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ANTONIA J. GUTANG v. CA

This case has been cited 5 times or more.

	GR No. 180543 2010-07-27	KILOSBAYAN FOUNDATION v. LEONCIO M. JANOLO CARPIO MORALES, J.
While the second paragraph does not expressly enumerate the specific grounds for inhibition and leaves it to the sound discretion of the judge, such should be based on just or valid reasons. The import of the rule on the voluntary inhibition of judges is that the decision on whether to inhibit is left to the sound discretion and conscience of the judge based on his rational and logical assessment of the circumstances prevailing in the case brought before him. It makes clear to the occupants of the Bench that outside of pecuniary interest, relationship or previous participation in the matter that calls for adjudication, there might be other causes that could conceivably erode the trait of objectivity, thus calling for inhibition. That is to betray a sense of realism, for the factors that lead to preferences and predilections are many and varied. [21]
	GR No. 171137 2009-06-05	PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK v. SPS. WILSON DY HONG PI AND LOLITA DY AND SPS. PRIMO CHUYACO PUNO, J.
At the outset, we underscore that while a party has the right to seek the inhibition or disqualification of a judge who does not appear to be wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent in handling the case, this right must be weighed with the duty of a judge to decide cases without fear of repression.[59] Respondents consequently have no vested right to the issuance of an Order granting the motion to inhibit, given its discretionary nature.[60]
	AM NO. RTJ-04-1823 2006-08-28	ARCELY Y. SANTOS v. JUDGE UBALDINO A. LACUROM CARPIO, J.
The Court agrees with the OCA's finding that respondent judge's inhibition from the cases was discretionary. The three cases do not fall under the instances covered by the rule on the mandatory disqualification of judges[33] and the issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and sound discretion on the part of the judge.[34]
	GR NOS. 162130-39 2006-05-05	PEOPLE v. JUSTICE GREGORY S. ONG AZCUNA, J.
This discretion granted to trial judges takes cognizance of the fact that these judges are in a better position to determine the issue of voluntary inhibition as they are the ones who directly deal with the parties-litigants in their courtrooms.[30] Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that the authority for voluntary inhibition does not give judges unlimited discretion to decide whether or not they will desist from hearing a case.[31] The decision on whether or not judges should inhibit themselves must be based on their rational and logical assessment of the circumstances prevailing in the cases brought before them.[32]
	GR No. 144618 2003-08-15	JORGE CHIN v. CA QUISUMBING, J.
The issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and sound discretion on the part of the judge.[25] It is a subjective test the result of which the reviewing tribunal will not disturb in the absence of any manifest finding of arbitrariness and whimsicality. The discretion given to trial judges is an acknowledgment of the fact that these judges are in a better position to determine the issue of inhibition as they are the ones who directly deal with the parties-litigants in their courtrooms.[26]