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GR No. 192898

2011-01-31

SPS. ALEXANDER TRINIDAD AND CECILIA TRINIDAD v. VICTOR ANG

BRION, J.

In addition, the cases cited by the petitioners - Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. How,[11] Roberts, Jr. v. CA,[12] and Dimatulac v. Villon[13] - were all decided prior to the amendment to Section 11 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which took effect on December 1, 2000. At the time these cases were decided, there was no 60-day limit on the suspension of arraignment.

GR No. 175887

2010-11-24

HEIRS OF LATE NESTOR TRIA v. ATTY. EPIFANIA OBIAS

VILLARAMA, JR., J.

Further, it is well within the court's sound discretion to suspend arraignment to await the result of the justice secretary's review of the correctness of the filing of the criminal information.[36] There are exceptional cases, such as in Dimatulac v. Villon[37] wherein we have suggested that it would have been wiser for the court to await the justice secretary's resolution before proceeding with the case to avert a miscarriage of justice. Evidently however, this is not a hard and fast rule, for the court has complete control over the case before it.

GR No. 171175

2009-10-09

PEOPLE v. ARTURO F. DUCA

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.

The assailed decision of the CA acquitting the respondent without giving the Solicitor General the chance to file his comment on the petition for review clearly deprived the State of its right to refute the material allegations of the said petition filed before the CA. The said decision is, therefore, a nullity. In Dimatulac v. Villon,[19] we held: Indeed, for justice to prevail, the scales must balance; justice is not to be dispensed for the accused alone. The interests of society and the offended parties which have been wronged must be equally considered. Verily, a verdict of conviction is not necessarily a denial of justice; and an acquittal is not necessarily a triumph of justice; for, to the society offended and the party wronged, it could also mean injustice. Justice then must be rendered even-handedly to both the accused, on one hand, and the State and offended party, on the other.[20]

GR No. 152889

2009-06-05

ENRIQUE V. VIUDEZ II v. CA

PERALTA, J.

Petitioner has put emphasis on his argument that the suspension of the proceedings in court, including the suspension of the implementation of a warrant of arrest pending a resolution of an appeal by the Secretary of Justice, is in consonance with jurisprudence laid down by this Court in Marcelo v. Court of Appeals, [34] Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, [35] Ledesma v. Court of Appeals,[36] Dimatulac v. Villon,[37] and Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. How.[38]

GR No. 173637

2009-04-21

DANTE T. TAN v. PEOPLE

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

The old adage that justice delayed is justice denied has never been more valid than in our jurisdiction, where it is not a rarity for a case to drag in our courts for years and years and even decades. It was this difficulty that inspired the constitutional requirement that the rules of court to be promulgated by the Supreme Court shall provide for a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy trial and disposition of cases.[50] Indeed, for justice to prevail, the scales must balance, for justice is not to be dispensed for the accused alone.[51]

GR No. 164170

2009-04-16

MACA-ANGCOS ALAWIYA Y ABDUL v. CA

CARPIO, J.

Settled is the rule that the Secretary of Justice retains the power to review resolutions of his subordinates even after the information has already been filed in court.[19] In Marcelo v. Court of Appeals,[20] reiterated in Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,[21] this Court clarified that nothing in Crespo v. Mogul[22] forecloses the power or authority of the Secretary of Justice to review resolutions of his subordinates in criminal cases despite an information already having been filed in court.[23] The nature of the power of control of the Secretary of Justice over prosecutors was explained in Ledesma v. Court of Appeals[24] in this wise:Decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are subject to appeal to the Secretary of justice who, under the Revised Administrative Code, exercises the power of direct control and supervision over said prosecutors; and who may thus affirm, nullify, reverse or modify their rulings. (Emphasis supplied)

GR NO. 145945

2006-06-27

PEOPLE v. VICTOR SUBIDA

CALLEJO, SR., J.

The time limitations provided under this section and the preceding section shall not apply where special laws or circulars of the Supreme Court provide for a shorter period of trial. It bears stressing that in criminal cases, the public prosecutor, the Judge and the accused have sacrosanct duties and obligations geared towards the speedy administration of criminal justice. The prosecution and the Judge are mandated to see to it that justice is done, i.e., not to allow the guilty to escape nor the innocent to suffer. The Judge should always be imbued with a high sense of duty and responsibility in the discharge of his obligation to promptly and properly administer justice. He must view himself as a priest, for the administration of justice is akin to a religious crusade.[26]

AM NO. RTJ-02-1698

2005-06-23

DANTE VICENTE v. JUDGE JOSE S. MAJADUCON

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

The Court finds respondent's reasoning shallow and unjustified. He cannot simply shirk responsibility by conveniently passing the buck, so to speak, to this Court on the pretext that we have the final say on the matter. This is hardly the kind of trait expected of a judge. Rule 3.02, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that in every case, a judge shall endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts and the applicable law unswayed by partisan interests, public opinion or fear of criticism. In Dimatulac vs. Villon,[11] we held that:The judge, on the other hand, "should always be imbued with a high sense of duty and responsibility in the discharge of his obligation to promptly and properly administer justice." He must view himself as a priest for the administration of justice is akin to a religious crusade. Thus, exerting the same devotion as a priest "in the performance of the most sacred ceremonies of religious liturgy," the judge must render service with impartiality commensurate with public trust and confidence reposed in him.[12]

GR NOS. 138792-804

2005-03-31

DANTE GUEVARRA v. FOURTH DIVISION OF SANDIGANBAYAN

CALLEJO, SR., J.

Indeed, for justice to prevail, the scales must balance; justice is not to be dispensed for the accused alone. The interests of society and the offended parties which have been wronged must be equally considered. Verily, a verdict of conviction is not necessarily a denial of justice; and an acquittal is not necessarily a triumph of justice, for, to the society offended and the party wronged, it could also mean injustice. Justice then must be rendered even-handedly to both the accused, on one hand, and the State and offended party, on the other.[32]

AM No. MTJ-03-1487

2003-12-01

SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF GUINDULMAN v. JUDGE MANUEL A. DE CASTRO

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

Absent a written notice duly sent to all parties concerned necessarily produces an impression of partiality of the court in favor of the accused. Respondent must know that it is not only the accused who has rights. The prosecution likewise has the right to a fair trial. Thus, in Dimatulac vs. Hon. Villon,[15] we held:. . . The judge's action must not impair the substantial rights of the accused, nor the right of the State and offended party to due process of law.

	GR No. 192898 2011-01-31	SPS. ALEXANDER TRINIDAD AND CECILIA TRINIDAD v. VICTOR ANG BRION, J.
In addition, the cases cited by the petitioners - Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. How,[11] Roberts, Jr. v. CA,[12] and Dimatulac v. Villon[13] - were all decided prior to the amendment to Section 11 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which took effect on December 1, 2000. At the time these cases were decided, there was no 60-day limit on the suspension of arraignment.
	GR No. 175887 2010-11-24	HEIRS OF LATE NESTOR TRIA v. ATTY. EPIFANIA OBIAS VILLARAMA, JR., J.
Further, it is well within the court's sound discretion to suspend arraignment to await the result of the justice secretary's review of the correctness of the filing of the criminal information.[36] There are exceptional cases, such as in Dimatulac v. Villon[37] wherein we have suggested that it would have been wiser for the court to await the justice secretary's resolution before proceeding with the case to avert a miscarriage of justice. Evidently however, this is not a hard and fast rule, for the court has complete control over the case before it.
	GR No. 171175 2009-10-09	PEOPLE v. ARTURO F. DUCA LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
The assailed decision of the CA acquitting the respondent without giving the Solicitor General the chance to file his comment on the petition for review clearly deprived the State of its right to refute the material allegations of the said petition filed before the CA. The said decision is, therefore, a nullity. In Dimatulac v. Villon,[19] we held: Indeed, for justice to prevail, the scales must balance; justice is not to be dispensed for the accused alone. The interests of society and the offended parties which have been wronged must be equally considered. Verily, a verdict of conviction is not necessarily a denial of justice; and an acquittal is not necessarily a triumph of justice; for, to the society offended and the party wronged, it could also mean injustice. Justice then must be rendered even-handedly to both the accused, on one hand, and the State and offended party, on the other.[20]
	GR No. 152889 2009-06-05	ENRIQUE V. VIUDEZ II v. CA PERALTA, J.
Petitioner has put emphasis on his argument that the suspension of the proceedings in court, including the suspension of the implementation of a warrant of arrest pending a resolution of an appeal by the Secretary of Justice, is in consonance with jurisprudence laid down by this Court in Marcelo v. Court of Appeals, [34] Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, [35] Ledesma v. Court of Appeals,[36] Dimatulac v. Villon,[37] and Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. How.[38]
	GR No. 173637 2009-04-21	DANTE T. TAN v. PEOPLE CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
The old adage that justice delayed is justice denied has never been more valid than in our jurisdiction, where it is not a rarity for a case to drag in our courts for years and years and even decades. It was this difficulty that inspired the constitutional requirement that the rules of court to be promulgated by the Supreme Court shall provide for a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy trial and disposition of cases.[50] Indeed, for justice to prevail, the scales must balance, for justice is not to be dispensed for the accused alone.[51]
	GR No. 164170 2009-04-16	MACA-ANGCOS ALAWIYA Y ABDUL v. CA CARPIO, J.
Settled is the rule that the Secretary of Justice retains the power to review resolutions of his subordinates even after the information has already been filed in court.[19] In Marcelo v. Court of Appeals,[20] reiterated in Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,[21] this Court clarified that nothing in Crespo v. Mogul[22] forecloses the power or authority of the Secretary of Justice to review resolutions of his subordinates in criminal cases despite an information already having been filed in court.[23] The nature of the power of control of the Secretary of Justice over prosecutors was explained in Ledesma v. Court of Appeals[24] in this wise:Decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are subject to appeal to the Secretary of justice who, under the Revised Administrative Code, exercises the power of direct control and supervision over said prosecutors; and who may thus affirm, nullify, reverse or modify their rulings. (Emphasis supplied)
	GR NO. 145945 2006-06-27	PEOPLE v. VICTOR SUBIDA CALLEJO, SR., J.
The time limitations provided under this section and the preceding section shall not apply where special laws or circulars of the Supreme Court provide for a shorter period of trial. It bears stressing that in criminal cases, the public prosecutor, the Judge and the accused have sacrosanct duties and obligations geared towards the speedy administration of criminal justice. The prosecution and the Judge are mandated to see to it that justice is done, i.e., not to allow the guilty to escape nor the innocent to suffer. The Judge should always be imbued with a high sense of duty and responsibility in the discharge of his obligation to promptly and properly administer justice. He must view himself as a priest, for the administration of justice is akin to a religious crusade.[26]
	AM NO. RTJ-02-1698 2005-06-23	DANTE VICENTE v. JUDGE JOSE S. MAJADUCON AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
The Court finds respondent's reasoning shallow and unjustified. He cannot simply shirk responsibility by conveniently passing the buck, so to speak, to this Court on the pretext that we have the final say on the matter. This is hardly the kind of trait expected of a judge. Rule 3.02, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that in every case, a judge shall endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts and the applicable law unswayed by partisan interests, public opinion or fear of criticism. In Dimatulac vs. Villon,[11] we held that:The judge, on the other hand, "should always be imbued with a high sense of duty and responsibility in the discharge of his obligation to promptly and properly administer justice." He must view himself as a priest for the administration of justice is akin to a religious crusade. Thus, exerting the same devotion as a priest "in the performance of the most sacred ceremonies of religious liturgy," the judge must render service with impartiality commensurate with public trust and confidence reposed in him.[12]
	GR NOS. 138792-804 2005-03-31	DANTE GUEVARRA v. FOURTH DIVISION OF SANDIGANBAYAN CALLEJO, SR., J.
Indeed, for justice to prevail, the scales must balance; justice is not to be dispensed for the accused alone. The interests of society and the offended parties which have been wronged must be equally considered. Verily, a verdict of conviction is not necessarily a denial of justice; and an acquittal is not necessarily a triumph of justice, for, to the society offended and the party wronged, it could also mean injustice. Justice then must be rendered even-handedly to both the accused, on one hand, and the State and offended party, on the other.[32]
	AM No. MTJ-03-1487 2003-12-01	SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF GUINDULMAN v. JUDGE MANUEL A. DE CASTRO AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
Absent a written notice duly sent to all parties concerned necessarily produces an impression of partiality of the court in favor of the accused. Respondent must know that it is not only the accused who has rights. The prosecution likewise has the right to a fair trial. Thus, in Dimatulac vs. Hon. Villon,[15] we held:. . . The judge's action must not impair the substantial rights of the accused, nor the right of the State and offended party to due process of law.

PETER PAUL DIMATULAC v. SESINANDO VILLON