This case has been cited 8 times or more.
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2009-03-13 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| Neither can the appellant cast suspicion on the prosecution witnesses' failure to immediately report the crimes and the identities of their assailants. This Court has previously ruled that delay in revealing the author of the crime does not impair the credibility of witnesses, more so if such delay is satisfactorily explained.[43] In this case, the delay in reporting the shooting incident and the identities of those responsible for the same were satisfactorily explained by the prosecution witnesses. As the Court of Appeals stated in its Decision, the delay and hesitation of Allan Montorio and Jomar Pillor to reveal the identities of the assailants to those people who interviewed them, i.e., the police authorities of San Juan, Abra, a media practitioner, and the appellant himself, were attributable to fear for their lives and those of their families; more so, if the one asking about the identities of the assailants is the assailant himself. It must be remembered that the appellant in this case is a policeman, while his co-accused Judito Molina is a bodyguard of the Mayor. Considering their standing in the community, it is quite natural for the eyewitnesses to be scared and to keep the information to themselves until they found enough courage to disclose the same.[44] Such fear was quite obvious on the part of the prosecution witnesses, as they were placed under the Witness Protection Program of the Department of Justice the moment they revealed what they knew about the shooting incident and who were responsible for the same. | |||||
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2007-01-23 |
TINGA, J. |
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| Pascual's defense of denial and alibi, supported by nothing but his say-so, is futile in the light of Adelaida's positive identification of him as the assailant. Denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses which should be buttressed by other convincing evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility.[25] | |||||
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2007-01-23 |
TINGA, J. |
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| At any rate, the doctrinal rule is that where the wound inflicted on the victim is not life threatening, the accused not having performed all the acts of execution that would have brought about death, the crime committed is only attempted murder.[36] In this case, the wound inflicted on Adelaida was not the kind which could have caused her death as, in fact, she was confined at the Medicare Hospital for only one (1) day. Pascual was thus properly convicted only of Attempted Murder in Criminal Case No. T-2515. | |||||
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2002-09-17 |
BELLOSILLO, J. |
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| mortal wound. This finding is fairly evident from Dr. Francisco Ricafort's testimony that Florencia Cabatu was "walking normally" when brought to the hospital for medical examination and treatment after a full five (5)-hour period from the time she was shot by accused-appellant.[11] This conclusion is corroborated by the medical certificate, Exh. "A," which verified that "under normal condition, without subsequent complication and/or deeper involvement present but not clinically apparent at the time of examination, the above-described physical injuries will require medical or will incapacitate the victim for a period of not less than nine (9) days but not more than thirty (30) days from the alleged date of infliction."[12] Clearly, where the wound inflicted on the victim is not as severe as to cause her death, the offender not having performed all the acts of execution that would have brought it about, the crime is perpetrated only in its attempted stage.[13] The assumption proposed by the prosecution that infection of the wound in the absence of timely medical attendance could have caused her death is too speculative and very remote to be even considered as the probable result of the criminal act proved against accused-appellant. | |||||
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2001-09-07 |
PUNO, J. |
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| We also rule that treachery was not established. The essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without warning--done in a swift and unexpected manner, affording the hapless and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape.[42] The prosecution did not prove the deliberateness of the attack. The evidence shows that Macuibelle peeped through the hole on the wall only after she heard the victim made an outcry. Appellant Hermosa was already at the main door and was then in the act of assaulting the victim. Macuibelle could not give the particulars on how the killing of the victim began and developed. Absent any particulars on how the aggression commenced or how the act which resulted in the victim's death unfolded, treachery cannot be appreciated.[43] We note, further, that the victim was aware of the danger on her life. She was holding a bolo when she was attacked. She was also able to shout for help. In light of these circumstances, treachery cannot be appreciated. | |||||
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2001-09-05 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| Treachery cannot be presumed but must be proved by clear and convincing evidence as conclusively as the killing itself. To appreciate treachery, two (2) conditions must be present, namely, (a) the employment of the means of execution that give the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate, and (b) the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted.[37] This court has already held that where treachery is alleged, the manner of attack must be proven. Where no particulars are shown as to the manner in which the aggression was made or how the act which resulted in death of the deceased began and developed, treachery cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance.[38] (Emphasis ours) | |||||
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2001-07-06 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| Second. We do not agree with the trial court, however, that treachery attended the commission of the crime and that accused-appellant must be convicted of the crime of murder. For treachery to exist, the following must be established: (1) the employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) the deliberate and conscious adoption of the means of execution.[44] It cannot be denied that the victim in this case sustained several gunshot wounds at the back. However, proof that the fatal wounds were located at the back of the deceased does not, sufficient to justify itself, compel a finding of treachery.[45] There must be a clear showing that the mode of attack was employed to reduce, if not eliminate, the danger arising from the defense that the victim might offer. Absent any particulars on the manner in which the aggression was commenced, treachery cannot be reasonably appreciated to qualify the killing in this case to murder.[46] The manner of attack not having been proven in this case, accused-appellant should be given the benefit of the doubt and the crime committed should be considered only as homicide under Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code.[47] | |||||
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2001-03-07 |
DE LEON, JR., J. |
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| Treachery cannot be presumed but must be proved by clear and convincing evidence as conclusively as the killing itself. To appreciate treachery, two (2) conditions must be present, namely, (a) the employment of means of execution that give the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate, and (b) the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted.[33] This Court has also previously held that where treachery is alleged, the manner of attack must be proven. Where no particulars are shown as to the manner in which the aggression was made or how the act which resulted in the death of the deceased began and developed, treachery cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance.[34] In the instant case, treachery cannot be appreciated considering that the only eyewitness to the actual stabbing, Benjamin Samudio, did not see the initial stage and particulars of the attack on the victim, Baldomero San Juan. | |||||