This case has been cited 7 times or more.
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2014-02-19 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| A drug den is a lair or hideaway where prohibited or regulated drugs are used in any form or are found. Its existence may be proved not only by direct evidence but may also be established by proof of facts and circumstances, including evidence of the general reputation of the house, or its general reputation among police officers.[50] In this case, this fact was proven by none other than the testimony of PO2 Martinez, the poseur-buyer, who after buying the shabu had told the appellant that he wanted to sniff the same to which the latter responded by requiring the former to pay a rental fee of P10.00. The appellant, thereafter, allowed PO2 Martinez to enter his house and directed him to proceed to one of the rooms located at the right side of the sala. Upon entering the said room, PO2 Martinez saw three other persons already sniffing shabu.[51] This testimony of PO2 Martinez was corroborated by PO3 Yanson and P/Sr. Insp. Sanchez.[52] | |||||
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2012-02-22 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| In People v. Ladjaalam,[36] we laid down the correct interpretation of the law and ruled: x x x A simple reading thereof shows that if an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of any crime, there can be no separate offense of simple illegal possession of firearms. Hence, if the "other crime" is murder or homicide, illegal possession of firearms becomes merely an aggravating circumstance, not a separate offense. Since direct assault with multiple attempted homicide was committed in this case, appellant can no longer be held liable for illegal possession of firearms. | |||||
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2008-12-17 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| This unique characteristic of the incremental penalty rule does not pose any obstacle to interpreting it as analogous to a modifying circumstance, and, hence, falling within the letter and spirit of "attending circumstances" for purposes of the application of the ISL. Under the wording of the ISL, "attending circumstances" may be reasonably interpreted as referring to such circumstances that are applied in conjunction with certain rules in the Code in order to determine the penalty to be actually imposed based on the prescribed penalty of the Code for the offense. The incremental penalty rule substantially meets this standard. The circumstance is the amount defrauded in excess of P22,0000.00 and the incremental penalty rule is utilized to fix the penalty actually imposed. At its core, the incremental penalty rule is merely a mathematical formula for computing the penalty to be actually imposed using the prescribed penalty as starting point. Thus, it serves the same function of determining the penalty actually imposed as the modifying circumstances under Articles 13, 14, and 160 of the RPC, although the manner by which the former accomplishes this function differs with the latter. For this reason, the incremental penalty rule may be considered as merely analogous to modifying circumstances. Besides, in case of doubt as to whether the incremental penalty rule falls within the scope of "attending circumstances" under the ISL, the doubt should be resolved in favor of inclusion because this interpretation is more favorable to the accused following the time-honored principle that penal statutes are construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused.[56] Thus, even if the Dissenting Opinion's interpretation is gratuitously conceded as plausible, as between Gabres and the dissent's interpretation, Gabres should be sustained since it is the interpretation more favorable to the accused. | |||||
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2003-02-12 |
CORONA, J. |
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| This Court cannot, however, convict appellant for the separate offense of illegal possession of firearms under PD 1866. The earlier provision of PD 1866 which justified a conviction for illegal possession of firearms separate from any other crime, cannot apply as it was already superseded by the provisions of RA 8294. As held in People vs. Wadjaalam:[41] | |||||
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2002-09-02 |
CORONA, J. |
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| that this will spare him his life and is thus favorable to him? We do not think so either. In Criminal Case No. 1647 for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition (violation of PD 1866), we should apply the ruling enunciated in the recent case of People vs. Walpan M. Ladjaalam[17] where we declared: xxx if an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of any crime, there can be no separate offense of simple illegal possession of firearms. | |||||
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2001-08-09 |
DE LEON, JR. J. |
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| before service of the second sentence for illegal possession of a low powered firearm, which is imprisonment of four (4) years, two (2) months, and one day to six (6) years, may even commence. Thus, the maximum period of petitioner's incarceration is twelve (12) years and eight (8) months. Petitioner's service of nine (9) years and three (3) months of the prison terms imposed upon him is therefore not sufficient to meet the maximum period of twelve (12) years and eight (8) months, and he cannot be released from confinement on this basis. Fortunately, however, petitioner can and shall be restored to his liberty in light of recent jurisprudence, specifically this Court's ruling in People vs. Walpan Ladjaalam y Mihajil alias "Warpan" [10] | |||||
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2001-08-08 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| Then, too, the court a quo correctly acquitted accused-appellant Cabilto of the charge of illegal possession of firearms in Criminal Case No. 4180-V-94, for failure of the prosecution to prove that accused-appellant did not have the necessary permit to possess and carry a firearm. At any rate, even if a judgment of conviction for illegal possession was meted out on accused-appellant, such conviction cannot stand in view of the enactment of Republic Act No. 8294, which amended certain provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1866. Under said act, if an unlicensed firearm is used in the perpetration of any crime, there can be no separate offense of illegal possession of firearms.[24] | |||||