This case has been cited 27 times or more.
|
2014-07-01 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
||||
| The term "budget" originated from the Middle English word bouget that had derived from the Latin word bulga (which means bag or purse).[51] | |||||
|
2014-04-08 |
MENDOZA, J. |
||||
| Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental act.[113] It requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.[114] | |||||
|
2014-01-28 |
BRION, J. |
||||
| We clarify, too, that the issue of whether a Deputy Ombudsman may be subjected to the administrative disciplinary jurisdiction of the President (concurrently with that of the Ombudsman) is a justiciable not a political question. A justiciable question is one which is inherently susceptible of being decided on grounds recognized by law,[31] as where the court finds that there are constitutionally-imposed limits on the exercise of the powers conferred on a political branch of the government.[32] | |||||
|
2012-06-13 |
PERALTA, J. |
||||
| In G.R. No. 201121, petitioners Solidarity for Sovereignty (S4S), represented by Ma. Linda Olaguer, Ramon Pedrosa, Benjamin Paulino, Sr., Evelyn Coronel, Ma. Linda Olaguer Montayre and Nelson T. Montayre, pray that a TRO be issued directing the Comelec to desist from implementing the contract; that Resolution No. 9376 be declared unconstitutional and all acts made pursuant thereto, including the purchase of the PCOS machines unlawful and void; that an Injunction be issued prohibiting the Comelec from further pursuing any act pursuant to Resolution No. 9376.[15] | |||||
|
2012-04-24 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
||||
| x x x a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain a direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The term "interest" means a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges "such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."[11] | |||||
|
2012-04-10 |
ABAD, J. |
||||
| But, as the Court previously held, where there are serious allegations that a law has infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but the duty of the Court to look into such allegations and, when warranted, uphold the supremacy of the Constitution.[39] Moreover, where the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, as in this case, the Court has the discretion to brush aside technicalities of procedure.[40] | |||||
|
2011-03-29 |
BRION, J. |
||||
| When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are present: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) the existence of personal and substantial interest on the part of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) recourse to judicial review is made at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.[30] | |||||
|
2010-10-05 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
||||
| Locus standi or legal standing requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.[11] | |||||
|
2009-06-16 |
PUNO, C.J. |
||||
| Neither can the lack of locus standi be cured by the claim of petitioners that they are instituting the cases at bar as taxpayers and concerned citizens. A taxpayer's suit requires that the act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation.[15] It is undisputed that there has been no allocation or disbursement of public funds in this case as of yet. To be sure, standing as a citizen has been upheld by this Court in cases where a petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental importance or when paramount public interest is involved.[16] While the Court recognizes the potential far-reaching implications of the issue at hand, the possible consequence of House Resolution No. 1109 is yet unrealized and does not infuse petitioners with locus standi under the "transcendental importance" doctrine. | |||||
|
2009-04-02 |
BRION, J. |
||||
| As Tañada v. Cuenco puts it, political questions refer "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of government." Thus, if an issue is clearly identified by the text of the Constitution as matters for discretionary action by a particular branch of government or to the people themselves then it is held to be a political question. In the classic formulation of Justice Brennan in Baker v. Carr, "[p]rominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on the one question."[14] [Emphasis supplied.] | |||||
|
2008-11-18 |
CARPIO, J. |
||||
| The rule has been adopted in our jurisdiction. In House International Building Tenants Association, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[32] Joya v. Presidential Commission on Good Government,[33] Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,[34] Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives,[35] and Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v. The Executive Secretary,[36] among others, this Court made similar pronouncements on locus standi. In the last mentioned case, the Court summarized the rule, thus:Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question on standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. | |||||
|
2008-08-29 |
YNARES-SATIAGO, J. |
||||
| The judgment in Civil Case No. 67315 declaring BON-MAR as owner of the subject lots should have convinced the trial court to conduct an inquiry. Although BON-MAR may have conceded that it is a stranger to the litigation, the same does not bind the Court. Besides, the facts and the law belie this claim. While this Court gives considerable weight to the parties' formulation of the issues, the resolution of the controversy may warrant an approach that goes beyond the narrow confines of the issues raised.[33] Justice does not depend on the depth of the parties' arguments; it is based on the established facts and the applicable law. | |||||
|
2008-04-18 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
||||
| Legal standing or locus standi is a party's personal and substantial interest in a case such that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act being challenged.[109] It calls for more than just a generalized grievance.[110] The term "interest" means a material interest, an interest in the issue affected by the govermental act, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved or a mere incidental interest.[111] Here, Baterina invoked that his being a legislator, taxpayer, concerned citizen, and the transcendental importance of the issues involved, imbued him with standing to intervene in the expropriation case.[112] | |||||
|
2008-02-27 |
REYES, R.T., J. |
||||
| Had the legislature intended other barangays from Nueva Era to become part of Marcos, it could have easily done so by clear and concise language. Where the terms are expressly limited to certain matters, it may not by interpretation or construction be extended to other matters.[51] The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have made specified enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.[52] | |||||
|
2007-01-31 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
||||
| In Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,[22] this Court defined legal standing as follows:"Legal standing" or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The term "interest" means a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges "such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied) | |||||
|
2006-05-03 |
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J. |
||||
| In G.R. No. 171489, petitioners, Cadiz et al., who are national officers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) have no legal standing, having failed to allege any direct or potential injury which the IBP as an institution or its members may suffer as a consequence of the issuance of PP No. 1017 and G.O. No. 5. In Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,[66] the Court held that the mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general an interest which is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry. However, in view of the transcendental importance of the issue, this Court declares that petitioner have locus standi. | |||||
|
2005-01-18 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
||||
| Even with the presence of an actual case or controversy, the Court may refuse to exercise judicial review unless the constitutional question is brought before it by a party having the requisite standing to challenge it.[10] Legal standing or locus standi is defined as a "personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged."[11] For a citizen to have standing, he must establish that he has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.[12] | |||||
|
2004-11-25 |
TINGA, J, |
||||
| The challenge to the legal standing of petitioners cannot succeed. Legal standing or locus standi is defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The term "interest" means a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the decree, as distinguished from a mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest.[30] | |||||
|
2004-02-03 |
TINGA, J, |
||||
| Petitioners Sanlakas and PM, and SJS Officers/Members, have no legal standing or locus standi to bring suit. "Legal standing" or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged…. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges "such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."[23] | |||||
|
2004-02-03 |
TINGA, J, |
||||
| Once before, the President on May 1, 2001 declared a state of rebellion and called upon the AFP and the PNP to suppress the rebellion through Proclamation No. 38 and General Order No. 1. On that occasion, "'an angry and violent mob armed with explosives, firearms, bladed weapons, clubs, stones and other deadly weapons' assaulted and attempted to break into Malacañang."[20] Petitions were filed before this Court assailing the validity of the President's declaration. Five days after such declaration, however, the President lifted the same. The mootness of the petitions in Lacson v. Perez and accompanying cases[21] precluded this Court from addressing the constitutionality of the declaration. | |||||
|
2004-01-27 |
CARPIO MORALES, J. |
||||
| "Legal standing" or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged,[64] alleging more than a generalized grievance.[65] The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges "such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."[66] Unless a person is injuriously affected in any of his constitutional rights by the operation of statute or ordinance, he has no standing.[67] | |||||
|
2004-01-21 |
CARPIO, J. |
||||
| On the other hand, we have relaxed the requirement on standing and exercised our discretion to give due course to voters' suits involving the right of suffrage.[21] Also, in the recent case of Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,[22] we gave the same liberal treatment to a petition filed by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines ("IBP"). The IBP questioned the validity of a Presidential directive deploying elements of the Philippine National Police and the Philippine Marines in Metro Manila to conduct patrols even though the IBP presented "too general an interest." We held:[T]he IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the rule of law and the Constitution. Apart from this declaration, however, the IBP asserts no other basis in support of its locus standi. The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general an interest which is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry x x x. | |||||
|
2004-01-21 |
CARPIO, J. |
||||
| Having stated the foregoing, this Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the requirement of legal standing when paramount interest is involved. In not a few cases, the court has adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people. Thus, when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, the Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure. In this case, a reading of the petition shows that the IBP has advanced constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. Moreover, because peace and order are under constant threat and lawless violence occurs in increasing tempo, undoubtedly aggravated by the Mindanao insurgency problem, the legal controversy raised in the petition almost certainly will not go away. It will stare us in the face again. It, therefore, behooves the Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the issue now, rather than later.[23] (Emphasis supplied) | |||||
|
2002-11-29 |
CARPIO, J. |
||||
| have a personal and substantial interest in the resolution of the controversy; (3) the controversy must be raised at the earliest reasonable opportunity; and (4) the resolution of the constitutional issue must be indispensable to the final determination of the controversy.[29] The five party-list representatives who are petitioners in the instant case have not alleged that they are entitled to, and have been unlawfully deprived of, seats in the HRET or the CA. Neither have they claimed that they have been nominated by the party-list groups in the | |||||
|
2001-05-10 |
MELO, J. |
||||
| Section 18 grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, the power to call out the armed forces in cases of (1) lawless violence, (2) rebellion and (3) invasion.[9] In the latter two cases, i.e., rebellion or invasion, the President may, when public safety requires, also (a) suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or (b) place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. However, in the exercise of this calling out power as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, the Constitution does not require the President to make a declaration of a "state of rebellion" (or, for that matter, of lawless violence or invasion). The term "state of rebellion" has no legal significance. It is vague and amorphous and does not give the President more power than what the Constitution says, i.e, whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. As Justice Mendoza observed during the hearing of this case, such a declaration is "legal surplusage." But whatever the term means, it cannot diminish or violate constitutionally-protected rights, such as the right to due process,[10] the rights to free speech and peaceful assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances,[11] and the right against unreasonable searches and seizures,[12] among others. | |||||
|
2001-05-10 |
MELO, J. |
||||
| In Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora, et al.,[13] the Court held that: x x x [T]he distinction (between the calling out power, on one hand, and the power to suspend the privilege of the write of habeas corpus and to declare martial law, on the other hand) places the calling out power in a different category from the power to delcare martial law and the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped together the three powers and provided for their revocation and review without any qualification. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. | |||||