This case has been cited 6 times or more.
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2002-02-13 |
PUNO, J. |
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| The accused-appellant assails the factual findings of the trial court with respect to the identity of Juan Bacuta's assailants. He admits being present at the scene of the crime but points to Remwel Cornel and Daryl Cornel as the culprits. In upholding the factual findings of the trial court, we adhere to the well-entrenched rule that findings of fact of the trial court are entitled to great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed except for strong and valid reasons because of the trial court's unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to observe their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under gruelling examination.[17] The prosecution witness Nestor Astorga clearly saw the accused-appellant stab Bacuta on the chest while he (Jocel Bejo) was on board the left back portion of Bacuta's owner-type jeep and Bacuta was on the driver's seat of the jeep. The other witnesses, Alolor and Bartolo, in unmistakable terms, also identified Jocel Bejo as the assailant who jumped off the left back portion of the jeep carrying a bloodstained knife. All three witnesses were innocent residents along Legaspi Street where the stabbing incident took place. They had no reason to falsely testify against the accused-appellant. Their testimonies are worthy of full faith and credit.[18] We find no reason to disturb the factual findings of the trial court. In light of the prosecution witnesses' positive identification of the accused Jocel Bejo, the latter's denial of the charge against him and his attempt to point to Remwel Cornel and his brother Daryl Cornel as the assailants of Juan Bacuta must prove futile. The running case law is that positive identification of the accused will prevail over the defense of denial.[19] | |||||
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2002-02-06 |
PUNO, J. |
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| In upholding the decision of the trial court, we adhere to the well-settled rule that the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is best left to the discretion of the trial court which, unlike a review court, observed the demeanor and conduct of witnesses while testifying and thus was in a better position to assess their capacity for truth.[21] While accused's arguments based on the witnesses' affidavits speculate on what could have actually happened, the prosecution witnesses testified on what actually happened, i.e., that they saw the accused Castillo as one of the four men who fired at them. We have ruled that affidavits are generally subordinate in importance to open court declarations. Affidavits are not complete reproductions of what the affiants have in mind because they are generally prepared by the administering officer and the affiants simply sign them after the same have been read to him.[22] The accused Castillo's argument that he was not ably identified to have been one of the assailants as even the police blotter entry regarding the incident failed to mention him deserves scant consideration. We have ruled that police blotter entries should not always be given due significance or probative value for they do not constitute conclusive proof of the identities of suspected assailants.[23] | |||||
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2001-12-14 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| Moreover, we find that the alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the Aguares couple as eyewitnesses were minor, trivial and inconsequential. They pertained to surrounding incidents and not to the elements of the crime itself. Witnesses cannot be expected to remember all the details of the harrowing event which unfolded before their eyes. Minor discrepancies might be found in their testimony, but they do not damage the essential integrity of the evidence in its material whole, nor should they reflect adversely on the witnesses' credibility. In fact, they may even strengthen their credibility as they erase suspicion that the same was perjured.[34] | |||||
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2001-11-26 |
PARDO, J. |
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| Life expectancy is equivalent to two-thirds (2/3) of the difference between 80 years and the age of the victim at the time of his death,[57] which is 33 or is equivalent to 31.33 years.[58] Hence, following the formula, the compensation for loss of earning capacity amounts to P676,728.00.[59] | |||||
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2001-09-21 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| Indeed, the evaluation of the credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best left to the discretion of the trial court which, having had the opportunity to observe the demeanor and conduct of witnesses while on the stand, was in the best position to assess their capacity for truth.[29] In the absence of evidence that the trial court overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which, if properly considered, would have altered the result of the case, its findings on the credibility of the witnesses shall be accorded respect by this Court.[30] We see no reason to overturn the findings of the trial court in this case. | |||||
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2001-07-31 |
BELLOSILLO, J. |
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| The heirs of the deceased may recover damages for loss of earning capacity. Although the prosecution did not present documentary evidence to support this claim, testimonial evidence is sufficient to establish a basis for which the court can make a fair and reasonable estimate of damages for loss of earning capacity,[28] and the unrebutted testimony of Leonora Salo is sufficient basis for the award. She testified that the victim was fifty (50) years old at the time of his death and earned a basic salary of P130.00 a day but including tips as waiter in a restaurant he was earning a total average of P9,000.00 per month. Under the American Expectancy Table of Mortality adopted by this Court in several cases,[29] loss of earning capacity is computed according to the following formula: Net Earning Capacity (X) = Life Expectancy x Gross Annual Income - Living Expenses (50% of Gross Annual Income) where life expectancy = 2/3 x (80 - [age of deceased]); and Gross Annual Income = Monthly Earnings x number of months (12) Therefore, X = 2/3 (80-50) x [(P9,000.00 x 12) - [P9,000.00 x 12) 50%] X = 2/3 (30) x [P108,000.00 - P54,000.00] X = 20 x P54,000.00 X = P1,080,000.00 The award of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity is reduced to P50,000.00 since murder was not qualified by any circumstance under which the death penalty is authorized. The testimony of Leonora that she suffered sleepless nights and mental anxiety as a result of her husband's murder sufficiently justifies moral damages,[30] although the award of P100,000.00 may be considered excessive hence must be lowered to P50,000.00 to conform with current jurisprudence.[31] | |||||