Lawyerly

GR No. 199114

2013-07-16

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

It is a standing rule that every public official is entitled to the presumption of good faith in the discharge of official duties,[54] such that, in the absence of any proof that a public officer has acted with malice or bad faith, he should not be charged with personal liability for damages that may result from the performance of an official duty.[55] Good faith is always presumed and he who alleges the contrary bears the burden[56] to convincingly show that malice or bad faith attended the public officer's performance of his duties.[57]

GR No. 188635

2013-01-29

BRENDA L. NAZARETH v. REYNALDO A. VILLAR

BERSAMIN, J.

Nevertheless, our pronouncement in Blaquera v. Alcala[28] supports petitioners' position on the refund of the benefits they received. In Blaquera, the officials and employees of several government departments and agencies were paid incentive benefits which the COA disallowed on the ground that Administrative Order No. 29 dated 19 January 1993 prohibited payment of these benefits. While the Court sustained the COA on the disallowance, it nevertheless declared that:Considering, however, that all the parties here acted in good faith, we cannot countenance the refund of subject incentive benefits for the year 1992, which amounts the petitioners have already received. Indeed, no indicia of bad faith can be detected under the attendant facts and circumstances. The officials and chiefs of offices concerned disbursed such incentive benefits in the honest belief that the amounts given were due to the recipients and the latter accepted the same with gratitude, confident that they richly deserve such benefits.

GR No. 189774

2012-09-18

DR. EMMANUEL T. VELASCO v. COA

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

The Tariff Commission's ESIAS cannot be implemented independently and without regard to subsequent presidential administrative orders such as AO 161. In Blaquera v. Alcala,[30] the Court comprehensively discussed the effects of an administrative order similar to AO 161 on the implementation of the ESIAS. It ruled that in issuing an administrative order to regulate the grant of productivity incentive benefits, the President was only exercising his power of control, thus: Specifically, implementation of the Employee Suggestions and Incentive Award System has been decentralized to the President or to the head of each department or agency

GR No. 193978

2012-02-28

JELBERT B. GALICTO v. H.E. PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III

BRION, J.

We note that while the petition raises vital constitutional and statutory questions concerning the power of the President to fix the compensation packages of GOCCs and GFIs with possible implications on their officials and employees, the same cannot "infuse" or give the petitioner locus standi under the transcendental importance or paramount public interest doctrine. In Velarde v. Social Justice Society,[36] we held that even if the Court could have exempted the case from the stringent locus standi requirement, such heroic effort would be futile because the transcendental issue could not be resolved any way, due to procedural infirmities and shortcomings, as in the present case.[37] In other words, giving due course to the present petition which is saddled with formal and procedural infirmities explained above in this Resolution, cannot but be an exercise in futility that does not merit the Court's liberality. As we emphasized in Lozano v. Nograles,[38] "while the Court has taken an increasingly liberal approach to the rule of locus standi, evolving from the stringent requirements of 'personal injury' to the broader 'transcendental importance' doctrine, such liberality is not to be abused."[39]

GR No. 185001

2009-09-25

RONNIE H. LUMAYNA v. COA

DEL CASTILLO, J.

In Blaquera v. Alcala,[35] petitioners who were officials and employees of several government agencies were paid productivity incentive benefits for the year 1992 pursuant to Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987. On 19 January 1993, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 29 limiting the grant of productivity incentive benefits for the year 1992 in the maximum amount of P1,000.00 and enjoining the grant of said benefit without prior approval of the President.

GR No. 173226

2009-01-20

LAND BANK OF PHILIPPINES v. MANUEL O. GALLEGO

TINGA, J.

While the SAC is required to consider the acquisition cost of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declaration and the assessments made by the government assessors to determine just compensation, it is equally true that these factors have been translated into a basic formula by the DAR pursuant to its rule-making power under Section 49 of R.A. No. 6657.[36] In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Celada,[37] the Court upheld the applicability of DAR Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 5, series of 1998 in determining just compensation.

GR NO. 164195

2007-02-06

APO FRUITS CORPORATION v. CA

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

On 12 October 1995, AFC and HPI voluntarily offered to sell the above parcels of land to the government.[6] After the initial processing at the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) of the Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS)[7] application of AFC and HPI, it was referred to the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) for initial valuation. On 16 October 1996, AFC and HPI received separately from the DAR's Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) of Davao province a notice of land acquisition and valuation, informing AFC that the value of the properties has been placed at P86,900,925.88 or P165,484.47 per hectare[8] while HPI's properties were valued at P164,478,178.14.[9] Both AFC and HPI considered the valuations unreasonably low and inadequate as just compensation for the properties.

GR NO. 156537

2007-01-24

PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY v. COA

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.

We find, however, that the personnel concerned, in receiving the rice subsidy, acted in good faith in the honest belief they were entitled to such benefit. Hence, following our rulings in Blanquera v. Alcala,[15] De Jesus v. Commissioner of Audit,[16] Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa Government Service Insurance System (KMG) v. Commission on Audit,[17] and Philippine Ports Authority v. Commission on Audit,[18] the affected employees of petitioner PEA need not refund the rice subsidy they received. In these cases, the parties, in receiving incentive benefits, acted in good faith. Thus, they were no longer ordered to refund those benefits disallowed by COA.

GR NO. 159200

2006-02-16

PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY v. COA

AZCUNA, J.

In regard to the refund of the disallowed benefits, this Court holds that petitioners need not refund the benefits received by them based on our rulings in Blaquera v. Alcala,[7] De Jesus v. Commission on Audit[8] and Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa Government Service Insurance System (KMG) v. Commission on Audit.[9]

GR No. 155336

2004-11-25

CHR EMPLOYEES’ ASSOCIATION v. CHR

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

Nor is there any legal basis to support the contention that the CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy. In essence, fiscal autonomy entails freedom from outside control and limitations, other than those provided by law. It is the freedom to allocate and utilize funds granted by law, in accordance with law, and pursuant to the wisdom and dispatch its needs may require from time to time.[22] In Blaquera v. Alcala and Bengzon v. Drilon,[23] it is understood that it is only the Judiciary, the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Audit, the Commission on Elections, and the Office of the Ombudsman, which enjoy fiscal autonomy. Thus, in Bengzon,[24] we explained:As envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary, the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Audit, the Commission on Elections, and the Office of the Ombudsman contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs require. It recognizes the power and authority to levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates of compensation not exceeding the highest rates authorized by law for compensation and pay plans of the government and allocate and disburse such sums as may be provided by law or prescribed by them in the course of the discharge of their functions.

GR No. 150769

2004-08-31

KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM v. COA

TINGA, J,

The Court however finds that the DOH and GSIS officials concerned who granted hazard pay under R.A. No. 7305 to the SIG personnel acted in good faith, in the honest belief that there was legal basis for such grant. The SIG personnel in turn accepted the hazard pay benefits likewise believing that they were entitled to such benefit. At that time, neither the concerned DOH and GSIS officials nor the SIG personnel knew that the grant of hazard pay to the latter is not sanctioned by law. Thus, following the rulings of the Court in De Jesus v. Commission on Audit,[55] and Blaquera v. Alcala,[56] the SIG personnel who previously received hazard pay under R.A. No. 7305 need not refund such benefits.

	GR No. 199114 2013-07-16	ROSALINDA DIMAPILIS-BALDOZ v. COA PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
It is a standing rule that every public official is entitled to the presumption of good faith in the discharge of official duties,[54] such that, in the absence of any proof that a public officer has acted with malice or bad faith, he should not be charged with personal liability for damages that may result from the performance of an official duty.[55] Good faith is always presumed and he who alleges the contrary bears the burden[56] to convincingly show that malice or bad faith attended the public officer's performance of his duties.[57]
	GR No. 188635 2013-01-29	BRENDA L. NAZARETH v. REYNALDO A. VILLAR BERSAMIN, J.
Nevertheless, our pronouncement in Blaquera v. Alcala[28] supports petitioners' position on the refund of the benefits they received. In Blaquera, the officials and employees of several government departments and agencies were paid incentive benefits which the COA disallowed on the ground that Administrative Order No. 29 dated 19 January 1993 prohibited payment of these benefits. While the Court sustained the COA on the disallowance, it nevertheless declared that:Considering, however, that all the parties here acted in good faith, we cannot countenance the refund of subject incentive benefits for the year 1992, which amounts the petitioners have already received. Indeed, no indicia of bad faith can be detected under the attendant facts and circumstances. The officials and chiefs of offices concerned disbursed such incentive benefits in the honest belief that the amounts given were due to the recipients and the latter accepted the same with gratitude, confident that they richly deserve such benefits.
	GR No. 189774 2012-09-18	DR. EMMANUEL T. VELASCO v. COA PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
The Tariff Commission's ESIAS cannot be implemented independently and without regard to subsequent presidential administrative orders such as AO 161. In Blaquera v. Alcala,[30] the Court comprehensively discussed the effects of an administrative order similar to AO 161 on the implementation of the ESIAS. It ruled that in issuing an administrative order to regulate the grant of productivity incentive benefits, the President was only exercising his power of control, thus: Specifically, implementation of the Employee Suggestions and Incentive Award System has been decentralized to the President or to the head of each department or agency
	GR No. 193978 2012-02-28	JELBERT B. GALICTO v. H.E. PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III BRION, J.
We note that while the petition raises vital constitutional and statutory questions concerning the power of the President to fix the compensation packages of GOCCs and GFIs with possible implications on their officials and employees, the same cannot "infuse" or give the petitioner locus standi under the transcendental importance or paramount public interest doctrine. In Velarde v. Social Justice Society,[36] we held that even if the Court could have exempted the case from the stringent locus standi requirement, such heroic effort would be futile because the transcendental issue could not be resolved any way, due to procedural infirmities and shortcomings, as in the present case.[37] In other words, giving due course to the present petition which is saddled with formal and procedural infirmities explained above in this Resolution, cannot but be an exercise in futility that does not merit the Court's liberality. As we emphasized in Lozano v. Nograles,[38] "while the Court has taken an increasingly liberal approach to the rule of locus standi, evolving from the stringent requirements of 'personal injury' to the broader 'transcendental importance' doctrine, such liberality is not to be abused."[39]
	GR No. 185001 2009-09-25	RONNIE H. LUMAYNA v. COA DEL CASTILLO, J.
In Blaquera v. Alcala,[35] petitioners who were officials and employees of several government agencies were paid productivity incentive benefits for the year 1992 pursuant to Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987. On 19 January 1993, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 29 limiting the grant of productivity incentive benefits for the year 1992 in the maximum amount of P1,000.00 and enjoining the grant of said benefit without prior approval of the President.
	GR No. 173226 2009-01-20	LAND BANK OF PHILIPPINES v. MANUEL O. GALLEGO TINGA, J.
While the SAC is required to consider the acquisition cost of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declaration and the assessments made by the government assessors to determine just compensation, it is equally true that these factors have been translated into a basic formula by the DAR pursuant to its rule-making power under Section 49 of R.A. No. 6657.[36] In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Celada,[37] the Court upheld the applicability of DAR Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 5, series of 1998 in determining just compensation.
	GR NO. 164195 2007-02-06	APO FRUITS CORPORATION v. CA CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
On 12 October 1995, AFC and HPI voluntarily offered to sell the above parcels of land to the government.[6] After the initial processing at the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) of the Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS)[7] application of AFC and HPI, it was referred to the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) for initial valuation. On 16 October 1996, AFC and HPI received separately from the DAR's Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) of Davao province a notice of land acquisition and valuation, informing AFC that the value of the properties has been placed at P86,900,925.88 or P165,484.47 per hectare[8] while HPI's properties were valued at P164,478,178.14.[9] Both AFC and HPI considered the valuations unreasonably low and inadequate as just compensation for the properties.
	GR NO. 156537 2007-01-24	PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY v. COA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
We find, however, that the personnel concerned, in receiving the rice subsidy, acted in good faith in the honest belief they were entitled to such benefit. Hence, following our rulings in Blanquera v. Alcala,[15] De Jesus v. Commissioner of Audit,[16] Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa Government Service Insurance System (KMG) v. Commission on Audit,[17] and Philippine Ports Authority v. Commission on Audit,[18] the affected employees of petitioner PEA need not refund the rice subsidy they received. In these cases, the parties, in receiving incentive benefits, acted in good faith. Thus, they were no longer ordered to refund those benefits disallowed by COA.
	GR NO. 159200 2006-02-16	PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY v. COA AZCUNA, J.
In regard to the refund of the disallowed benefits, this Court holds that petitioners need not refund the benefits received by them based on our rulings in Blaquera v. Alcala,[7] De Jesus v. Commission on Audit[8] and Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa Government Service Insurance System (KMG) v. Commission on Audit.[9]
	GR No. 155336 2004-11-25	CHR EMPLOYEES’ ASSOCIATION v. CHR CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Nor is there any legal basis to support the contention that the CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy. In essence, fiscal autonomy entails freedom from outside control and limitations, other than those provided by law. It is the freedom to allocate and utilize funds granted by law, in accordance with law, and pursuant to the wisdom and dispatch its needs may require from time to time.[22] In Blaquera v. Alcala and Bengzon v. Drilon,[23] it is understood that it is only the Judiciary, the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Audit, the Commission on Elections, and the Office of the Ombudsman, which enjoy fiscal autonomy. Thus, in Bengzon,[24] we explained:As envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary, the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Audit, the Commission on Elections, and the Office of the Ombudsman contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs require. It recognizes the power and authority to levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates of compensation not exceeding the highest rates authorized by law for compensation and pay plans of the government and allocate and disburse such sums as may be provided by law or prescribed by them in the course of the discharge of their functions.
	GR No. 150769 2004-08-31	KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM v. COA TINGA, J,
The Court however finds that the DOH and GSIS officials concerned who granted hazard pay under R.A. No. 7305 to the SIG personnel acted in good faith, in the honest belief that there was legal basis for such grant. The SIG personnel in turn accepted the hazard pay benefits likewise believing that they were entitled to such benefit. At that time, neither the concerned DOH and GSIS officials nor the SIG personnel knew that the grant of hazard pay to the latter is not sanctioned by law. Thus, following the rulings of the Court in De Jesus v. Commission on Audit,[55] and Blaquera v. Alcala,[56] the SIG personnel who previously received hazard pay under R.A. No. 7305 need not refund such benefits.

REMEDIOS T. BLAQUERA v. ANGEL C. ALCALA