This case has been cited 8 times or more.
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2015-08-17 |
PERALTA, J. |
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| There are three essential requisites to admit evidence as part of the res gestae, namely: (1) that the principal act, the res gestae be a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood; and (3) that the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediate attending circumstances.[48] | |||||
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2014-11-26 |
REYES, J. |
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| There are then three essential requisites to admit evidence as part of the res gestae, namely: (1) that the principal act, the res gestae, be a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood; and (3) that the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediate attending circumstances.[34] | |||||
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2014-11-10 |
BRION, J. |
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| This constitutional mandate is identical with the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. The Fourth Amendment traces its origins to the writings of Sir Edward Coke[24] and The Great Charter of the Liberties of England (Magna Carta Libertatum), sealed under oath by King John on the bank of the River Thames near Windsor, England on June 15, 1215.[25] The Magna Carta Libertatum limited the King of England's powers and required the Crown to proclaim certain liberties[26] under the feudal vassals' threat of civil war.[27] The declarations in Chapter 29 of the Magna Carta Libertatum later became the foundational component of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.[28] It provides: No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseised[29] of his Freehold, or Liberties, or free Customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any otherwise destroyed; nor will we not pass upon him, nor condemn him, but by lawful Judgment of his Peers, or by the Law of the Land, We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either Justice or Right.[30] [Emphasis supplied] | |||||
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2013-11-20 |
BRION, J. |
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| The records show that not one of the complainants actually witnessed the transfer of money from Alingasa to Erederos and Mendoza. Nowhere in their affidavits did they specifically allege that they saw Alingasa remit the collections to Erederos. In fact, there is no specific allegation that they saw or witnessed Erederos or Mendoza receive money. That the complainants alleged in the preface of their affidavits that they "noticed and witnessed" the anomalous act complained of does not take their statements out of the coverage of the hearsay evidence rule. Their testimonies are still "evidence not of what the witness knows himself but of what he has heard from others."[29] Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence.[30] | |||||
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2006-08-31 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| True, petitioner's statements may be considered as independently relevant statements and may be admissible not as to the veracity thereof but to the fact that they had been thus uttered.[19] However, the admissibility of his testimony to such effect should not be equated with its weight and sufficiency.[20] Admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and competence, while the weight of evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its tendency to convince and persuade.[21] In this case, both the RTC and the CA refused to give credence to petitioner's testimony, and the Court finds no reason to doubt the assessments made by both courts. Even assuming that his wife, indeed, told him that payments were made on these dates, still, it does not follow that it is sufficient proof to establish his claim of overpayment. These should be weighed vis-à-vis the other evidence on record, which, as appraised by the RTC and the CA, do not support petitioner's claim. | |||||
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2006-01-27 |
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. |
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| Furthermore, admissibility of evidence should not be equated with its weight and sufficiency.[23] Admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and competence, while the weight of evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its tendency to convince and persuade.[24] Even assuming that the declaration of the bystanders that it was the members of the CPP/NPA who caused the fire may be admitted as evidence, it does not follow that such declarations are sufficient proof. These declarations should be calibrated vis-á-vis the other evidence on record. And the trial court aptly noted that there is a need for additional convincing proof, viz.:The Court finds the foregoing to be insufficient to establish that the cause of the fire was the intentional burning of the radio facilities by the rebels or an act of insurrection, rebellion or usurped power. Evidence that persons who burned the radio facilities shouted "Mabuhay ang NPA"does not furnish logical conclusion that they are member [sic] of the NPA or that their act was an act of rebellion or insurrection. Additional convincing proof need be submitted. Defendants failed to discharge their responsibility to present adequate proof that the loss was due to a risk excluded.[25] While the documentary evidence presented by petitioner, i.e., (1) the police blotter; (2) the certification from the Bacolod Police Station; and (3) the Fire Investigation Report may be considered exceptions to the hearsay rule, being entries in official records, nevertheless, as noted by the CA, none of these documents categorically stated that the perpetrators were members of the CPP/NPA.[26] Rather, it was stated in the police blotter that: "a group of persons accompanied by one (1) woman all believed to be CPP/NPA "more or less 20 persons suspected to be CPP/NPA,"[27] while the certification from the Bacolod Police station stated that "... some 20 or more armed men believed to be members of the New People's Army NPA,"[28] and the fire investigation report concluded that "(I)t is therefore believed by this Investigating Team that the cause of the fire is intentional, and the armed men suspected to be members of the CPP/NPA where (sic) the ones responsible ..."[29] All these documents show that indeed, the "suspected" executor of the fire were believed to be members of the CPP/NPA. But suspicion alone is not sufficient, preponderance of evidence being the quantum of proof. | |||||
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2003-06-23 |
QUISUMBING, J. |
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| Res gestae refers to statements made by the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or after the commission of the crime.[48] Such statements are a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion without any opportunity for the declarant to fabricate a false statement.[49] The rule in res gestae applies when the testimony of the witness who heard the declarant complies with the following requisites: (1) that the principal act, the res gestae, be a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood; and (3) that the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediate attending circumstances.[50] | |||||
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2003-05-09 |
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. |
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| Under Rule 130, Section 36 of the Rules of Court, a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his own personal knowledge, i.e., which are derived from his own perception; otherwise, such testimony would be hearsay. Hearsay evidence is defined as "evidence not of what the witness knows himself but of what he has heard from others."[10] The hearsay rule bars the testimony of a witness who merely recites what someone else has told him, whether orally or in writing.[11] In Sanvicente v. People,[12] we held that when evidence is based on what was supposedly told the witness, the same is without any evidentiary weight for being patently hearsay. Familiar and fundamental is the rule that hearsay testimony is inadmissible as evidence.[13] | |||||