This case has been cited 9 times or more.
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2012-11-13 |
PEREZ, J. |
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| Given the finality of the lifting of the writ of sequestration issued by the PCGG and the long-standing failure of the Republic to allege and prove the illegality of the ownership of the Liwayway shares and the invalidity of the transfers thereof, we find and so hold that the Sandiganbayan cannot be faulted for ordering the release of TDC Nos. 162828 and 162829 in favor of the Estate and HMHMI. An extraordinary measure in the form of a provisional remedy, sequestration is merely "intended to prevent the destruction, concealment or dissipation of sequestered properties and, thereby, to conserve and preserve them, pending the judicial determination in the appropriate proceeding of whether the property was in truth ill-gotten."[82] While it is true that the lifting of a writ of sequestration will not necessarily be fatal to the main case, as it does not ipso facto mean that the sequestered property is not ill-gotten,[83] it cannot be over-emphasized that there has never been a main case against the Liwayway shares as would justify the Republic's continued claim on the subject TDCs and, for that matter, the prolonged withholding of the proceeds thereof from the Estate and HMHMI. Although jurisprudence recognizes the possibility of a resort to other ancillary remedies since the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction over sequestration cases demands that it should also have the authority to preserve the subject matter of the cases or put the same in custodia legis,[84] this is unavailing to the Republic since, by its own admission, the Liwayway shares were not litigated in Civil Case No. 0022. | |||||
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2011-04-12 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| Plainly enough, the irregularities infirming the issuance of the several WOS could not be ignored in favor of the Republic and resolved against the persons whose properties were subject of the WOS. Where the Rules of the PCGG instituted safeguards under Section 3, supra, by requiring the concurrent signatures of two Commissioners to every WOS issued and the existence of a prima facie case of ill gotten wealth to support the issuance, the non-compliance with either of the safeguards nullified the WOS thus issued. It is already settled that sequestration, due to its tendency to impede or limit the exercise of proprietary rights by private citizens, is construed strictly against the State, conformably with the legal maxim that statutes in derogation of common rights are generally strictly construed and rigidly confined to the cases clearly within their scope and purpose.[86] | |||||
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2011-04-12 |
BERSAMIN, J. |
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| On February 23, 2004, the Sandiganbayan issued an order,[32] in which it enumerated the admitted facts or facts that appeared to be without substantial controversy in relation to the Republic's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and/or for Partial Summary Judgment [Re: Defendants CIIF Companies, 14 Holding Companies and COCOFED, et al.]. | |||||
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2010-12-07 |
ABAD, J. |
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| In Bataan Shipyard & Engineering Co, Inc. v. PCGG,[13] the Court held that a prima facie factual foundation that the properties sequestered are "ill-gotten wealth" is required. The power to determine the existence of a prima facie case has been vested in the PCGG as an incident to its investigatory powers. The two-commissioner rule is obviously intended to assure a collegial determination of such fact.[14] | |||||
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2010-07-09 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| The settled rule is that the filing of an amended pleading does not retroact to the date of the filing of the original; hence, the statute of limitation runs until the submission of the amendment.[22] It is true that, as an exception, this Court has held that an amendment which merely supplements and amplifies facts originally alleged in the complaint relates back to the date of the commencement of the action and is not barred by the statute of limitations which expired after the service of the original complaint.[23] The exception, however, would not apply to the party impleaded for the first time in the amended complaint.[24] | |||||
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2008-09-26 |
REYES, R.T., J. |
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| The rule is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that the interpretation given to a rule or regulation by those charged with its execution is entitled to the greatest weight by the courts construing such rule or regulation.[74] While this Court has consistently yielded and accorded great respect to such doctrine, it will not hesitate to set aside an executive interpretation if there is an error of law, abuse of power, lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with the letter and spirit of the law.[75] | |||||
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2006-07-21 |
VELASCO, JR., J. |
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| An amount subtracted from an individual's or entity's tax liability to arrive at the total tax liability. A tax credit reduces the taxpayer's liability x x x, compared to a deduction which reduces taxable income upon which the tax liability is calculated. A credit differs from deduction to the extent that the former is subtracted from the tax while the latter is subtracted from income before the tax is computed.[16] The interpretation of an administrative government agency, which is tasked to implement the statute, is accorded great respect and ordinarily controls the construction of the courts.[17] Be that as it may, the definition laid down in the questioned Revenue Regulations can still be subjected to scrutiny. Courts will not hesitate to set aside an executive interpretation when it is clearly erroneous. There is no need for interpretation when there is no ambiguity in the rule, or when the language or words used are clear and plain or readily understandable to an ordinary reader.[18] The definition of the term "tax credit" is plain and clear, and the attempt of Revenue Regulations No. 2-94 to define it differently is the root of the conflict. | |||||
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2005-08-03 |
TINGA, J. |
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| The Separate Opinion notes that notwithstanding above, the Secretary of Department of Transportation and Communication may review the findings of the CAB, the Agriculture Secretary may review those of the PCA, and that the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources may pass upon decisions of the Mines and Geosciences Board.[75] These three officers may be alter egos of the President, yet their authority to review is limited to those agencies or bureaus which are, pursuant to statutes such as the Administrative Code of 1987, under the administrative control and supervision of their respective departments. Thus, under the express provision of the Administrative Code expressly provides that the CAB is an attached agency of the DOTC[76], and that the PCA is an attached agency of the Department of Agriculture.[77] The same law establishes the Mines and Geo-Sciences Bureau as one of the Sectoral Staff Bureaus[78] that forms part of the organizational structure of the DENR.[79] | |||||
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2004-06-15 |
TINGA, J. |
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| FDC argues that the November 27, 2003 Order of the ERC is void for having been issued without legal or statutory authority. It also contends that Rule 3, Section 4(e) of the Implementing Rules of the EPIRA is unconstitutional for being an undue delegation of legislative power. FDC further asserts that the November 27, 2003 Order is void for having been issued by the ERC with grave abuse of discretion and manifest bias. In support of its prayer for the issuance of injunctive relief, FDC claims that the implementation by MERALCO of the provisional rate increase will result in irreparable prejudice to FDC and others similarly situated unless the Court restrains such implementation.[14] | |||||