This case has been cited 4 times or more.
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2001-06-26 |
PARDO, J. |
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| As a general rule, the discharge or exclusion of a co-accused from the information in order to utilize him as a prosecution witness rests on the sound discretion of the trial court.[39] This discretion shall be exercised strictly on the basis of the conditions set forth in Rule 119, Section 9 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. The court's discretion is not absolute or arbitrary. Sound judicial discretion must be exercised with due regard to the proper administration of justice.[40] We consider it unthinkable that the Sandiganbayan can so grossly violate the strict conditions set out in this Rule. | |||||
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2001-03-28 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| First, there appears no viable reason why Tello would implicate petitioner as the brains behind the robbery if this were not true. Petitioner has failed to establish that Tello was motivated to falsely testify against him. Absent any clear showing that Tello was actuated by ill-motive and selfish ends, this Court a fortiori finds his narration truthful and unblemished by falsehood.[12] Indeed, it would have been enough for Tello to merely point out to the actual participants in the crime, his co-accused Deles, Sapitula and Suganob, all of whom were identified and pointed out as such by truck driver Juyo and his helper, Oribado. There really was no reason for Tello to falsify the truth and to point to petitioner as the mastermind behind the robbery, if such were not really the case. | |||||
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2001-03-16 |
DAVIDE JR., C.J. |
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| Q Who killed your brother Magno Cabael? A The two (2) of them, sir.[11] FREDDIE and RICARDO maintain that their alibis should not have been disregarded by the trial court as they presented corroborative witnesses in support thereof. Time and again, we have ruled that for the defense of alibi to prosper, it must meet the requirements of time and place. Thus, the accused must establish by clear and convincing evidence that he was so far away and that it was not possible for him to have been physically present at the locus criminis or its immediate vicinity at the time the crime was committed.[12] FREDDIE and RICARDO failed to discharge this burden. On the stand, FREDDIE admitted that his residence at San Pedro, Lasam, Cagayan was very near the place where the killing occurred, which was at Bicud, Lal-lo, Cagayan, and that the distance between them could be negotiated by motorbike. RICARDO likewise admitted in his testimony that Cabayabasan, Lal-lo, Cagayan where his house is located is adjacent to Bicud. The short distances and negligible travel time between the residences of FREDDIE and RICARDO and the place of the commission of the crime negate their defense of alibi. Beyond this, their alibi was likewise rendered incredible in view of the positive identification by eyewitnesses who narrated the details of the killing.[13] | |||||
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2000-12-14 |
PER CURIAM |
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| But treachery was incorrectly considered by the trial court. The accused stand charged with, tried and convicted of robbery with homicide. This special complex crime is primarily classified in this jurisdiction as a crime against property, and not against persons, homicide being merely an incident of robbery with the latter being the main purpose and object of the criminals. As such, treachery cannot be validly appreciated as an aggravating circumstance under Art. 14 of The Revised Penal Code.[18] This is completely a reversal of the previous jurisprudence on the matter decided in a litany of cases before People v. Bariquit.[19] | |||||