This case has been cited 9 times or more.
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2011-05-30 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| Petitioner argues that the NLRC had established that there existed serious doubt between the evidence presented by the parties and, thus, the NLRC was correct in resolving the doubt in petitioner's favor following jurisprudence which states that if doubt exists between the evidence presented by the employer and the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter.[29] | |||||
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2008-09-23 |
BRION, J. |
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| Code[31] - and the CA erred when it saw grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC's ruling. The evidentiary situation, at the very least, brings to the fore the dictum we stated in Prangan v. NLRC[32] and in Ni cario v. NLRC[33] that "if doubts exist between the evidence presented by the employer and the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter. It is a time-honored rule in controversies between a laborer and his master, doubts reasonably arising from the evidence, or in the interpretation of agreements and writing should be resolved in the former's favor." | |||||
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2008-08-13 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| Moreover, it is a well-settled doctrine that if doubts exist between the evidence presented by the employer and the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter. It is a time-honored rule that in controversies between a laborer and his master, doubts reasonably arising from the evidence, or in the interpretation of agreements and writing, should be resolved in the former's favor. The policy is to extend the doctrine to a greater number of employees who can avail themselves of the benefits under the law, which is in consonance with the avowed policy of the State to give maximum aid and protection to labor.[47] | |||||
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2008-06-26 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Due to petitioners' failure to adduce any evidence showing that petitioners were project employees who had been informed of the duration and scope of their employment, they were unable to discharge the burden of proof required to establish that respondents' dismissal was legal and valid. Furthermore, it is a well-settled doctrine that if doubts exist between the evidence presented by the employer and that by the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter.[44] For these reasons, respondents are to be considered regular employees of HANJIN. | |||||
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2006-12-06 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| The rule is that officers of a corporation are not personally liable for their official acts unless it is shown that they have exceeded their authority. However, the legal fiction that a corporation has a personality separate and distinct from stockholders and members may be disregarded if it is used as a means to perpetuate fraud or an illegal act or as a vehicle for the evasion of an existing obligation, the circumvention of statutes, or to confuse legitimate issues.[15] | |||||
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2006-11-22 |
CALLEJO, SR., J. |
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| Indeed, the rule is that all doubts in the implementation and the interpretation of the Labor Code shall be resolved in favor of labor,[35] in order to give effect to the policy of the State to "afford protection to labor, promote full employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed, and regulate the relations between workers and employers," and to "assure the rights of workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work."[36] We reiterate the following pronouncement in Nicario v. National Labor Relations Commission:[37] | |||||
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2005-08-28 |
TINGA, J. |
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| At this point, it is important to note that one of the loans sought to be included in the "blanket mortgage clause" was obtained by respondents for Donalco Trading, Inc. Indeed, PN BD#76/C-430 was executed by respondents on behalf of Donalco Trading, Inc. and not in their personal capacity. Petitioner asks the Court to pierce the veil of corporate fiction and hold respondents liable even for obligations they incurred for the corporation. The mortgage contract states that the mortgage covers "as well as those that the Mortgagee may extend to the Mortgagor and/or DEBTOR, including interest and expenses or any other obligation owing to the Mortgagee, whether direct or indirect, principal or secondary." Well-settled is the rule that a corporation has a personality separate and distinct from that of its officers and stockholders. Officers of a corporation are not personally liable for their acts as such officers unless it is shown that they have exceeded their authority.[36] However, the legal fiction that a corporation has a personality separate and distinct from stockholders and members may be disregarded if it is used as a means to perpetuate fraud or an illegal act or as a vehicle for the evasion of an existing obligation, the circumvention of statutes, or to confuse legitimate issues.[37] PN BD#76/C-430, being an obligation of Donalco Trading, Inc., and not of the respondents, is not within the contemplation of the "blanket mortgage clause." Moreover, petitioner is unable to show that respondents are hiding behind the corporate structure to evade payment of their obligations. Save for the notation in the promissory note that the loan was for house construction and personal consumption, there is no proof showing that the loan was indeed for respondents' personal consumption. Besides, petitioner agreed to the terms of the promissory note. If respondents were indeed the real parties to the loan, petitioner, a big, well-established institution of long standing that it is, should have insisted that the note be made in the name of respondents themselves, and not to Donalco Trading Inc., and that they sign the note in their personal capacity and not as officers of the corporation. | |||||
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2005-07-28 |
TINGA, J. |
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| At this point, it is important to note that one of the loans sought to be included in the "blanket mortgage clause" was obtained by respondents for Donalco Trading, Inc. Indeed, PN BD#76/C-430 was executed by respondents on behalf of Donalco Trading, Inc. and not in their personal capacity. Petitioner asks the Court to pierce the veil of corporate fiction and hold respondents liable even for obligations they incurred for the corporation. The mortgage contract states that the mortgage covers "as well as those that the Mortgagee may extend to the Mortgagor and/or DEBTOR, including interest and expenses or any other obligation owing to the Mortgagee, whether direct or indirect, principal or secondary." Well-settled is the rule that a corporation has a personality separate and distinct from that of its officers and stockholders. Officers of a corporation are not personally liable for their acts as such officers unless it is shown that they have exceeded their authority.[36] However, the legal fiction that a corporation has a personality separate and distinct from stockholders and members may be disregarded if it is used as a means to perpetuate fraud or an illegal act or as a vehicle for the evasion of an existing obligation, the circumvention of statutes, or to confuse legitimate issues.[37] PN BD#76/C-430, being an obligation of Donalco Trading, Inc., and not of the respondents, is not within the contemplation of the "blanket mortgage clause." Moreover, petitioner is unable to show that respondents are hiding behind the corporate structure to evade payment of their obligations. Save for the notation in the promissory note that the loan was for house construction and personal consumption, there is no proof showing that the loan was indeed for respondents' personal consumption. Besides, petitioner agreed to the terms of the promissory note. If respondents were indeed the real parties to the loan, petitioner, a big, well-established institution of long standing that it is, should have insisted that the note be made in the name of respondents themselves, and not to Donalco Trading Inc., and that they sign the note in their personal capacity and not as officers of the corporation. | |||||
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2000-05-31 |
BELLOSILLO, J. |
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| Prescinding from the foregoing, the general rule is that officers of a corporation are not personally liable for their official acts unless it is shown that they have exceeded their authority.[21] Article 31 of the Corporation Code is in point - | |||||