This case has been cited 8 times or more.
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2008-09-30 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| Moreover, the fact that there was no weapon used by the accused does not rule out force in the rape committed.[50] It is a settled rule that the force contemplated by law in the commission of rape is relative, depending on the age, size and strength of the parties.[51] It is not necessary that the force and intimidation employed in accomplishing it be so great and of such character as could not be resisted; it is only necessary that the force or intimidation be sufficient to consummate the purpose which the accused had in mind.[52] | |||||
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2007-06-21 |
TINGA, J. |
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| The long-standing Latin maxim "actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea" supplies an important characteristic of a crime, that "ordinarily, evil intent must unite with an unlawful act for there to be a crime," and accordingly, there can be no crime when the criminal mind is wanting.[35] Accepted in this jurisdiction as material in crimes mala in se,[36] mens rea has been defined before as "a guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful purpose or criminal intent,"[37] and "essential for criminal liability."[38] It follows that the statutory definition of our mala in se crimes must be able to supply what the mens rea of the crime is, and indeed the U.S. Supreme Court has comfortably held that "a criminal law that contains no mens rea requirement infringes on constitutionally protected rights."[39] The criminal statute must also provide for the overt acts that constitute the crime. For a crime to exist in our legal law, it is not enough that mens rea be shown; there must also be an actus reus.[40] | |||||
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2003-06-27 |
DAVIDE JR., C.J. |
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| We also take note of the fact that while the informations allege that Irma was 13 years old at the time she was raped, her birth certificate reveals that she was only 11 years old at the time, having been born on 29 November 1985. Thus, these cases could have been cases of statutory rape. But, Nelson cannot be convicted of statutory rapes. In People vs. Moreno,[50] reiterated in People v. Capinpin,[51] we ruled that an accused cannot be convicted under paragraphs 2 or 3 of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code in an information charging him with rape under paragraph 1 (by using force or intimidation) because none of these modes of committing rape (i.e., when the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or when the woman is under twelve years of age) were alleged in the information. The rationale for this rule is that "[t]o convict him under either of these statutory provisions is to deprive him of the constitutional right to be informed of the accusation against him." Section 14 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused...shall enjoy the right ... to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him." | |||||
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2002-07-31 |
PER CURIAM |
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| charge only one (1) offense. This is important to apprise the accused fully of the charge against him so that he may not be confused in his defense.[18] Furthermore, an accused cannot be convicted of an offense unless it is clearly charged in the complaint or information since he has that right under the Constitution to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. To convict him of an offense other than that charged in the complaint or information would violate that constitutional right.[19] Hence, the trial court appropriately convicted the accused of and meted the capital penalty for only one (1) count of rape with homicide. It is axiomatic that the accused can only be convicted for a crime duly charged and proved. Besides, this case was brought to us on automatic review and not upon the initiative of the accused themselves. We are thus called upon to re-examine only their conviction for a single offense, as found by the trial court, and inquire only into the propriety of the imposition of the death penalty. As to the civil liability of the accused, current jurisprudence sets an indemnity of P100,000.00 for the victim Myrna Alibio since her rape was effectively qualified by circumstances under which the death penalty is authorized by applicable laws, namely, the death of the rape | |||||
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2000-09-27 |
BELLOSILLO, J. |
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| In People v. Morena[17] this Court explained that it would be a denial of the accused of his right to be informed of the charges against him and, consequently, a denial of due process if he is convicted of an offense other than that charged in the complaint or information. Hence, when the information alleges rape by force and intimidation under par. 1, Art. 335, of The Revised Penal Code, the accused cannot be convicted of rape under pars. 2 or 3 of the same Article.[18] In this case, since the accused was charged with rape qualified by minority and relationship under the first attendant circumstance where the death penalty is imposable, he cannot be convicted of rape qualified by the third attendant circumstance of commission of rape within the full view of the relatives of the victim, since this was not alleged in the Information. | |||||
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2000-05-31 |
GONZAGA-REYES, J. |
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| It is settled that sexual intercourse with a woman who is a mental retardate constitutes statutory rape, which does not require proof that the accused used force or intimidation in having carnal knowledge of the victim for conviction.[30] However, the fact of her mental retardation was not alleged in the information and, therefore, cannot be the basis for conviction.[31] Nevertheless, there is adequate evidence to show that appellant used force and intimidation in committing the crime of rape in this case, which mode of committing rape was alleged in the Information. Jennifer's testimony sufficiently demonstrated that the sexual act was forced on her as she declared that she resisted or "lumaban ako".[32] It has been held that "[b]ecause the mental faculties of a retardate with the mental age of a six-year old are different from those of a fully functioning adult, the degree of force needed to overwhelm her is less.[33] | |||||
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2000-05-31 |
GONZAGA-REYES, J. |
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| Finally, the trial court failed to order appellant to indemnify complainant although it did award moral damages. Thus, and in line with the pronouncement in People vs. Victor[36] appellant should be made to pay P50,000.00 as indemnification. The award of P100,000.00 granted by the trial court as and for moral damages is reduced to P50,000.00 following and adhering to current jurisprudence.[37] | |||||
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2000-02-29 |
BELLOSILLO, J. |
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| Moreover, private complainant's testimony was corroborated by Dr. Diosdado Fuentebella who affirmed on the witness stand the presence of spermatozoa in her vaginal secretion, consistent with the claim of recent sexual contact. Although no sign of external physical injury was noted on her body the same did not negate her claim of rape. We have held that it was not necessary that there be marks of physical violence on the victim's body because the exertion of irresistible force by the accused is not an element of the offense,[27] more so when the force required to overwhelm a child especially one who is of subnormal mental capacity like herein private complainant, is obviously and understandably of a lesser degree than that needed to overwhelm a normal adult.[28] Considering that accused-appellant was at the time of the incident a thirty-five (35)-year old normal male while private complainant was a puny thirteen (13)-year old with a mental capacity of an eight (8)-year old, it is not really difficult to understand how accused-appellant succeeded in his criminal design with minimal force - but force nonetheless[29] - such that no manifestation of physical injury was noted on private complainant. | |||||