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GR No. 205728

2015-01-21

LEONEN, J.

In Ambil, Jr. v. COMELEC, the losing party in the gubernatorial race of Eastern Samar filed the election protest.[32] At issue was the validity of the promulgation of a COMELEC Division resolution.[33] No motion for reconsideration was filed to raise this issue before the COMELEC En Banc. This court declared that it did not have jurisdiction and clarified: We have interpreted [Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution][34] to mean final orders, rulings and decisions of the COMELEC rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers." This decision must be a final decision or resolution of the Comelec en banc, not of a division, certainly not an interlocutory order of a division. The Supreme Court has no power to review via certiorari, an interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a Division of the Commission on Elections.[35] (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)

GR No. 205728

2015-01-21

DIOCESE OF BACOLOD v. COMELEC

LEONEN, J.

We have interpreted [Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution][34] to mean final orders, rulings and decisions of the COMELEC rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers." This decision must be a final decision or resolution of the Comelec en banc, not of a division, certainly not an interlocutory order of a division. The Supreme Court has no power to review via certiorari, an interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a Division of the Commission on Elections.[35] (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)

GR No. 212953

2014-08-05

JOSE TAPALES VILLAROSA v. ROMULO DE MESA FESTIN

VELASCO JR., J.

In the instructive case of Ambil v. Commission on Elections,[4]We have interpreted the provision to limitthe remedy of certiorari against final orders, rulings and decisions of the COMELEC en banc rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.[5] Certiorari will not generally lie against an order, ruling, or decision of a COMELEC division for being premature, taking into account the availability of the plain, speedy and adequate remedy of a motion for reconsideration. As elucidated in the case: Rule 65, Section 1, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, requires that there be no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A motion for reconsideration is a plain and adequate remedy provided by law. Failure to abide by this procedural requirement constitutes a ground for dismissal of the petition.

GR No. 194139

2012-01-24

DOUGLAS R. CAGAS v. COMELEC

BERSAMIN, J.

This provision, although it confers on the Court the power to review any decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC, limits such power to a final decision or resolution of the COMELEC en banc, and does not extend to an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC. Otherwise stated, the Court has no power to review on certiorari an interlocutory order or even a final resolution issued by a Division of the COMELEC. The following cogent observations made in Ambil v. Commission on Elections[24] are enlightening, viz: To begin with, the power of the Supreme Court to review decisions of the Comelec is prescribed in the Constitution, as follows:

GR No. 151911

2011-07-25

EDGAR PAYUMO v. SANDIGANBAYAN

MENDOZA, J.

A final decision or resolution becomes binding only after it is promulgated and not before.[29] It is an elementary doctrine that for a judgment to be binding, it must be duly signed and promulgated during the incumbency of the judge who penned it.[30] In this connection, the Court En-Banc issued the Resolution dated February 10, 1983 implementing B.P. 129[31] which merely requires that the judge who pens the decision is still an incumbent judge, that is, a judge of the same court, albeit now assigned to a different branch, at the time the decision is promulgated.[32] In People v. CFI of Quezon, Branch X,[33] it was clarified that a judge who died, resigned, retired, had been dismissed, promoted to a higher court or appointed to another office with inconsistent functions, would no longer be considered an incumbent member of the court and his decision written thereafter would be invalid. Indeed, one who is no longer a member of the court at the time the final decision or resolution is signed and promulgated cannot validly take part in that decision or resolution.[34] Much less could he be the ponente of the decision or resolution. Also, when a judge or a member of the collegiate court, who had earlier signed or registered his vote, has vacated his office at the time of the promulgation of the decision or resolution, his vote is automatically withdrawn or cancelled.[35]

GR NO. 174763

2007-04-24

ANTONIO A. DIMAYUGA v. COMELEC

AZCUNA, J.

Two, the power of this Court to review[11] decisions of the COMELEC as prescribed in Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution refers to final orders, rulings and decisions of the COMELEC en banc, in accordance with the pronouncement in Ambil, Jr. v. Commission on Elections.[12] Hence, the status quo ante order of the COMELEC en banc, being in the nature of an interlocutory order, will not be reviewed herein by this Court.

GR NO. 163776

2007-04-24

REV. FR. NARDO B. CAYAT v. COMELEC

CARPIO, J.

In an order dated 9 May 2004, the COMELEC First Division dismissed Cayat's motion for reconsideration for failure to pay the required filing fee. In the local elections held on 10 May 2004, Cayat's name remained on the COMELEC's list of candidates. In the Certificate of Canvass of Votes dated 12 May 2004, Cayat received 8,164 votes.[10] Palileng, on the other hand, received 5,292 votes.[11] Cayat was thus proclaimed the duly elected Mayor of Buguias, Benguet. Cayat took his oath of office on 17 May 2004.

GR NO. 142666

2005-09-26

METRO DRUG DISTRIBUTION v. METRO DRUG CORPORATION EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION – FEDERATION OF FREE WORKERS

Time and again, this Court has exhorted that "before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the court's judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of court's judicial intervention is fatal to one's cause of action."[21] This rule is certainly not without reason The underlying principle of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies rests on the presumption that the administrative agency, if afforded a complete chance to pass upon the matter, will decide the same correctly. There are both legal and practical reasons for the principle. The administrative process is intended to provide less expensive and more speedy solutions to disputes. Where the enabling statute indicates a procedure for administrative review and provides a system of administrative appeal or reconsideration, the courts for reasons of law, comity and convenience will not entertain a case unless the available administrative remedies have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have been given an opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the administrative forum.[22]

GR No. 161418

2004-04-28

NOEL Y. REPOL v. COMELEC

CARPIO, J.

We held in Ambil, Jr. v. Commission on Elections[11] that -

GR No. 145802

2001-04-04

DOMINADOR T. BELAC v. COMELEC

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.

The rule has not been modified. In fact in the recently decided case of Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr. vs. COMELEC,[9] this Court passed upon a resolution written by Commissioner Guiani himself, holding that the said resolution is null and void ab initio because: "A final decision or resolution becomes binding only after it is promulgated and not before. Accordingly, one who is no longer a member of the Commission at the time the final decision or resolution is promulgated cannot validly take part in that resolution or decision. Much more could he be the ponente of the resolution or decision. The resolution or decision [of the Division] must be signed by a majority of its members and duly promulgated."

GR No. 140884

2001-03-06

GELACIO P. GEMENTIZA v. COMELEC

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.

In an en banc resolution dated January 18, 2000,[10] this Court dismissed the petition for having been prematurely filed. The Constitution, in its Section 7, Article IX-A in relation to Section 3, Article IX-C, and Rule 37 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure mandate that only final orders, rulings and decisions of the COMELEC en banc can be challenged before the Supreme Court on certiorari.[11]

	GR No. 205728 2015-01-21	DIOCESE OF BACOLOD v. COMELEC LEONEN, J.
In Ambil, Jr. v. COMELEC, the losing party in the gubernatorial race of Eastern Samar filed the election protest.[32] At issue was the validity of the promulgation of a COMELEC Division resolution.[33] No motion for reconsideration was filed to raise this issue before the COMELEC En Banc. This court declared that it did not have jurisdiction and clarified: We have interpreted [Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution][34] to mean final orders, rulings and decisions of the COMELEC rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers." This decision must be a final decision or resolution of the Comelec en banc, not of a division, certainly not an interlocutory order of a division. The Supreme Court has no power to review via certiorari, an interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a Division of the Commission on Elections.[35] (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)
	GR No. 205728 2015-01-21	DIOCESE OF BACOLOD v. COMELEC LEONEN, J.
We have interpreted [Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution][34] to mean final orders, rulings and decisions of the COMELEC rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers." This decision must be a final decision or resolution of the Comelec en banc, not of a division, certainly not an interlocutory order of a division. The Supreme Court has no power to review via certiorari, an interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a Division of the Commission on Elections.[35] (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)
	GR No. 212953 2014-08-05	JOSE TAPALES VILLAROSA v. ROMULO DE MESA FESTIN VELASCO JR., J.
In the instructive case of Ambil v. Commission on Elections,[4]We have interpreted the provision to limitthe remedy of certiorari against final orders, rulings and decisions of the COMELEC en banc rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.[5] Certiorari will not generally lie against an order, ruling, or decision of a COMELEC division for being premature, taking into account the availability of the plain, speedy and adequate remedy of a motion for reconsideration. As elucidated in the case: Rule 65, Section 1, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, requires that there be no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A motion for reconsideration is a plain and adequate remedy provided by law. Failure to abide by this procedural requirement constitutes a ground for dismissal of the petition.
	GR No. 194139 2012-01-24	DOUGLAS R. CAGAS v. COMELEC BERSAMIN, J.
This provision, although it confers on the Court the power to review any decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC, limits such power to a final decision or resolution of the COMELEC en banc, and does not extend to an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC. Otherwise stated, the Court has no power to review on certiorari an interlocutory order or even a final resolution issued by a Division of the COMELEC. The following cogent observations made in Ambil v. Commission on Elections[24] are enlightening, viz: To begin with, the power of the Supreme Court to review decisions of the Comelec is prescribed in the Constitution, as follows:
	GR No. 151911 2011-07-25	EDGAR PAYUMO v. SANDIGANBAYAN MENDOZA, J.
A final decision or resolution becomes binding only after it is promulgated and not before.[29] It is an elementary doctrine that for a judgment to be binding, it must be duly signed and promulgated during the incumbency of the judge who penned it.[30] In this connection, the Court En-Banc issued the Resolution dated February 10, 1983 implementing B.P. 129[31] which merely requires that the judge who pens the decision is still an incumbent judge, that is, a judge of the same court, albeit now assigned to a different branch, at the time the decision is promulgated.[32] In People v. CFI of Quezon, Branch X,[33] it was clarified that a judge who died, resigned, retired, had been dismissed, promoted to a higher court or appointed to another office with inconsistent functions, would no longer be considered an incumbent member of the court and his decision written thereafter would be invalid. Indeed, one who is no longer a member of the court at the time the final decision or resolution is signed and promulgated cannot validly take part in that decision or resolution.[34] Much less could he be the ponente of the decision or resolution. Also, when a judge or a member of the collegiate court, who had earlier signed or registered his vote, has vacated his office at the time of the promulgation of the decision or resolution, his vote is automatically withdrawn or cancelled.[35]
	GR NO. 174763 2007-04-24	ANTONIO A. DIMAYUGA v. COMELEC AZCUNA, J.
Two, the power of this Court to review[11] decisions of the COMELEC as prescribed in Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution refers to final orders, rulings and decisions of the COMELEC en banc, in accordance with the pronouncement in Ambil, Jr. v. Commission on Elections.[12] Hence, the status quo ante order of the COMELEC en banc, being in the nature of an interlocutory order, will not be reviewed herein by this Court.
	GR NO. 163776 2007-04-24	REV. FR. NARDO B. CAYAT v. COMELEC CARPIO, J.
In an order dated 9 May 2004, the COMELEC First Division dismissed Cayat's motion for reconsideration for failure to pay the required filing fee. In the local elections held on 10 May 2004, Cayat's name remained on the COMELEC's list of candidates. In the Certificate of Canvass of Votes dated 12 May 2004, Cayat received 8,164 votes.[10] Palileng, on the other hand, received 5,292 votes.[11] Cayat was thus proclaimed the duly elected Mayor of Buguias, Benguet. Cayat took his oath of office on 17 May 2004.
	GR NO. 142666 2005-09-26	METRO DRUG DISTRIBUTION v. METRO DRUG CORPORATION EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION – FEDERATION OF FREE WORKERS
Time and again, this Court has exhorted that "before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the court's judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of court's judicial intervention is fatal to one's cause of action."[21] This rule is certainly not without reason The underlying principle of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies rests on the presumption that the administrative agency, if afforded a complete chance to pass upon the matter, will decide the same correctly. There are both legal and practical reasons for the principle. The administrative process is intended to provide less expensive and more speedy solutions to disputes. Where the enabling statute indicates a procedure for administrative review and provides a system of administrative appeal or reconsideration, the courts for reasons of law, comity and convenience will not entertain a case unless the available administrative remedies have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have been given an opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the administrative forum.[22]
	GR No. 161418 2004-04-28	NOEL Y. REPOL v. COMELEC CARPIO, J.
We held in Ambil, Jr. v. Commission on Elections[11] that -
	GR No. 145802 2001-04-04	DOMINADOR T. BELAC v. COMELEC SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
The rule has not been modified. In fact in the recently decided case of Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr. vs. COMELEC,[9] this Court passed upon a resolution written by Commissioner Guiani himself, holding that the said resolution is null and void ab initio because: "A final decision or resolution becomes binding only after it is promulgated and not before. Accordingly, one who is no longer a member of the Commission at the time the final decision or resolution is promulgated cannot validly take part in that resolution or decision. Much more could he be the ponente of the resolution or decision. The resolution or decision [of the Division] must be signed by a majority of its members and duly promulgated."
	GR No. 140884 2001-03-06	GELACIO P. GEMENTIZA v. COMELEC SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
In an en banc resolution dated January 18, 2000,[10] this Court dismissed the petition for having been prematurely filed. The Constitution, in its Section 7, Article IX-A in relation to Section 3, Article IX-C, and Rule 37 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure mandate that only final orders, rulings and decisions of the COMELEC en banc can be challenged before the Supreme Court on certiorari.[11]

RUPERTO A. AMBIL v. COMELEC