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SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION v. SANDIGANBAYAN

This case has been cited 7 times or more.

	GR Nos. 177857-58 2012-01-24	PHILIPPINE COCONUT v. REPUBLIC VELASCO JR., J.
Judging from the allegations of the defendants' illegal acts thereat made, it is fairly obvious that both CC Nos. 0033-A and CC 0033-F partake, in the context of EO Nos. 1, 2 and 14, series of 1986, the nature of ill-gotten wealth suits. Both deal with the recovery of sequestered shares, property or business enterprises claimed, as alleged in the corresponding basic complaints, to be ill-gotten assets of President Marcos, his cronies and nominees and acquired by taking undue advantage of relationships or influence and/or through or as a result of improper use, conversion or diversion of government funds or property. Recovery of these assets--determined as shall hereinafter be discussed as prima facie ill-gotten--falls within the unquestionable jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.[74]
	GR Nos. 177857-58 2010-02-11	PHILIPPINE COCONUT PRODUCERS FEDERATION v. REPUBLIC VELASCO JR., J.
Movants-intervenors contend that the challenged resolution violates the Court's holding in San Miguel Corporation v. Sandiganbayan,[13] as the conversion of the sequestered common shares into treasury shares would destroy the character of the shares of stock.
	GR No. 174567 2009-03-12	SEVERINO B. VERGARA v. OMBUDSMAN CARPIO, J.
We reiterate the rule that courts do not interfere in the Ombudsman's exercise of discretion in determining probable cause unless there are compelling reasons. The Ombudsman's finding of probable cause, or lack of it, is entitled to great respect absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion. Besides, to justify the issuance of the writ of certiorari on the ground of abuse of discretion, the abuse must be grave, as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all, in contemplation of law, as to be equivalent to having acted without jurisdiction.[61]
	AM No. RTJ-07-2036 2008-08-20	JESUS G. CRISOLOGO v. JUDGE MARIVIC TRABAJO DARAY NACHURA, J.
The allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. The permissive tenor of the rules shows the intention to give to the court the full measure of discretion in permitting or disallowing the intervention.[9]
	GR No. 130228 2004-07-27	BERNABE FOSTER-GALLEGO v. SPS. ROMEO AND VIVIEN GALANG CARPIO, J.
The allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene is addressed to the sound discretion of the court hearing the case.[32] This discretion, once exercised, is not reviewable by certiorari or mandamus save in instances where such discretion is exercised in an arbitrary or capricious manner.[33] Petitioner has not shown that the trial court acted capriciously or arbitrarily. That the trial court initially allowed petitioner to intervene but subsequently reconsidered and withdrew its permission does not prove, by itself, that the trial court acted in a manner warranting review. This is certainly not the first time a trial court initially allowed a motion for intervention and later reconsidered and denied it.[34]
	GR No. 146540 2004-07-14	HEIRS OF GERONIMO RESTRIVERA v. SALVADOR DE GUZMAN SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
Fundamentally, the allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. The permissive tenor of the rules shows the intention to give to the court the full measure of discretion in permitting or disallowing the intervention. The discretion of the court, once exercised, cannot be reviewed by certiorari nor controlled by mandamus save in instances where such discretion has been so exercised in an arbitrary or capricious manner.[6] However, such instances are not present in the case at bar.