This case has been cited 7 times or more.
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2013-11-27 |
MENDOZA, J. |
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| Spouses Bautista's claim of good faith is negated by their failure to verify the extent and nature of Nasino's authority. Since Spouses Bautista did not deal with the registered owners but with Nasino, who merely represented herself to be their agent, they should have scrutinized all factual circumstances necessary to determine her authority to insure that there are no flaws in her title or her capacity to transfer the land.[33] They should not have merely relied on her verbal representation that she was selling the subject lots on behalf of Spouses Jalandoni. Moreover, Eliseo's claim that he did not require Nasino to give him a copy of the special power of attorney because he trusted her is unacceptable. Well settled is the rule that persons dealing with an assumed agency are bound at their peril, if they would hold the principal liable, to ascertain not only the fact of agency but also the nature and extent of authority, and in case either is controverted, the burden of proof is upon them to establish it.[34] As stated, Spouses Bautista's failure to observe the required degree of caution in ascertaining the genuineness and extent of Nasino's authority is tantamount to bad faith that precludes them from claiming the rights of a purchaser in good faith.[35] | |||||
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2012-06-13 |
PERLAS-BERNABE, J. |
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| Having, thus, traced the roots of the parties' respective titles supported by the records of the Register of Deeds of Malaybalay City, the courts a quo[53] were correct in upholding the title of the Heirs of Adolfo as against TCT No. T-10567 of Bangis, notwithstanding its earlier issuance on August 18, 1976[54] or long before the Heirs of Adolfo secured their own titles on May 26, 1998. To paraphrase the Court's ruling in Mathay v. Court of Appeals:[55] where two (2) transfer certificates of title have been issued on different dates, the one who holds the earlier title may prevail only in the absence of any anomaly or irregularity in the process of its registration, which circumstance does not obtain in this case. | |||||
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2011-06-15 |
VILLARAMA, JR., J. |
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| In Degollacion v. Register of Deeds of Cavite[38] we held that if two certificates of title purport to include the same land, whether wholly or partly, the better approach is to trace the original certificates from which the certificates of title were derived. Citing our earlier ruling in Mathay v. Court of Appeals[39] we declared: x x x where two transfer certificates of title have been issued on different dates, to two different persons, for the same parcel of land even if both are presumed to be title holders in good faith, it does not necessarily follow that he who holds the earlier title should prevail. On the assumption that there was regularity in the registration leading to the eventual issuance of subject transfer certificates of title, the better approach is to trace the original certificates from which the certificates of title in dispute were derived. Should there be only one common original certificate of title, x x x, the transfer certificate issued on an earlier date along the line must prevail, absent any anomaly or irregularity tainting the process of registration.[40] | |||||
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2006-07-17 |
GARCIA, J. |
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| Of course it is beyond cavil that the fraudulent registration of the property in the forger Valenzuela's name using the forged deed of sale is not sufficient to vest title to the property in him. Settled is the rule that a certificate is not conclusive evidence of title;[12] registration does not vest title, it is merely evidence of such title over a particular property.[13] Certificates of title merely confirm or record title already existing and vested. They cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true owner, nor can they be used as a shield for the commission of fraud, nor to permit one to enrich himself at the expense of others.[14] The Torrens system has never been recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership.[15] | |||||
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2005-03-11 |
TINGA, J. |
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| The fraudulent registration of the property in Rafael's name using the forged deed of sale is not sufficient to vest title to the entire property in him. Settled is the rule that a certificate is not conclusive evidence of title;[12] registration does not vest title, it is merely evidence of such title over a particular property.[13] Certificates of title merely confirm or record title already existing and vested. They cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true owner, nor can they be used as a shield for the commission of fraud, nor to permit one to enrich himself at the expense of others.[14] The Torrens sytem has never been recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership.[15] | |||||
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2003-12-08 |
YNARES-SATIAGO, J. |
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| The evidence on record shows that the Sumulong spouses are not purchasers in good faith. Well-settled is the rule that the person who asserts the status of a purchaser in good faith and for value has the burden of proving such assertion.[23] The Sumulongs failed to discharge this burden. | |||||
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2003-08-05 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| A purchaser in good faith is one who buys the property of another without notice that some other person has a right to or interest in such property and pays a full and fair price at the time of purchase or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other person in the property. As good faith primarily refers to a state of mind and is always a question of intention, evidence as to conduct and outward acts are usually resorted to in order to arrive at a reasonable determination of the inward motive or intention. The records show that respondent Chua knew for a fact that prior to 1962 and prior to the sale, there were erected on the land in question an old wooden house and a semi-bungalow house which were occupied by the father of Amado Celestial, Erlindo Celestial and their other relatives.[30] Carmencita Paradena, a witness for the petitioners, admitted residing with Amado and Florencia as their tenant on the land in question since 1963. She also testified that the brothers and sisters of Amado resided with them in the old wooden house.[31] This contradicts what respondent Chua's claim that prior to the sale, only spouses Editha and Erlindo Celestial occupied the land in question and nobody else.[32] These facts alone should have put respondent Chua on guard that there were possible defects in the title of the vendor. As enumerated in Mathay v. Court of Appeals,[33] viz:Although it is a recognized principle that a person dealing on a registered land need not go beyond its certificate of title, it is also a firmly settled rule that where there are circumstances which would put a party on guard and prompt him to investigate or inspect the property being sold to him, such as the presence of occupants/tenants thereon, it is of course, expected from the purchaser of a valued piece of land to inquire first into the status or nature of possession of the occupants, i.e., whether or not the occupants possess the land en concepto de dueño, in concept of owner. As is the common practice in the real estate industry, an ocular inspection of the premises involved is a safeguard a cautious and prudent purchaser usually takes. Should he find out that the land he intends to buy is occupied by anybody else other than the seller x x x, it would then be incumbent upon the purchaser to verify the extent of the occupant's possessory rights. The failure of a prospective buyer to take such precautionary steps would mean negligence on his part and would thereby preclude him from claiming or invoking the rights of a `purchaser in good faith'. In the case at bar, respondent Chua failed to make the necessary inquiry as to the possessory rights of the relatives of Editha and Erlindo Celestial. The records show that respondent Chua failed to inquire on the respective rights of petitioner Florencia and Carmencita Paradena, who were in actual possession of the land in question, or of the other brothers and sisters of Erlindo Celestial, husband of Editha, who also resided on the questioned land.[34] No amount of good faith can therefore be appreciated in favor of respondent Chua's acquisition of the land in question. | |||||