This case has been cited 3 times or more.
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2005-07-15 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| The CA agreed with the ruling of the MTC that applying Article 1311 of the New Civil Code, no double payments were made during the first period of the lease. The payments of LPI pertained only to those areas/spaces leased by it, while the payments of ASTRO pertained to the areas/spaces sublet to it; hence, such payments should not be credited to LPI.[28] Relying on the rulings of this Court in Filoil Refinery Corporation v. Sayo,[29] and Tan v. Lim,[30] the CA, likewise, ruled that the RTC also erred in ordering LPI to be placed in possession of the property, considering that the MOA had already expired pendente lite; hence, LPI could no longer regain possession of the property as lessee. | |||||
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2005-07-15 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| On the second issue, the appellate court reversed the ruling of the RTC ordering RCAM to restore possession of the leased property to LPI for a period of 21 months corresponding to the alleged unused portion of the period set in the MOA: from October 31, 1995 when RCAM unilaterally rescinded the MOA, to July 31, 1997. Citing the rulings of the Court in Filoil Refinery Corporation v. Sayo,[52] and Tan v. Lim,[53] the CA held as follows:The MTC was correct in not ordering the restoration of LPI in possession of the leased premises. The reason is obvious. The four-year term of the lease under the MOU (sic), which began on August 1, 1993 had expired on July 31, 1997. In view of the expiration of the lease, the directive of the Court a quo to restore LPI in possession of the leased premises for the period of 21 months from October 31, 1995 to July 31, 1997 was moot and academic, such period having already lapsed. A lessee's claim of possessory rights over the leased premises is lost upon the expiry of the lease contract. The subject directive cannot be interpreted to empower LPI to retake possession of the leased premises even after July 31, 1997, as this will amount to an extension of the lease, contrary to the express provision in the lease contract. A court is completely devoid of authority to extend the lease after the period stipulated has expired.[54] | |||||
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2000-02-15 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| Again, we disagree. The memorandum of sale appearing in Exhibit "3" is sufficient to prove the sale between petitioner Fortunata Calonge Agasen and her late sister, the previous vendee of the land subject of the Deed of Absolute Sale from private respondent. After all, contracts are obligatory in whatever form they may have been entered into provided all essential requisites are present.[14] The provision of Article 1358 on the necessity of a public document is only for convenience, not for validity or enforceability. It is not a requirement for the validity of a contract of sale of a parcel of land that this be embodied in a public instrument.[15] | |||||