This case has been cited 7 times or more.
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2010-04-23 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| It is a well-recognized principle that factual findings of the trial court are entitled to great weight and respect by this Court, more so when they are affirmed by the appellate court. However, the rule is not without exceptions, such as: (1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, and conjectures; (2) the inferences made are manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; and (4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts or premised on the absence of evidence on record.[10] Especially in criminal cases where the accused stands to lose his liberty by virtue of his conviction, the Court must be satisfied that the factual findings and conclusions of the lower courts leading to his conviction must satisfy the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. | |||||
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2007-09-05 |
CORONA, J. |
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| A judge may properly intervene in the presentation of evidence to expedite and prevent unnecessary waste of time and clarify obscure and incomplete details in the course of the testimony of the witness or thereafter.[32] Questions designed to clarify points and to elicit additional relevant evidence are not improper.[33] But the judge should limit himself to asking clarificatory questions and the power should be sparingly and judiciously used. The rule is that the court should stay out of it as much as possible, neither interfering nor intervening in the conduct of the trial.[34] A judge must always maintain cold neutrality and impartiality for he is a magistrate, not an advocate.[35] | |||||
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2007-08-17 |
TINGA, J. |
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| Appellant's argument is not well-taken. It is the judge's prerogative to ask clarificatory queries to ferret out the truth.[53] It cannot be taken against him if the questions he propounds reveal certain truths which, in turn, tend to destroy the theory of one party.[54] After all, the judge is the arbiter and ought to be satisfied himself as to the respective merits and claims of both parties in accord with the stringent demands of due process.[55] Also, being the arbiter, he may properly intervene in the presentation of evidence to expedite proceedings and prevent unnecessary waste of time.[56] | |||||
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2005-08-29 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| It is a well-recognized principle that factual findings of trial courts are entitled to great weight and respect by this Court, more so when these are affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The rule, however, is not without exceptions, such as: (1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises and conjectures; (2) the inferences made are manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; and (4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts or premised on the absence of evidence on record.[20] Especially in criminal cases where the accused stands to lose his liberty by virtue of his conviction, the Court must be satisfied that the factual findings and conclusions of the lower courts leading to his conviction must satisfy the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. | |||||
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2005-07-29 |
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. |
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| It is a well-recognized principle that factual findings of trial courts are entitled to great weight and respect by this Court, more so when these are affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The rule, however, is not without exceptions, such as: (1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises and conjectures; (2) the inferences made are manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; and (4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts or premised on the absence of evidence on record.[20] Especially in criminal cases where the accused stands to lose his liberty by virtue of his conviction, the Court must be satisfied that the factual findings and conclusions of the lower courts leading to his conviction must satisfy the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. | |||||
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2003-10-15 |
VITUG, J. |
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| It is within the sound discretion of the trial judge to ask questions from witnesses, if only to clarify what may appear to him to be vague points in the narration. Questions designed to avoid obscurity in the testimony or to elicit additional relevant evidence are not improper. The judge may aptly need to intervene in the presentation of evidence in order to expedite the resolution of a case and prevent unnecessary waste of time.[4] Judges, however, should be extremely careful so as not to be misunderstood, and they must refrain from making comments, remarks or suggestions that could lead to even the slightest suspicion that he is thereby unduly assisting a party or counsel. | |||||
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2000-02-29 |
BELLOSILLO, J. |
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| Taking Rowena's version in its totality, we find ourselves unable to concur with the credibility accorded to it by the trial court. For evidence to be believed, it must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must be credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances.[15] The test to determine the value of the testimony of a witness is whether such is in conformity with knowledge and consistent with the experience of mankind.[16] Whatever is repugnant to these standards becomes incredible and lies outside of judicial cognizance.[17] | |||||