This case has been cited 4 times or more.
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2009-04-16 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| Finally, we note that petitioner faults the appellate court for not excluding the videotaped statement of Anita as hearsay evidence. Evidence is hearsay when its probative force depends, in whole or in part, on the competency and credibility of some persons other than the witness by whom it is sought to be produced. There are three reasons for excluding hearsay evidence: (1) absence of cross-examination; (2) absence of demeanor evidence; and (3) absence of oath.[41] It is a hornbook doctrine that an affidavit is merely hearsay evidence where its maker did not take the witness stand.[42] Verily, the sworn statement of Anita was of this kind because she did not appear in court to affirm her averments therein. Yet, a more circumspect examination of our rules of exclusion will show that they do not cover admissions of a party;[43] the videotaped statement of Anita appears to belong to this class. Section 26 of Rule 130 provides that "the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. It has long been settled that these admissions are admissible even if they are hearsay.[44] Indeed, there is a vital distinction between admissions against interest and declaration against interest. Admissions against interest are those made by a party to a litigation or by one in privity with or identified in legal interest with such party, and are admissible whether or not the declarant is available as a witness. Declaration against interest are those made by a person who is neither a party nor in privity with a party to the suit, are secondary evidence and constitute an exception to the hearsay rule. They are admissible only when the declarant is unavailable as a witness.[45] Thus, a man's acts, conduct, and declaration, wherever made, if voluntary, are admissible against him, for the reason that it is fair to presume that they correspond with the truth, and it is his fault if they do not.[46] However, as a further qualification, object evidence, such as the videotape in this case, must be authenticated by a special testimony showing that it was a faithful reproduction.[47] Lacking this, we are constrained to exclude as evidence the videotaped statement of Anita. Even so, this does not detract from our conclusion concerning petitioner's failure to prove, by preponderant evidence, any right to the lands subject of this case. | |||||
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2007-03-30 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| as well as the doctrines enunciated by the Court that the prosecution must establish beyond reasonable doubt every circumstance essential to the guilt of the accused;[44] and that every circumstance or doubt favoring the innocence of the accused must be duly taken into account.[45] | |||||
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2005-01-17 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| It is a hornbook doctrine that unless the affiant himself takes the witness stand to affirm the averments in his affidavits, the affidavits must be excluded from the judicial proceeding, being inadmissible hearsay.[42] The trial court and the Court of Appeals were correct in considering the same as hearsay evidence and in not giving probative weight to such affidavits. | |||||
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2003-04-04 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| This is not what is contemplated by law. In People v. Quidato, Jr.,[48] where the police officers already prepared the affidavits of the accused when they were brought to the CLAO (now PAO) lawyer, and the latter explained the contents of the affidavits in Visayan to the accused who affirmed the veracity and voluntary execution of the same, the court held that the affidavits are inadmissible in evidence even if they were voluntarily given. As also ruled in People v. Compil,[49] the belated arrival of the CLAO lawyer the following day, even if prior to the actual signing of the uncounseled confession, does not cure the defect of lack of counsel for the investigators were already able to extract incriminatory statements from the accused therein. Thus, in People v. De Jesus,[50] we said that admissions obtained during custodial interrogations without the benefit of counsel, although later reduced to writing and signed in the presence of counsel, are still flawed under the Constitution. | |||||