This case has been cited 5 times or more.
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2011-09-14 |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. |
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| Here, there was no indication, and Domingo did not insist otherwise, that the OSG had any notice of the filing of Civil Case No. 333-M-2002. Domingo speculates that, in the subsequent civil actions against the DPWH Region III, the latter most likely brought the said cases to the attention of the OSG. On the other hand, Domingo opines that the DPWH Region III apparently neglected to inform the OSG of the pendency of Civil Case No. 333-M-2002. Accordingly, Domingo asserted that he should not be faulted therefor. The Court disagrees. Domingo ought to bear in mind that it is the duty of the plaintiff to implead all the necessary or indispensable parties for the complete determination of the action.[34] It was, thus, incumbent upon him to name and implead the proper defendant in this case, i.e., the Republic, and cause the service of summons to be made upon the officer mandated by law, that is, the OSG. As Domingo failed to discharge this burden, he cannot now be allowed to shift the blame on the DPWH Region III or hold in estoppel the OSG. | |||||
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2009-06-30 |
VELASCO JR., J. |
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| The RTC denied the Republic's motion for reconsideration through an Order of October 24, 2002. In the same order, the trial court observed that the Republic is actually asking the present presiding judge to review the decision of her predecessor, Judge Posadas, and to annul the same decision. Pursuing the point, the RTC, citing Miranda v. Court of Appeals[18] and Nery v. Leyson,[19] ratiocinated that a judge who succeeds another has no reviewing and appellate authority and jurisdiction over his predecessor's final judgment on the merits of a case, such authority residing, as it does, in the ordinary course of things, with the appellate court. | |||||
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2008-08-06 |
NACHURA, J. |
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| Forum shopping exists when the elements of litis pendentia are present or when a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other.[22] Among its elements are identity of the parties, identity of the subject matter and identity of the causes of action in the two cases.[23] | |||||
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2004-07-27 |
CARPIO, J. |
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| The issues petitioner raised would also necessarily require the trial court to review the decision of another regional trial court. This is plainly beyond the powers of the trial court. Under the doctrine of non-interference, a trial court has no authority to interfere with the proceedings of a court of equal jurisdiction,[37] much less to annul the final judgment of a co-equal court.[38] The Court held in Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. v. Alejo[39] that an action for quieting of title is not the appropriate remedy where the action would require the court hearing it to modify or interfere with the judgment or order of another co-equal court. | |||||
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2001-07-20 |
DE LEON, JR., J. |
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| A careful examination of the records, particularly the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 48321-R, showed that even during the pre-trial of the case for reconveyance, plaintiffs Felipe Riple, et al., herein private respondents, were aware that the parcels of land, subject of the action for reconveyance, had been sold to third parties. However, the third-party vendees, who are indispensable parties, were not impleaded in the case. Owners of property over which reconveyance is asserted are indispensable parties, without whom no relief is available and without whom the court can render no valid judgment.[49] Section 7, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court provides for the compulsory joinder of indispensable parties without whom no final determination can be had of an action. It is the duty of the plaintiffs (private respondents herein) to implead all the necessary or indispensable parties for the complete determination of the action.[50] Considering that private respondents knew that the lots, subject of the reconveyance, were already sold to third parties, and yet did not implead them as indispensable defendants in their complaint for reconveyance, private respondents have only themselves to blame. In other words, the judgment ordering the reconveyance of the subject lots is not binding on the third-party vendees who were not impleaded as defendants in the case at bar. A person not included as a party to a case cannot be bound by the decision made by a court.[51] Hence, private respondents could not impute delay to the petitioner in the reconveyance of the subject lots inasmuch as private respondents knew that petitioner, being no longer the owner of the subject lots even during the pre-trial of the case for reconveyance, could not reconvey the same. It was incumbent on the private respondents to amend their complaint and include the vendees of the lots sought to be recovered as defendants in the action for reconveyance so that a judgment in their favor may be validly executed against said vendees. Unfortunately, private respondents failed to do so. The cited case of National Power Corporation vs. Court of Appeals is clearly not applicable to the case at bar. | |||||