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MARSH THOMSON v. CA

This case has been cited 4 times or more.

	GR No. 153510 2008-02-13	R.B. MICHAEL PRESS and ANNALENE REYES ESCOBIA v. NICASIO C. GALIT VELASCO JR., J.
The mere fact that the numerous infractions of respondent have not been immediately subjected to sanctions cannot be interpreted as condonation of the offenses or waiver of the company to enforce company rules. A waiver is a voluntary and intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known legal right or privilege.[9] It has been ruled that "a waiver to be valid and effective must be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a party to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him."[10] Hence, the management prerogative to discipline employees and impose punishment is a legal right which cannot, as a general rule, be impliedly waived.
	GR NO. 159810 2006-10-09	ESTATE OF EDWARD MILLER GRIMM v. ESTATE OF CHARLES PARSONS GARCIA, J.
The Court cannot, for two reasons, also lend cogency to the CA's observation that the heirs of Grimm may have had waived, abandoned or denounced their rights to the trust property when, for P100,000.00, they executed a Deed of Acknowledgment of Satisfaction of Partnership Interests.[43] Firstly, the deed, as a quitclaim instrument, did not mention any share certificate at all, which is only logical since MC No. 1088 was not a partnership asset in the first place. Secondly, the intention to waive a known right must be clear and unequivocal. In this case, the intent to renounce beneficial ownership of MC No. 1088 cannot reasonably be drawn from the tenor of the quitclaim document. For perspective, what the heirs of Grimm stated in the Deed of Acknowledgment is that the amount of P100,000.00 they received "represents the total liquidation and complete settlement ... of the entire partnership interests pertaining to the late Edward Miller Grimm as partner in G-P AND COMPANY." If, to borrow from Thompson v. Court of Appeals,[44] we apply the standard norm on how a waiver must be formulated, then clearly the general terms of the aforementioned deed merely indicate a clearance from general accountability, not specifically an abandonment of ownership of the disputed share. For: xxx. Settled is the rule that a waiver to be valid and effective must, in the first place, be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a party to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. xxx A waiver may not be attributed to a person when the terms thereof do not explicitly and clearly evidence an intent to abandon a right vested in such person. If we apply the standard rule that waiver must be cast in clear and unequivocal terms, then clearly the general terms of the cited release and quitclaim indicates merely a clearance from general accountability, not specifically a waiver of Amcham's beneficial ownership of the disputed shares.[45] In all, the facts and circumstances attendant militate against the CA's finding pointing to G-P & Co. as the beneficial owner of MC No. 1088. What the evidence adduced instead proved beyond cavil is that Grimm or his estate is such owner. We therefore reverse.
	GR NO. 163707 2006-09-15	MICHAEL C. GUY v. CA YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
As regards Remedios' Release and Waiver of Claim, the same does not bar private respondents from claiming successional rights. To be valid and effective, a waiver must be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a party to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. A waiver may not be attributed to a person when its terms do not explicitly and clearly evince an intent to abandon a right.[14]
	GR No. 125838 2003-06-10	DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PHILIPPINES v. CA CARPIO, J.
To constitute a waiver, the intent to waive must be shown clearly and convincingly.[36] A mere offer to lease the foreclosed properties cannot constitute a waiver of ERHC's right to contest the validity of the foreclosure on the ground of non-compliance with the statutory requisites. ERHC's offer to lease does not relinquish ERHC's right to challenge the validity of the foreclosure. The offer to lease the foreclosed properties cannot validate or ratify a void foreclosure. ERHC's intention to lease the foreclosed properties cannot simply outweigh DBP's failure to comply with the statutory requisite for a valid extrajudicial foreclosure. As the Court of Appeals correctly ruled, "there can be no waiver of the posting and publication requirements in foreclosure proceedings because the same is contrary to law and public order."