This case has been cited 9 times or more.
|
2012-07-18 |
PEREZ, J. |
||||
| For review[1] are the Decision[2] dated 9 May 2008 and Resolution[3] dated 1 July 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 99947. In the assailed decision, the Court of Appeals declared as void ad initio petitioner's applications for Mineral Production Sharing Agreements (MPSA) but held as valid a similar application of the respondent. The decision was a reversal of the ruling[4] of the Office of the President (OP) in O.P. Case No. 06-C-113 and a reinstatement of the previous orders[5] issued by the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). The decretal portion of the decision of the appellate court accordingly reads:[6] | |||||
|
2007-11-23 |
NACHURA, J. |
||||
| Finally, the respondent asserts that the court a quo ought to have dismissed the complaint for failure to implead the other heirs who are indispensable parties. We agree. We note that the complaint filed by the petitioner sought to recover ownership, not just possession of the property; thus, the suit is in the nature of an action for reconveyance. It is axiomatic that owners of property over which reconveyance is asserted are indispensable parties. Without them being impleaded, no relief is available, for the court cannot render valid judgment. Being indispensable parties, their absence in the suit renders all subsequent actions of the trial court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present. Thus, when indispensable parties are not before the court, the action should be dismissed.[49] At any rate, a resolution of this issue is now purely academic in light of our finding that the complaint is already barred by prescription, estoppel and laches. | |||||
|
2007-10-18 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
||||
| Based on the foregoing, when the consent of one of the contracting parties is vitiated by fraud, the contract is voidable. However, even granting that Adoracion's consent to the sale was indeed obtained through fraud, the action to annul the contract is subject to a prescriptive period of four years from the time of the discovery of the fraud.[14] The time of discovery is the date when the deed of sale was registered with the Register of Deeds because registration constitutes constructive notice to the world.[15] | |||||
|
2007-07-10 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
||||
| At any rate, whether or not petitioner was properly served with summons in Civil Case No. 1102-P, and that Augusto was not authorized to enter into the Compromise Agreement dated July 25, 1983 on her behalf, will not affect the outcome of this case. There is sufficient evidence on record to establish that petitioner impliedly ratified the compromise agreement as well as the other documents executed pursuant thereto. Implied ratification may take various forms such as by silence or acquiescence; by acts showing approval or adoption of the contract; or by acceptance and retention of benefits flowing therefrom.[51] | |||||
|
2006-08-22 |
CORONA, J. |
||||
| However, the corporation may ratify the unauthorized act of its corporate officer.[12] Ratification means that the principal voluntarily adopts, confirms and gives sanction to some unauthorized act of its agent on its behalf. It is this voluntary choice, knowingly made, which amounts to a ratification of what was theretofore unauthorized and becomes the authorized act of the party so making the ratification.[13] The substance of the doctrine is confirmation after conduct, amounting to a substitute for a prior authority.[14] Ratification can be made either expressly or impliedly. Implied ratification may take various forms like silence or acquiescence, acts showing approval or adoption of the act, or acceptance and retention of benefits flowing therefrom.[15] | |||||
|
2005-04-12 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
||||
| In any event, the third-party complaint could not have prospered, on the additional ground that the petitioner failed to implead the private respondent's three (3) sisters who were the co-owners of the subject property. They were indispensable parties to the petitioner's action for the nullification of OCT No. RP-4176 and its derivative title and the reconveyance of the property to him by the said co-owners.[14] | |||||
|
2004-11-25 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
||||
| Petitioners find fault in the decision of the Court of Appeals which ruled that Land Bank has the right to appeal on the ground that it is a necessary party. It is argued that DAR, being the only agency authorized by law to represent the Republic of the Philippines in the acquisition of private agricultural lands for agrarian reform, as stated under Section 51(1) of Republic Act No. 3844 and amended by Rep. Act No. 6389, is an indispensable party in expropriation proceedings. Petitioners allege that Land Bank is only a necessary party, thus, the Court of Appeals should have dismissed the appeal pursuant to MWSS v. Court of Appeals[27] which states that "when indispensable parties are not before the courts, the action should be dismissed." Hence, petitioners concluded that the Court of Appeals acted without jurisdiction when it gave due course and decided the appeal filed by Land Bank, a necessary party, without being joined by the DAR, the indispensable party. | |||||
|
2003-10-03 |
TINGA, J. |
||||
| (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held barred.[56] | |||||
|
2001-09-26 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
||||
| There is laches when: (1) the conduct of the defendant or one under whom he claims, gave rise to the situation complained of; (2) there was delay in asserting a right after knowledge of the defendant's conduct and after an opportunity to sue; (3) defendant had no knowledge or notice that the complainant would assert his right; (4) there is injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant.[10] | |||||