resolutions denied him the right to procedural due process and to present evidence to substantiate his claim of massive substitute voting committed in the counter-protested precincts, suffice it to state that the HRET | |||||
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2004-01-20 |
YNARES-SATIAGO, J. |
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| Along the same vein, to read into the ordinances relied upon by petitioner objects which were neither specifically mentioned nor enumerated would be to run afoul of the dictum that where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to other matters.[13] In other words, it is a basic precept of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others, as expressed in the oft-repeated maxim expression unius est exlusio alterius.[14] Elsewise stated, expressium facit cessare tacitum what is expressed puts an end to what is implied.[15] The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislative body would not have made specific enumerations in a statute, if it had the intention not to restrict its meaning and confine its terms to those expressly mentioned. | |||||
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2003-08-12 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| However, where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same. The determination of whether a specific rule or set of rules issued by an administrative agency contravenes the law or the constitution is within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. Indeed, the Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation in the courts, including the regional trial courts.[25] This is within the scope of judicial power, which includes the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political departments.[26] Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.[27] | |||||