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THELMA C. PANADO MARTINA C. RELLORTA v. CA

This case has been cited 5 times or more.

	GR No. 191661 2013-08-13	CITY GOVERNMENT OF MAKATI v. EMERITA B. ODEÑA SERENO, C.J.
It is axiomatic that final and executory judgments can no longer be attacked by any of the parties or be modified, directly or indirectly, even by the highest court of the land.[73]
	AM NO. RTJ-06-2009 2006-07-27	JOSE B. TIONGCO v. JUDGE EVELYN E. SALAO CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
It is also well-settled that the power to declare a person in contempt is inherent in all courts so as to preserve order in judicial proceedings and to uphold the administration of justice. Judges, however, are enjoined to exercise such power judiciously and sparingly, with utmost restraint, and with the end view of utilizing the same for correction and preservation of the dignity of the court, and not for retaliation or vindication.[13] The salutary rule is that the power to punish for contempt must be exercised on the preservative, not vindictive principle, and on the corrective and not retaliatory idea of punishment. The courts must exercise the power to punish for contempt for purposes that are impersonal, because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges as persons but for the functions that they exercise.[14] Only occasionally should the court invoke the inherent power in order to retain that respect without which the administration of justice must falter or fail.[15]
	AM NO. RTJ-06-1972 2006-06-21	JOHN PANALIGAN v. JUDGE FRANCISCO B. IBAY CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
It is well-settled that the power to declare a person in contempt is inherent in all courts so as to preserve order in judicial proceedings and to uphold the administration of justice. Judges, however, are enjoined to exercise such power judiciously and sparingly, with utmost restraint, and with the end view of utilizing the same for correction and preservation of the dignity of the court, and not for retaliation or vindication.[10] The salutary rule is that the power to punish for contempt must be exercised on the preservative, not vindictive principle, and on the corrective and not retaliatory idea of punishment. The courts must exercise the power to punish for contempt for purposes that are impersonal, because the power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges as persons but for the functions that they exercise.[11] Only occasionally should the court invoke the inherent power in order to retain that respect without which the administration of justice must falter or fail.[12]