This case has been cited 2 times or more.
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2011-07-20 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| 1. The finding of the military authorities that Sgt. Angel died while in the line of duty is not binding on the ECC. This is not a new ECC doctrine. Apropos is the case of Government Service Insurance System v. Court of Appeals, [17] even if the case concerns the PNP and not the AFP. Thus: x x x the proceedings before the PNP Board and the ECC are separate and distinct, treating of two (2) totally different subjects; moreover, the PNP Board's conclusions here may not be used as basis to find that private respondent is entitled to compensation under P.D. No. 626, as amended. The presumption afforded by the Order relied upon by the PNP Board concerns itself merely with the query as to whether one died in the line of duty, while P.D. No. 626 addressed the issue of whether a causal relation existed between a claimant's ailment and his working conditions. Plainly, these are different issues calling for differing forms of proof or evidence, thus accounting for the existence of a favorable presumption in favor of a claimant under the Defense Department Order, but not under P.D. No. 626 when the disease is not listed under Annex `A' of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation. | |||||
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2009-07-15 |
BRION, J. |
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| The GSIS further argues, relying on GSIS v. CA,[14] that the proceedings in the AFP and the administrative machinery tasked by law to handle the government's employees compensation program are separate and distinct from one another; thus, the AFP's conclusions may not be used as basis in the determination of the compensability of De Castro's ailments. It thus objects to the CA's rejection of the ECC's findings of fact on the nature of the heart ailments of De Castro, stressing that the decision of the ECC clearly elaborated on what CAD is and why De Castro is not entitled to the employees' compensation. The ECC decision, it explains, was based on well-respected and often quoted medical references;[15] its medical evaluations revealed that De Castro's heart illnesses were related to his drinking and smoking habits. Finding further support in the declarations of the American Heart Association,[16] it maintains that the ECC is correct in taking into consideration De Castro's lifestyle, particularly his smoking and drinking habits, in denying his claim for compensation. The GSIS concludes that based on the findings of the ECC, De Castro's ailments were not acquired by reason of his employment with the PAF and were, therefore, not work-connected. | |||||