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GR No. 181057

2015-06-17

PERALTA, J.

Petitioner asserts that the re-appearance and existence of the owner's duplicate copy renders the court issuing the decision ordering the issuance of a second owner's copy devoid of any jurisdiction. In support of her contention, petitioner cites Sections 18[19] and 19[20] of Republic Act (RA) No. 26[21] as well as several rulings[22] wherein it has been held that if a certificate of title has not been lost but is in fact in the possession of another person, the reconstituted title is void and the court rendering the decision has not acquired jurisdiction to order the issuance of a new duplicate title. Thus, while the appellate court correctly declared the decision of the trial court as well as the second owner's copy issued therefrom null and void, petitioner maintains that TCT No. 269811 in the names of respondents Imelda and Adelaida, as well as TCT No. 274696 in the names of respondent spouses Badar, should have likewise been declared a nullity for having been derived from a void title.

GR No. 181057

2015-06-17

JOSEFINA C. BILLOTE v. IMELDA SOLIS

PERALTA, J.

Time and again, it has been consistently ruled that when the owner's duplicate certificate of title has not been lost, but is in fact in the possession of another person, the reconstituted certificate is void, because the court that rendered the decision had no jurisdiction.[27] Reconstitution can validly be made only in case of loss of the original certificate.[28] Thus, the fact of loss of the duplicate certificate is jurisdictional.[29]

GR No. 159926

2014-01-20

PINAUSUKAN SEAFOOD HOUSE v. FAR EAST BANK

BERSAMIN, J.

In contrast, intrinsic fraud refers to the acts of a party at a trial that prevented a fair and just determination of the case, but the difference is that the acts or things, like falsification and false testimony, could have been litigated and determined at the trial or adjudication of the case.[37] In other words, intrinsic fraud does not deprive the petitioner of his day in court because he can guard against that kind of fraud through so many means, including a thorough trial preparation, a skillful cross-examination, resorting to the modes of discovery, and proper scientific or forensic applications. Indeed, forgery of documents and evidence for use at the trial and perjury in court testimony have been regarded as not preventing the participation of any party in the proceedings, and are not, therefore, constitutive of extrinsic fraud.[38]

GR No. 177042

2012-12-10

SPS. CRISANTO ALCAZAR AND SUSANA VILLAMAYOR v. EVELYN ARANTE

PERALTA, J.

As early as the case of Strait Times, Inc. v. CA,[33] this Court has held that when the owner's duplicate certificate of title has not been lost, but is in fact in the possession of another person, then the reconstituted certificate is void, because the court that rendered the decision had no jurisdiction.[34]

GR No. 175788

2009-06-30

ENRIQUITA ANGAT v. REPUBLIC

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

The nature of the action for reconstitution of a certificate of title under Republic Act No. 26, entitled "An Act Providing a Special Procedure for the Reconstitution of Torrens Certificate of Title Lost or Destroyed," denotes a restoration of the instrument, which is supposed to have been lost or destroyed, in its original form and condition.[30] The purpose of such an action is merely to have the certificate of title reproduced, after proper proceedings, in the same form it was in when its loss or destruction occurred.[31] The same Republic Act No. 26 specifies the requisites to be met for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over a petition for reconstitution of a certificate of title. As we held in Ortigas & Co. Ltd. Partnership v. Velasco,[32] failure to comply with any of these jurisdictional requirements for a petition for reconstitution renders the proceedings null and void. Thus, in obtaining a new title in lieu of the lost or destroyed one, Republic Act No. 26 laid down procedures which must be strictly followed in view of the danger that reconstitution could be the source of anomalous titles or unscrupulously availed of as an easy substitute for original registration of title proceedings.

GR No. 150470

2008-08-06

SPS. FELIPE AND VICTORIA LAYOS v. FIL-ESTATE GOLF

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

The reconstitution of a title is simply the reissuance of a new duplicate certificate of title allegedly lost or destroyed in its original form and condition. It does not pass upon the ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title. Possession of a lost certificate is not necessarily equivalent to ownership of the land covered by it. The certificate of title, by itself, does not vest ownership; it is merely an evidence of title over a particular property.[58]

GR NO. 161417

2007-02-08

MA. TERESA CHAVES BIACO v. PHILIPPINE COUNTRYSIDE RURAL BANK

TINGA, J.

Extrinsic fraud exists when there is a fraudulent act committed by the prevailing party outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party was prevented from presenting fully his side of the case by fraud or deception practiced on him by the prevailing party. [11] Extrinsic fraud is present where the unsuccessful party had been prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent, as by keeping him away from court, a false promise of a compromise; or where the defendant never had knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or where an attorney fraudulently or without authority assumes to represent a party and connives at his defeat; or where the attorney regularly employed corruptly sells out his client's interest to the other side. The overriding consideration is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court. [12]

GR No. 140799

2002-09-10

TOMAS T. TEODORO v. CA

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent.[17] Fraud is regarded as extrinsic where it prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in which it is procured.[18] The overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court.[19] None of these conditions obtain in the case at bar. Then, too, applying by analogy Rule 47, Section 2, second paragraph, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which governs annulment of judgments, the instant petition must be denied because "[e]xtrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed of, or could have been

GR No. 128412

2002-03-15

REXLON REALTY GROUP v. CA

DE LEON, JR., J.

Extrinsic fraud contemplates a situation where a litigant commits acts outside of the trial of the case, "the effect of which prevents a party from having a trial, a real contest, or from presenting all of his case to the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining, not to the judgment itself, but to the manner in which it was procured so that there is not a fair submission of the controversy." [11] The overriding consideration is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court. Hence, the Court has held that extrinsic fraud is present in cases where a party (1) is deprived of his interest in land, because of a deliberate misrepresentation that the lots are not contested when in fact they are; (2) applies for and obtains adjudication and registration in the name of a co-owner of land which he knows has not been allotted to him in the partition; (3) intentionally conceals facts and connives with the land inspector, so that the latter would include in the survey plan the bed of a navigable stream; (4) deliberately makes a false statement that there are no other claims; (5) induces another not to oppose an application; (6) deliberately fails to notify the party entitled to notice; or (7) misrepresents the identity of the lot to the true owner, causing the latter to withdraw his opposition. Fraud, in these cases, goes into and affects the jurisdiction of the court; thus, a decision rendered on the basis of such fraud becomes subject to annulment. [12]

GR No. 137448

2002-01-31

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM v. BENGSON COMMERCIAL BUILDINGS

DAVIDE JR., C.J.

To support such petition, the fraud must be extrinsic or collateral. "Fraud is regarded as extrinsic or collateral, where a litigant commits acts outside of the trial of the case, 'the effect of which prevents a party from having trial, a real contest or from presenting all of his case to the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining, not to the judgment itself, but to the manner in which it was procured so that there is not a fair submission of the controversy."'[60]

GR No. 113796

2000-12-14

CRESENCIANO C. BOBIS v. CA

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

Then, too, the decision of the trial court cannot be annulled on the basis of petitioners' allegation that the purported deed of sale of the property under scrutiny in favor of private respondents' predecessor-in-interest was dubious and forged, as this kind of fraud, if there is any, is intrinsic, and not an extrinsic fraud which is a ground to annul a judgment or order. In Strait Times, Inc., v. Court of Appeals,[23] we emphasized that the use of forged instruments or perjured testimonies during trial is not an extrinsic fraud, because such evidence does not preclude the participation of any party in the proceedings. While a perjured testimony or a forged instrument may prevent a fair and just determination of a case, it does not bar the adverse party from rebutting or opposing the use of such evidence. Extrinsic fraud, to reiterate, pertains to an act committed outside of the trial.

GR No. 111715

2000-06-08

MANUEL SILVESTRE BERNARDO and the HEIRS OF JOSE P. BERNARDO namely v. SANTOS

GONZAGA-REYES, J.

"x x x. (Reconstitution of title) does not pass upon the ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title. Possession of a lost certificate of title is not necessarily equivalent to ownership of the land covered by it. The certificate of title, by itself, does not vest ownership; it is merely an evidence of title over a particular property."[62]

	GR No. 181057 2015-06-17	JOSEFINA C. BILLOTE v. IMELDA SOLIS PERALTA, J.
Petitioner asserts that the re-appearance and existence of the owner's duplicate copy renders the court issuing the decision ordering the issuance of a second owner's copy devoid of any jurisdiction. In support of her contention, petitioner cites Sections 18[19] and 19[20] of Republic Act (RA) No. 26[21] as well as several rulings[22] wherein it has been held that if a certificate of title has not been lost but is in fact in the possession of another person, the reconstituted title is void and the court rendering the decision has not acquired jurisdiction to order the issuance of a new duplicate title. Thus, while the appellate court correctly declared the decision of the trial court as well as the second owner's copy issued therefrom null and void, petitioner maintains that TCT No. 269811 in the names of respondents Imelda and Adelaida, as well as TCT No. 274696 in the names of respondent spouses Badar, should have likewise been declared a nullity for having been derived from a void title.
	GR No. 181057 2015-06-17	JOSEFINA C. BILLOTE v. IMELDA SOLIS PERALTA, J.
Time and again, it has been consistently ruled that when the owner's duplicate certificate of title has not been lost, but is in fact in the possession of another person, the reconstituted certificate is void, because the court that rendered the decision had no jurisdiction.[27] Reconstitution can validly be made only in case of loss of the original certificate.[28] Thus, the fact of loss of the duplicate certificate is jurisdictional.[29]
	GR No. 159926 2014-01-20	PINAUSUKAN SEAFOOD HOUSE v. FAR EAST BANK BERSAMIN, J.
In contrast, intrinsic fraud refers to the acts of a party at a trial that prevented a fair and just determination of the case, but the difference is that the acts or things, like falsification and false testimony, could have been litigated and determined at the trial or adjudication of the case.[37] In other words, intrinsic fraud does not deprive the petitioner of his day in court because he can guard against that kind of fraud through so many means, including a thorough trial preparation, a skillful cross-examination, resorting to the modes of discovery, and proper scientific or forensic applications. Indeed, forgery of documents and evidence for use at the trial and perjury in court testimony have been regarded as not preventing the participation of any party in the proceedings, and are not, therefore, constitutive of extrinsic fraud.[38]
	GR No. 177042 2012-12-10	SPS. CRISANTO ALCAZAR AND SUSANA VILLAMAYOR v. EVELYN ARANTE PERALTA, J.
As early as the case of Strait Times, Inc. v. CA,[33] this Court has held that when the owner's duplicate certificate of title has not been lost, but is in fact in the possession of another person, then the reconstituted certificate is void, because the court that rendered the decision had no jurisdiction.[34]
	GR No. 175788 2009-06-30	ENRIQUITA ANGAT v. REPUBLIC CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
The nature of the action for reconstitution of a certificate of title under Republic Act No. 26, entitled "An Act Providing a Special Procedure for the Reconstitution of Torrens Certificate of Title Lost or Destroyed," denotes a restoration of the instrument, which is supposed to have been lost or destroyed, in its original form and condition.[30] The purpose of such an action is merely to have the certificate of title reproduced, after proper proceedings, in the same form it was in when its loss or destruction occurred.[31] The same Republic Act No. 26 specifies the requisites to be met for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over a petition for reconstitution of a certificate of title. As we held in Ortigas & Co. Ltd. Partnership v. Velasco,[32] failure to comply with any of these jurisdictional requirements for a petition for reconstitution renders the proceedings null and void. Thus, in obtaining a new title in lieu of the lost or destroyed one, Republic Act No. 26 laid down procedures which must be strictly followed in view of the danger that reconstitution could be the source of anomalous titles or unscrupulously availed of as an easy substitute for original registration of title proceedings.
	GR No. 150470 2008-08-06	SPS. FELIPE AND VICTORIA LAYOS v. FIL-ESTATE GOLF CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
The reconstitution of a title is simply the reissuance of a new duplicate certificate of title allegedly lost or destroyed in its original form and condition. It does not pass upon the ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title. Possession of a lost certificate is not necessarily equivalent to ownership of the land covered by it. The certificate of title, by itself, does not vest ownership; it is merely an evidence of title over a particular property.[58]
	GR NO. 161417 2007-02-08	MA. TERESA CHAVES BIACO v. PHILIPPINE COUNTRYSIDE RURAL BANK TINGA, J.
Extrinsic fraud exists when there is a fraudulent act committed by the prevailing party outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party was prevented from presenting fully his side of the case by fraud or deception practiced on him by the prevailing party. [11] Extrinsic fraud is present where the unsuccessful party had been prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent, as by keeping him away from court, a false promise of a compromise; or where the defendant never had knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or where an attorney fraudulently or without authority assumes to represent a party and connives at his defeat; or where the attorney regularly employed corruptly sells out his client's interest to the other side. The overriding consideration is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court. [12]
	GR No. 140799 2002-09-10	TOMAS T. TEODORO v. CA YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent.[17] Fraud is regarded as extrinsic where it prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in which it is procured.[18] The overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court.[19] None of these conditions obtain in the case at bar. Then, too, applying by analogy Rule 47, Section 2, second paragraph, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which governs annulment of judgments, the instant petition must be denied because "[e]xtrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed of, or could have been
	GR No. 128412 2002-03-15	REXLON REALTY GROUP v. CA DE LEON, JR., J.
Extrinsic fraud contemplates a situation where a litigant commits acts outside of the trial of the case, "the effect of which prevents a party from having a trial, a real contest, or from presenting all of his case to the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining, not to the judgment itself, but to the manner in which it was procured so that there is not a fair submission of the controversy." [11] The overriding consideration is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court. Hence, the Court has held that extrinsic fraud is present in cases where a party (1) is deprived of his interest in land, because of a deliberate misrepresentation that the lots are not contested when in fact they are; (2) applies for and obtains adjudication and registration in the name of a co-owner of land which he knows has not been allotted to him in the partition; (3) intentionally conceals facts and connives with the land inspector, so that the latter would include in the survey plan the bed of a navigable stream; (4) deliberately makes a false statement that there are no other claims; (5) induces another not to oppose an application; (6) deliberately fails to notify the party entitled to notice; or (7) misrepresents the identity of the lot to the true owner, causing the latter to withdraw his opposition. Fraud, in these cases, goes into and affects the jurisdiction of the court; thus, a decision rendered on the basis of such fraud becomes subject to annulment. [12]
	GR No. 137448 2002-01-31	GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM v. BENGSON COMMERCIAL BUILDINGS DAVIDE JR., C.J.
To support such petition, the fraud must be extrinsic or collateral. "Fraud is regarded as extrinsic or collateral, where a litigant commits acts outside of the trial of the case, 'the effect of which prevents a party from having trial, a real contest or from presenting all of his case to the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining, not to the judgment itself, but to the manner in which it was procured so that there is not a fair submission of the controversy."'[60]
	GR No. 113796 2000-12-14	CRESENCIANO C. BOBIS v. CA YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Then, too, the decision of the trial court cannot be annulled on the basis of petitioners' allegation that the purported deed of sale of the property under scrutiny in favor of private respondents' predecessor-in-interest was dubious and forged, as this kind of fraud, if there is any, is intrinsic, and not an extrinsic fraud which is a ground to annul a judgment or order. In Strait Times, Inc., v. Court of Appeals,[23] we emphasized that the use of forged instruments or perjured testimonies during trial is not an extrinsic fraud, because such evidence does not preclude the participation of any party in the proceedings. While a perjured testimony or a forged instrument may prevent a fair and just determination of a case, it does not bar the adverse party from rebutting or opposing the use of such evidence. Extrinsic fraud, to reiterate, pertains to an act committed outside of the trial.
	GR No. 111715 2000-06-08	MANUEL SILVESTRE BERNARDO and the HEIRS OF JOSE P. BERNARDO namely v. SANTOS GONZAGA-REYES, J.
"x x x. (Reconstitution of title) does not pass upon the ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title. Possession of a lost certificate of title is not necessarily equivalent to ownership of the land covered by it. The certificate of title, by itself, does not vest ownership; it is merely an evidence of title over a particular property."[62]

STRAIT TIMES INC. v. CA